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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This appeal is taken by Appellant Mobile Echocardiography, Inc. 
("Appellant" or "MEI") from orders and judgments of the Fourth District Court, 
Utah County, Utah. The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction of this appeal 
pursuant to Utah Code § 78-2a-3(2Vi). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW3 and the rule of 
law commonly known as nemo dat qui non habet ("he who hath not cannot 
give"), see Black's Law Dictionary 1037 (6th ed. 1990), requires that a debtor 
cannot give more as a security interest than the debtor owns. This is a question 
of law, upon which this Court shows the trial court no deference. See C&Y Corp. 
v. General Biometrics, Inc., 896 P.2d 47, 54 (Utah App. 1995) (addressing "the 
Correctness of the trial court's selection and statement of applicable law."); State 
v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 936 (Utah 1994) ("appellate review of a trial court's 
determination of the law is . . . 'correctness'"). 
Second Issue: Whether the trial court properly applied Utah Code § 70A-
9a-203 and the rule of nemo dat qui non habet. Where - as here - the issue is 
one of the intent of parties to an agreement, and where the parties' testimony as 
to their intent is consistent, the trial court's discretion is limited and the trial 
court's decision should be reviewed for correctness. See, e.g., Baladevon. Inc. 
v. Abbott Laboratories, Inc., 871 F.Supp. 89, 98 (P. Mass.1994) (discussing rule 
of law that "the undisputed evidence as to both the contracting parties' subiective 
intent controls the interpretation of the ambiguous contract terms . . . " ) 
(emphasis added); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 
201(1) ("Where the parties have attached the same meaning to a promise or 
agreement or a term thereof, it is interpreted in accordance with that meaning."). 
In addition, the core challenge is not that the court's findings of fact are all 
necessarily wrong, but rather that the application of the facts to the law was 
incorrect. See Jones v. Barlow, 2007 UT 20, If 10, 154 P.3d 808 ("noting that the 
appellate courts give minimal discretion to the district court in its application of 
the facts to the law.") (citations omitted). 
PRESERVATION OF ISSUES 
The issues at bar were preserved below by papers and presentation of 
evidence at the February 6, 2009 trial/hearing: (1) Motion for Release of Funds 
From Registry of Court to Mobile Echocardiography, Inc. [R. 003396 (motion), 
003392 (memo), 003521 (reply)]; (2) Notice of Filing of Affidavit of Keith L. Barton 
[R. 003984]; (3) May 5, 2008 Hearing [R. 006535]; (4) Pretrial Brief of Mobile 
Echocardiography, Inc. [R. 004823]; (5) February 6, 2009 Hearing [R. 006536]; 
(6) Closing Arguments of Mobile Echocardiography, Inc. [R. 004996]; and (7) 
Motion to Reconsider March 4, 2009 Order and Request to Certify Order Under 
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b) [R. 005429 (motion), 005530 (memo), 005830 
(reply)]. Preservation of the issues for appeal is also reflected at least in part in 
the trial court's two orders, a March 4, 2009 decision styled "Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law and Order Regarding Interpleading Funds" (the "March 
2 
Order");1 and ii) a July 23, 2009 decision styled "Order Denying MEI's Motion to 
Reconsider and Granting MEI's Motion for Certification as a Final Order" (the 
"July Order").2 [See R. 00522 & 006073]. 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES 
The central rule of law in this appeal is in Utah Code Ann. § 70A-9a-203, 
which provides that a security interest can attach to collateral "only if the debtor 
has rights in the collateral." Utah Code Ann. § 70A-9a-203 (emphasis added). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
I. NATURE OF THE CASE 
In a broad sense, this case is about whether a secured creditor can make 
a claim to money in which the debtor which gave the security interest never had 
any ownership in the first place. See, e.g.. Utah Code Ann. § 70A-9a-203 
(requiring that "a security interest is enforceable against the debtor and third 
parties with respect to the collateral only if... the debtor has rights in the 
collateral...") (emphasis added). This basic principle of commercial law is 
sometimes referenced as nemo dat qui non habet ("he who hath not cannot 
give"). See Black's Law Dictionary 1037 (6th ed. 1990). 
More specifically, this case is an appeal by MEI of the trial court's order 
dispersing certain funds (the "Escrow Funds") deposited into the registry of the 
1
 The March Order is attached as Addendum 1. 
2
 The July Order is attached as Addendum 2. 
^ 
Fourth District Court, to a purported secured party, Appellee DAT&K, LLC 
("Appellee" or "DAT&K") even though the undisputed evidence below - in fact 
stipulation of the parties - demonstrated that DAT&K could not have a security 
interest in the Escrow Funds because the debtor to DAT&K did not have any 
rights in the Escrow Funds to give. See, e.g.. First Commercial Corp. v. First 
National Bancorporation Inc., 572 F.Supp.1430, 1435 (Colo. 1983) (holding an 
unsecured supplier claiming an interest in retained funds took priority over 
lender's perfected security interest, because debtor never had rights to payments 
destined for supplier); Weld Colorado Bank v. E & E Construction, Inc., 653 P.2d 
758, 760 (Colo. Ct. App. 1982) (bank's security interest did not attach to 
escrowed funds because the debtor, a defaulting contractor, did not have any 
rights to the escrowed funds, which were paid for materials). 
Because the debtor did not have an interest in the Escrow Funds under 
Utah Code § 70A-9a-203, the only possible exceptions by which DAT&K might 
intercept the Escrow Funds designated for MEI was under i) a "reimbursement 
theory"; or ii) a "waiver theory." However, there was literally no evidence 
presented below to support application of either, and thus the trial court's award 
of the Escrow Funds to DAT&K was erroneous. 
II. COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS AND DISPOSITION BELOW 
The instant dispute was addressed in the context of a larger proceeding, to 
wit, the judicial dissolution of the Gregory Barton & Swapp, P.C. ("GBS") law firm, 
once famous for the catchy phrase used by its then-spokesperson Keith Barton, 
4 
that clients need only make "One Call, That's All!". [See Petition for Judicial 
Dissolution of Gregory Barton & Swapp, P.C. (the "Dissolution Petition"), R. 
000014]. GBS was a personal injury law firm, handling (among others) 
automobile accident and products liability tort cases. [See Dissolution Petition, 
R. 000013-103]. After the Dissolution Petition was filed, a receiver was appointed 
(the "Receiver"), and both secured and unsecured parties, with claims against 
GBS, filed and submitted claims. [See Memo. Supp. Appointment of Receiver, 
R. 000023]; [See Receivership Order, R. 000207-195]. 
During the dissolution proceedings, a dispute arose between Appellee 
DAT&K, LLC ("Appellee" or "DAT&K"), a secured creditor of GBS, and Appellant 
Mobile Echocardiography, Inc. ("MEI"). The trial court issued two orders in 
relation to the dispute, i.e., the March Order and the July Order. [See R. 00522 & 
006073]. This appeal followed. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Although the core challenge is to the trial court's application of the facts to 
the law, MEI recognizes the possible application of the marshalling requirements 
to this case. Thus, the following facts are marshalled and put in the light most 
favorable to DAT&K. But, it is important to note that with regard to the 
3
 The Record was numbered with the number "000001" on the first page of the 
trial court's file, and moving forward. As such, the numbering on pleadings and 
filings in the record are sometimes reported herein in reverse order, as this is the 
order in which the pages would be read in the document. [See, e.g., R. 00014-
00001, pages 1 to 14 of the Dissolution Petition]. 
e; 
agreements between MEI and GBS, DAT&K did not have any evidence to 
contradict the testimony from the only qualified parties - that of attorney Keith 
Barton (authorized agent of GBS) and Alan Fidler (President of MEI). 
I. BACKGROUND - THE GBS LAW FIRM AND FEN-PHEN CASES 
A. GBS and the Texas Firms 
Gregory, Barton & Swapp, P.C., i.e., "GBS" was a Utah law firm that 
specialized, in part, in the acquisition of mass tort cases, such as claims arising 
from the use of the pharmaceutical products, sometimes known as "Fen-Phen." 
[See March Order at 1, R. 005221]. GBS's mass tort cases, and in particular 
"Fen-Phen" cases, were generally referred to one of two Texas law firms, 
Williams Bailey Law Firm and Blizzard, McCarthy & Nabers, L.L.P. (collectively, 
the "Texas Firms"). [See March Order at 1, R. 005221]. 
The cases referred to the Texas Firms by GBS were contingency fee 
cases. Under the arrangement between GBS and the Texas Firms, clients paid 
individually allocated costs out of their portion (/'.e., the client portion) of the 
recovery. [See March Order at 3, R. 005220]; [See Fen-Phen Referral 
Agreement at 1, R. 004036 ("the fee agreements with the clients are on a 40% 
contingency basis plus reimbursement of costs and expenses (which are 
deducted from the client's portion of the recovery))].4 As between the law firms, 
4
 This document, and others, were stipulated as admissible for the May 2008 
argument and February 6, 2009 trial/evidentiary hearing. [See Stipulation for 
Admissibility of Documents, R. 004106, 004036]. 
6 
GBS was entitled to a portion (33.3%) of only the attorney fees arising from the 
referred cases. To state the obvious, neither Texas nor GBS were entitled to, or 
had any interest in, the clients' portion of the settlements. [See Fen-Phen 
Referral Agreement at 1, R. 004036]; [See 2-6-09 Trans, at 19-21, 32-34, 87-88 
R. 006536].5 
B. MEI's Services to the GBS Law Firm 
As indicated by the name of the company, "Mobile Echocardiography, 
Inc.," MEI provides "mobile" cardiac ultrasound screenings for use by physicians 
and other healthcare professionals. [See March Order at 2, R. 005221]; [See 
MEI-GBS Echo Agreement, R. 004039]; [See 2-6-09 Trans, at 7-8, 102-103, R. 
006536]. In November 2000, GBS and attorney Keith Barton entered into an 
agreement with MEI, by which MEI would provide cardiac ultrasound screenings 
for potential and actual clients of GBS and the Texas Firms, for use in the Fen-
Phen litigation. [See March Order at 2, R. 005221]; [See MEI-GBS Echo 
Agreement, R. 004039]; [See 2-6-09 Trans, at 7-8, 102-106, R. 006536]. 
In general, MEI provided two types of echocardiogram services: an "Initial 
Screening" and a "Full Study." An Initial Screening is a short procedure, which is 
not recorded, whereby the echocardiogram technician reviews the potential 
client's heart, to determine if the potential client had heart valve damage 
indicating a possibly viable Fen-Phen claim. If the Initial Screening was 
5
 A condensed copy of the February 6, 2009 Transcript is attached as Addendum 
3, for the Court's convenience. 
7 
"positive," then the law firm would "sign up" the client, including by having the 
client execute the documents described in the next section, and have the client 
return at a later date for the "Full Study." [See MEI-GBS Echo Agreement, R. 
004039]; [See 2-6-09 Trans, at 106-107,19-122]. 
MEI provided Initial Screenings at an agreed-upon price of a few hundred 
dollars, which was to be paid by GBS on a monthly basis, and provided the Full 
Study echocardiograms under an agreement that MEI would be paid $1,850 for 
each Full Study, at the time the client's case was settled. [See MEI-GBS Echo 
Agreement, R. 004039]; [See 2-6-09 Trans, at 106-107,19-122]. 
C. The GBS Client Contingency Fee Agreements, the MEI 
Screening Forms, and the Lien Agreements 
As part of GBS's client retention policies, every client signed a 
"Contingency Fee Agreement." Under these agreements, the clients agreed to 
pay from the client's portion of their Fen-Phen settlements certain "costs" related 
to their case: 
(b) I (we) will incur various costs and expenses in performing legal 
services under this Agreement. You agree to pay for all costs, 
disbursements, and expensefsl owed by vou in connection with this 
matter, or which have been paid or advanced by me (us) on your 
behalf and for which [you] have not previously paid or reimbursed to 
me (us), if I (we) reach a settlement or judgment on your behalf, or if 
our services are terminated for any reason by you. 
[Contingency Fee Agreement (emphasis added), R. 004040]. 
Unchallenged testimony below established that when a client appeared at 
GBS for an Initial Screening, every client was required to complete an "MEI 
8 
Screening Form" and a "Lien Agreement," or else no Full Study echocardiogram 
would have been performed by MEI. [See 2-6-09 Trans, at 16-18, 21-22, 121-
122, R. 006536]. Both of these documents gave MEI a lien that was superior to 
that now claimed by DAT&K. The MEI Screening Form makes clear that the 
client understood that they were going to pay MEI directly from their portion of 
the settlement, and provided as follows: 
In the event my screening is positive and I choose to go forward with 
a full workup, the cost of the full workup will be deducted from my 
total settlement as related to my fen-phen claim. In the event my 
screening does not meet FDA criteria for an individual claim, the cost 
of my echocardiogram will not be charged to me. A photocopy of 
this agreement is to be considered as valid as an original. 
[Screening Form (emphasis added), R. 004804]; [See also 2-6-9 Transcript 
at 10-13, R. 006536]. 
The Lien Agreement confirms that the client gives a Hen in favor of MEI, as 
follows:6 
I hereby authorize and direct you, GREGORY, BARTON & SWAPP, 
P.C. my attorneys, to pay directly after settlement or trial such sums 
as may be outstanding for goods and services rendered, plus any 
accumulated interest to date of settlement, and to withhold such 
6
 The trial court excluded the Lien Agreements from admissibility [See 2-6-09 
Trans, at 24, R. 006536]. That ruling was in error, because Barton's testimony 
was clear, unequivocal, and unchallenged: every client that received an MEI Full 
Study Echocardiogram signed one of these agreements. [See Barton Aff. ^ 7-8, 
R. 003979]; [See 2-6-09 Trans, at 21-22, 26-27, 53-54, 82-83, 88, 120-122, R. 
006536]. The exact same facts supported the admission of the Contingency Fee 
Contract, which DAT&K and the trial court accepted as admissible and controlling 
evidence as to the terms of the agreements with GBS's clients. Simply put, the 
only evidence is that one would not be submitted without the other, so if the 
Contingency Fee Agreement was admissible, so to was the Lien Agreement. 
Q 
sums from any settlement as may be necessary to adequately 
protect said provider. I further give a lien on my case to said 
provider of services against any and all proceeds to any settlement, 
judgment, or verdict which may be paid to my attorney or me as the 
result of my injuries for which I have been treated or injuries in 
connection therewith. 
[Lien Agreement (emphasis added), R. 004803]; [See Barton Aff. 1f 8, R. 003979, 
003972]. As further explained by Barton to the trial court, in the Lien Agreement 
and Contingency Fee Contract, the clients expressly acknowledged their 
personal liability to pay for litigation costs and services, such as those provided 
by MEI, and expressly gave a lien on any settlement proceeds they may obtain in 
favor of any provider of services, which would include MEI, in order to pay any 
outstanding sums for goods and services rendered on the client's behalf directly 
from the settlement proceeds. The disputed funds were withheld from the clients 
pursuant to these contractual obligations . . . the intent of GBS in entering into 
the Lien Agreements, that such liens granted by the clients attached before any 
arguable lien could have attached in favor of DAT&K." [Barton Aff. fl 8 (emphasis 
added), R. 003979];7 [See 2-6-09 Trans, at 21-22, 26-27, 53-54, 82-83, 88, 120-
122, R. 006536]. 
7
 The Court declined to consider Barton's affidavit at the May 8, 2008 hearing, 
because MEI had not been able to obtain the affidavit and submit it sufficiently in 
advance of the hearing. [See 5-8-08 Transcript at 13-14, R. 006535]. DAT&K 
subsequently had the affidavit for nearly a year, and also had the opportunity to 
depose Barton, which deposition testimony re-affirmed the statements in his 
affidavit. [See 5-8-08 Transcript at 14, R. 006535 ("THE COURT: . . . if this does 
go to an evidentiary hearing or something else, obviously, you'd be able to use 
Mr. Barton at that point.")]. 
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II. MEI'S LAWSUIT AND SETTLEMENT WITH GBS REGARDING ITS 
ECHOCARDIOGRAM SERVICES 
A. The MEI-GBS Lawsuit 
MEI provided echocardiography services to thousands of the GBS firms' 
Fen-Phen clients, pursuant to the written agreement. [See MEI-GBS Echo 
Agreement, R. 004039]; [See 2-6-09 Trans, at 7-9, 103-105, R. 006536]. In 
2004, After MEI had not been paid for some of these services MEI filed suit 
against GBS and Keith Barton personally. The lawsuit sought payments for a 
number of services rendered by MEI, including not just the Full Studies, but also 
monies owed for the Initial Screenings, monies paid by MEI out of its own pocket 
for cardiologist readings of certain echocardiograms, and other costs. [See 
March Order at 4, R. 005219]; [See 2-6-09 Trans, at 103-111, R. 006536]. 
B. The MEI-GBS Settlement Agreement - Payment for Initial 
Screenings and Other Costs, Excluding Full Studies 
In September, 2004, a settlement agreement was reached between MEI, 
GBS and the Texas Firms (the "MEI-GBS Settlement Agreement") [See MEI-
GBS Settlement Agreement, R. 004024]. Pursuant to this Agreement, $601,000 
was advanced by the Texas Firms as an initial payment to MEI. [See MEI-GBS 
Settlement Agreement at 3, R. 004022]. This payment was not, however, and 
advance payment for the costs that would be withheld from the client's portion of 
the settlements. Rather, the undisputed testimony below (and the related 
documents) was that the $601,000 payment was for other debts by GBS and 
Barton to MEI, including Initial Screenings, monies paid by MEI out of its own 
11 
pocket for cardiologist readings of certain echocardiograms, and other costs. In 
other words, there were no advances that could trigger a right by GBS to be 
reimbursed from the monies for Full Study echocardiograms, withheld from the 
client's portion of the settlements. [See 2-6-09 Trans, at 29-34, 37-38, 40-41, 79-
81, 87-93, 95, 104-111, 151-152, R. 006536]; [See Barton Aff. ffl[9-10, R-
003978]; [See Trial Ex. 20, R. 003969-003966]. 
C. The MEI-GBS Security Agreement 
Also part of the settlement, GBS gave MEI a security interest (the "MEI-
GBS Security Agreement") and a note (the "MEI Note"). [See MEI-GBS Security 
Agreement, R. 004071]; [See MEI Note, R. 004074]. The MEI-GBS Security 
Agreement acknowledged that DAT&K had a prior-in-time security agreement 
with GBS, in the attorney fees due to GBS from the Fen-Phen cases. [See MEI-
GBS Security Agreement at 4, R. 004068]. 
III. THE MEI-DAT&K DISPUTE AND THE INTERIM ESCROW AGREEMENT 
In approximately the Summer of 2006, the Texas Firms settled a large 
number of the Fen-Phen cases. As part of this process, the Texas Firms 
withheld $1,070,517.16 from the client's portion of the settlement recoveries, as 
repayment of the MEI echocardiogram costs, at a rate of about $953 per 
echocardiogram. In other words, the $1,070,517.16 was reflected as a cost 
charged to the client in addition to (and separate from) the contingency fee paid 
8
 Again, there was simply no testimony to the contrary, as was admitted by 
DAT&K's witness, the Receiver. [See 2-6-09 Trans, at 187-188, R. 006536]. 
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by the client as an attorney fee. The "Escrow Funds" at issue in this case 
originated with this $1,070,517.16. [See Escrow Agreement at 8-9, R. 004005-
004004]. The origin of these funds, designated the "Echocardiogram Fee," and 
the applicability of DAT&K's security interest, is reflected as follows: 
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clients to MEI, but rather were processed through the trust accounts of the Texas 
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[See Escrow Agreement at 8-9, R. 004005-004004]; [See July Order at 1 ( " . . . 
the Court finds the funds care from the 60% of the recovery attributed to the 
client's amount."), R. 006073]; [See 2-6-09 Trans, at 31-32, 42, R. 006536]. 
Despite the fact that the withheld monies were costs withheld from the 
clients' portion of recoveries, DAT&K asserted that it was entitled to a portion of 
such monies, in particular 50% of certain monies. DAT&K acknowledged that 
under its theory of the case, the other 50% would (if the theory was correct) go to 
the Texas Firms. [See Escrow Agreement at 1-3, 7-10, R. 004009-004003]. In 
an effort to resolve this dispute, the Texas Firms and DAT&K entered into an 
interim agreement that, among other things, provided for the deposit of certain 
funds into escrow (the "Escrow Agreement"), subject to the presentation of 
evidence to the trial court. In substance, this agreement did the following: 
a. An undisputed $97,006.94 would be paid to MEI. 
b. Since the Texas Firms believed that the monies collected from 
the clients for MEI costs were properly payable to MEI, and 
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assuming that DAT&K's argument were correct that they were 
entitled to fifty percent, the Texas Firms paid 'their' portion of the 
withheld costs (i.e., fifty percent (50%)) to MEI, in the amount of 
$442,768.03. 
c. The remaining fifty percent ($442,768.03, plus accrued 
interest) became the "Escrow Funds," and were placed into the 
Court's registry for determination as to whom it should be paid. 
[See Escrow Agreement at 1-3, 7-18, R. 004009-004003]. 
IV. THE PROCEEDINGS BELOW, RESULTING IN THE TRIAL COURT'S 
MARCH ORDER AND JULY ORDER 
The sole issue below in relation to the Escrow Funds was whether the 
Escrow Funds were monies properly due to GBS (and thus subject to the 
security interest of DAT&K) or were client costs, withheld from the client's portion 
of the Fen-Phen settlements (to which DAT&K's security interest could not 
attach) and were payable to MEI. 
A. The May 2008 Hearing 
Both MEI and DAT&K believed that the trial court could decide the issue 
based on the undisputed facts leading up to the deposit of the Escrow Funds, 
and thus the parties agreed to simply submit briefing and argue the proper 
disposition of the Escrow Funds at a motion hearing. [See Motion for Release of 
Funds From Registry of Court to Mobile Echocardiography, Inc. [R. 003396 
(motion), 003392 (memo), 003521 (reply)]; [See also 5-5-08 Transcript [R. 
006535]. 
At the conclusion of the May 2008 hearing, the trial court ruled that the 
agreements were ambiguous, and therefore an evidentiary hearing was required, 
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so that the Court could consider extrinsic evidence of the intent of the parties to 
the relevant agreements, GBS and MEI (and possibly the Texas Firms). [R. [See 
5-5-08 Transcript at 57-58 ("I can't determine that as a matter of law based on 
these documents . . . . " ) , R. 006535]. The trial court ordered that discovery could 
be had, in order to ascertain the intent of GBS and MEI in the agreements. [5-5-
08 Transcript at 16-17, 58-59, R. 006535]. 
B. The February 6, 2009 Evidentiary Hearing 
After depositions of Keith Barton and Alan Fidler, on February 6, 2009, the 
trial court held an evidentiary hearing. As to the meaning of various agreements 
between GBS and MEI (and the Texas firms), the only testimony was offered 
GBS's Keith Barton and MEI's Alan Fidler. [See 2-6-09 Trans., R. 006536]. 
C. The March Order 
In March 2009, the trial court issued what became its first order on the 
disposition of the Escrow Funds. This March Order reached the correct 
conclusion as to where the money should go - it depends on where it came from: 
The issue is resolved by determining whose money it is. If it is the 
clients' 60%, those clients can direct the sum go to MEI and Barton 
was their agent for that purpose. If the funds are GBS's 40%. 
DAT&K's security interest gives the money to DAT&K. 
[March Order at 8, R. 005215 (emphasis added)]. Similarly, the trial court 
emphasized the importance of the source of the Escrow Funds by noting the 
significance of its concern that there was a lack of "direct evidence from the 
Texas Firms showing whether the escrowed funds originated from the clients' 
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60% of the settlement proceeds from the lawyers' 40%, or some combination." 
[March Order at 6, R. 005217 (emphasis added)].9 In fact, many of the findings 
of fact in the July Order focused on the source of the Escow Funds (i.e., from 
client's portion of Fen-Phen settlements, or from contingency fees), an 
acknowledgement of the determinative nature of this issue. [See March Order, 
Findings, fflf 4, 5, 6, 8, 10, 14, 17, R. 005222-005216]. For example, the March 
Order notes that "DAT&K's secured interest did not reach the clients' portion of 
settlements unless part or all of the portion went to GBS as either a 
reimbursement for advanced costs or as some other form of income." [March 
Order 1f 6, R. 005220]. The March Order thus correctly established and made 
the findings of fact that the source of the Escrow Funds is determinative. 
However, the Order was mistaken in the respect that i) it approached the 
issue as if there was an actual dispute as to the origin of the Escrow Funds 
(which there was not); and ii) the trial court incorrectly concluded that the Escrow 
Agreement (which the trial court called a "settlement agreement") constituted an 
9
 As noted elsewhere, the trial court made a critical mistake in ignoring the 
undisputed fact that the Escrow Funds originated from the client's portion of the 
settlements, noting for example in the March Order that "one of the Texas firms 
(Williams Bailey) paid $442,768.03 into escrow with the Court but there is no 
competent evidence that amount came from the client's portion of the 
settlement." [March Order at 5 (emphasis added), R. 005218]. Part of the trial 
court's confusion was no doubt caused by DAT&K's initial, and overly simplistic 
argument that its security interest attached to Escrow Funds because these 
funds were contingency fees belonging to GBS. [See Memorandum in Support 
of Motion of DAT&K, LLC for Order Releasing Funds Held by Clerk in Registry at 
9-10, R. 003294-003293]. 
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accounting by the Texas Firms as to the origin of the Escrow Funds. In 
particular, the March Order (incorrectly) explained: 
The Texas firms, it is true, paid the half of the funds they retained to 
MEI. This could indicate an acknowledgment MEI was due the other 
half now held in escrow because that amount was client money. If it 
was not, the Texas Firms would not have paid their half to MEI. 
However, a statement in the Settlement Agreement indicates that is 
not the case: "Once [the Texas Firms] pay[] $97,006.94 to MEI, MEI 
will have been paid $1,070,517.16, which equals the full amount 
withheld as MEI echocardiograph charges from Fen-Phen Clients' 
settlements." (Emphasis added.) This statement appears to be the 
salient acknowledgment that the deposited funds were not client 
funds because the full amount of client funds had already been paid 
to MEI. 
[March Order at 11-12, R. 005212 - 005211 (emphasis added)]. 
Based upon this reasoning, the March Order next incorrectly concluded 
that the Escrow Funds did not come from the clients' portion of the Fen-Phen 
settlements, and therefore belonged to DAT&K: 
The Court concludes by a preponderance of evidence the 
Settlement Agreement language reflects the Texas Firms' 
accounting. Since no other client funds were being held to pay MEI 
the remaining amount from which the $442,768.03 was taken, that 
sum did not come from the clients' 60%. . . . Since the parties 
presented no direct evidence of the Texas Firms' accounting, and 
since the Settlement Agreement signed off by the Texas Firms is the 
most persuasive evidence of their accounting of settlement 
proceeds, the Court concludes the Texas firm accounting directs that 
the $442,768.03 escrowed amount is not client funds and DAT&K's 
prior security interest attaches to them. 
[March Order at 12, R. 005211 (emphasis added)]. 
D. MEI's Motion for Reconsideration 
Simply put, the trial court's March Order was absolutely correct in its 
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conclusion that if the Escrow Funds originated from the client's portion of the 
Fen-Phen settlements, then they belonged to MEI. [See March Order at 6, 8, R. 
005215, 005217]. The trial court's order was absolutely Incorrect in its 
conclusion the Escrow Funds were not from the client's portion of the Fen-Phen 
settlements. [See March Order at 12, R. 005211]. Accordingly, MEI was forced 
to file a motion for reconsideration.10 [See Motion to Reconsider March 4, 2009 
Order and Request to Certify Order Under Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b), 
[See R. 005429 (motion, 005530 (memo), 005830 (reply)]. 
E. The July Order 
The trial court was presented with the flaws in its reasoning, in particular its 
mistaken conclusion that the Escrow Funds were not from the clients' portion of 
the Fen-Phen settlements, through MEI's motion to reconsider. [See 
Reconsideration Memo., R. 005530-005430]. 
In its July Order, the trial court recognized and conceded its mistake, 
noting that "MEI is correct on this point in that having now reviewed the 
hearing transcript, the Court finds the funds came from the 60% of the 
recovery attributed to the clients' account. The parties stipulated to this 
fact and the Court amends its finding accordingly to reflect the stipulation." 
10
 In the March Order trial court bent over backwards to criticize MEI's 
presentation of the evidence, and to ignore the undisputed testimony. A 
summary of the flaws in the trial court's reasoning is in MEI's memorandum in 
support of its reconsideration motion (the "Reconsideration Memo."). [See 
Reconsideration Memo., R. 005530-005430]. 
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[July Order at 1 (emphasis added), R. 006073]. 
However, the July Order still distributed the Escrow Funds to DAT&K, even 
in the face of the new finding that these funds came from the client's portion of 
the Fen-Phen settlements. While the trial court's "analysis" is not a model of 
clarity, it appears that the trial court may have been relying upon a finding that 
the Escrow Funds belonged to GBS under a "reimbursement" theory, or under a 
"waiver" theory that MEI had agreed to subordinate its rights to DAT&K.11 
Strangely, the July Order also continued to rely upon the "accounting" by the 
Texas Firms, as purportedly reflected in the Escrow Agreement - even though 
the Escrow Agreement was clearly not an accounting, and even though the trial 
court admitted that its earlier conclusion that the "accounting" in the Escrow 
Agreement showed the monies were not from client funds, was wrong. The 
relevant portion of the July Order follows: 
As stated in the [March] Order, the funds may be from the 
client's 60% but still allocated to go elsewhere, such as to reimburse 
Mr. Barton's firm or to pay for the firm's obligations from which it was 
holding its clients harmless under the contingent fee agreements. 
The Court's findings indicate MEI had no privity with any contract 
that would give it a direct right of action against the clients and Mr. 
Barton's firm assumed liability for ECG costs incurred by MEI. 
Further, it is evident the disputed funds were not headed for the 
pockets of the Mr. Barton's Phen-Fen clients. The accounting 
evidence stated in the various agreements involving the Texas Firms 
is important and designated the funds' final intended resting place. 
This evidence was the basis for the Court's [March] [0]rder, as 
11
 To the extent the trial court was relying upon some other exception to the rule 
of nemo dat qui non habet, no such theory was ever advanced by DAT&K, nor 
identified by the trial court. 
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argued concisely by DAT&K. No party presented competent 
evidence, including Mr. Barton's understanding, of a strength 
necessary to contradict the accounting specified in the Settlement 
Agreement and other corroborative facts found by the Court. While 
admissible, a party's understanding!12] is neither binding nor 
The trial court's acknowledgement in its July Order of the testimony by Keith 
Barton and Alan Fidler, including testimony based on their "understanding," was 
another reversal of the trial court's prior ruling. In particular, in the earlier March 
Order, the trial court went to great lengths to discount Barton's testimony (which 
was the only testimony about the source of the Escrow Funds), and in particular 
to criticize use of the word "understanding" in the questions and answers. [See 
March Order at 10 and 12, R. 005213, 005211]. However, MEI pointed out in its 
motion for reconsideration that DAT&K had no contrary witnesses, and the 
Receiver also admitted he had no evidence or knowledge to contradict Barton's 
testimony. [See March Order at 9, R. 005214 (acknowledging that the "receiver 
repeatedly stated he had no first hand, or even second hand knowledge of the 
category into which the escrowed funds would fall - client funds, reimbursement 
for advanced costs, or attorney fees.")]. In addition, MEI pointed out that DAT&K 
and the Receiver both relied upon questions and testimony about the witnesses' 
"understanding," that DAT&K and the Receiver did not object to MEI's 
questioning, and that the case law allows this type of testimony. [See 
Reconsideration Memo, at 5, n. 2 and 3, R. 005526-23]. In fact, demonstrating 
the trial court's apparent devotion to making sure that DAT&K and the Receiver 
were victorious, even though the trial court later critiqued MEI's counsel for 
eliciting purportedly inadequate testimony based upon a witnesses 
"understanding," the trial court took the opposite position at the hearing, for the 
benefit of DAT&K: 
THE COURT: [To DAT&K counsel] You can ask what his — you 
could ask for his understanding on this. That's happened throughout 
this proceeding. So he can answer the Question. 
THE WITNESS: My understanding is that they have a right to legal 
and other services rendered and to be rendered for costs and 
expenses advanced. 
[2-6-09 Trans, at 66-67, R. 06536 (emphasis added)]. Similarly, DAT&K not only 
elicited other evidence relating to a witness' "understanding," but actually cross-
examined MEI's Alan Fidler with his deposition testimony as to his 
"understanding." [2-6-09 Trans, at 129, 134-135, 138, R. 006536]. Later on, the 
Court similarly allowed questioning by DAT&K, over MEI's objection: "THE 
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persuasive in this case given the second-hand knowledge enjoyed 
by Mr. Barton and the varying accounts of the MEI witness. 
Further, contrary to MEI's assumption, the Order was not 
based on a single sentence in the Settlement Agreement but 
incorporated findings based on financial data, agreements and other 
evidence. . . . 
The broad scope of DAT&K's security interest allowed it to 
attach to the funds as they went through GBS or its predecessor 
destined for someone other than the clients' personal bank 
accounts. As reflected by the Court's findings, the settlement 
agreement and other documents indicated the nature of the funds. 
[July Order at 1-2 (emphasis added), R. 006073-72]. 
MEI appeals the July Order, and any reliance by the July Order upon the 
faulty reasoning of the previous, March Order. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
There were only three possible grounds upon which the trial court could 
have awarded the Escrow Funds to DAT&K, none of which can apply in this 
case. 
First, if the Escrow Funds were monies in which GBS had a direct and 
immediate right, i.e., contingency attorney fees owing to GBS under the 
Contingency Fee Agreements, then DAT&K's security interest in those fees 
would trump any claim by MEI. However, the trial court reversed its initial finding, 
and ultimately found that the Escrow Funds were not from the contingency 
COURT: Well, the document speaks for itself. We've already covered that. 
We're just asking for his understanding." [2-6-09 Trans, at 144, R. 006536]. 
In short, the trial court was highly critical of MEI's case, but did not apply 
this criticism even handedly, or even to its own actions. 
2? 
attorney fees in which GBS had an interest, and in fact originated with the client's 
portion of the Fen-Phen settlements. [See July Order at 1, R. 006073]. This 
finding, which is not challenged by DAT&K on appeal and remains the law of the 
case, eliminates the first of the three possibilities, as a matter of law. 
Once it made its finding that the Escrow Funds originated from the client's 
portion of the Fen-Phen settlements, in which GBS did not have a direct right, the 
trial court could only award the Escrow Funds to DAT&K in contravention of 
Utah Code § 70A-9a-203 and the doctrine of nemo dat qui non habet, if one of 
two exceptions applied - either (ii) the Escrow Funds belonged to GBS under a 
"reimbursement" theory; or (iii) MEI waived or surrendered its claim to the Escrow 
Funds in favor of DAT&K.13 As to these two exceptions, the only evidence 
presented to the trial court - both before and at the February 6, 2009 hearing -
proved that the Escrow Funds could not belong to GBS as a reimbursement, and 
that MEI never waived its right to be paid by the clients. 
Accordingly, the Utah Court of Appeals should reverse the trial court's 
ruling, and order that the Escrow Funds should have been dispersed to MEI, and 
direct the trial court to take all action necessary to have DAT&K and the Receiver 
obtain the delivery and return of these funds (plus accrued interest) to MEI. 
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To understand the trial court's error, including its improper conclusions 
about the evidence, it is necessary to first discuss the applicable law, followed by 
a discussion of trial court's orders and the evidence. As explained infra, even 
applying the strict marshalling standard (which should not apply to the trial court's 
application of the facts to the law), the trial court must be reversed. 
I. THE APPLICABLE LAW REGARDING WHEN A SECURITY INTEREST 
CAN ATTACH 
A. The Law of Security Interests 
As noted, DAT&K did not contest below - and has not appealed - the basic 
rule of law applicable to this dispute, i.e., that a party with a security interest 
cannot gain more from a debtor than the debtor has to give. 
In particular, the Utah Uniform Commercial Code (the "UCC") governs 
security interests, such as that held by DAT&K and which gave rise to the instant 
dispute. Specifically, Utah Code Section 70A-9a-203, provides that a security 
interest can only attach to collateral in which the debtor giving the security 
interest has rights: 
(1) A security interest attaches to collateral when it becomes 
enforceable against the debtor with respect to the collateral, unless 
an agreement expressly postpones the time of attachment. 
(2) Except as otherwise provided in Subsections (3) through 
(9), a security interest is enforceable against the debtor and third 
parties with respect to the collateral only if. 
(a) value has been given; 
(b) the debtor has rights in the collateral or the power 
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to transfer rights in the collateral to a secured party; and 
(c) one of the following conditions is met: 
(i) the debtor has authenticated a security 
agreement that provides a description of the 
collateral . . .3 (emphasis added). 
This simple, but important, rule is sometimes referenced as the basic 
principle of commercial law, nemo dat qui non habet ("he who hath not cannot 
give"). See Black's Law Dictionary 1037 (6th ed. 1990). Stated otherwise, the 
security interest held by a creditor can only extend to the rights the debtor 
possesses in the subject property, and no further. The principal is so well 
established that none of the case law submitted by MEI to the trial court was 
challenged by DAT&K. [See Memorandum in Support of Motion for Release of 
Funds From Registry of Court to Mobile Echocardiography, Inc. and Opposition 
to Motion of DAT&K for Order Releasing Funds at 5-10, R. 003388 - 003383]. 
And, not surprisingly, the case law applying this rule of the law of security 
interests is legion. See, e.g., Fifth Third Bank v. Comark, Inc., 794 N.E.2d 433, 
51 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d 533 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003) (validity of security interest 
dependant on debtor having rights in collateral); Heinrichsdorff v. Raat, 655 P.2d 
860, 861-862 (Colo. Ct. App. 1982) (revising trial court's grant of summary 
judgment in favor of bank, because the debtor did not have any rights to the 
escrow funds); United Parcel Services, Inc. v. Weben Industries, Inc., 794 F.2d 
1005 (5th Cir. 1986) (reversing summary judgment to secured party, holding that 
monies in court escrow belonged to service / materials provider because debtor 
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had no right to these funds and therefore bank's perfected security interest could 
not attach); Himes v. Cameron County Construction Corp.. 444 A.2d 98 (Pa. 
1982) (secured lender could have no greater rights than possessed by the 
debtor, and since the disputed monies would have never belonged to the debtor, 
monies had to be paid to third parties that provided services to debtor); First 
Commercial Corp. v. First National Bancorporation Inc., 572 F.Supp.1430, 1435 
(Colo. 1983) (holding an unsecured supplier claiming an interest in retained 
funds takes priority over lender's perfected security interest in all present and 
future accounts receivable); Weld Colorado Bank v. E & E Construction, Inc., 
653 P.2d 758, 760 (Colo. Ct. APP. 1982) (bank's security interest did not attach 
to escrowed funds because defaulting contractor did not have a right to 
payment). 
With this law in mind, the next step in the analysis is to review the trial 
court's March Order and July Order. 
B. The March Order - The Trial Court's Initial, and Correct, 
Interpretation of the Law 
The Court's March Order implicitly adopted the correct rule of nemo dat qui 
non habet, by acknowledging as follows:14 
Frustratingly, the trial court's March Order and July Order did not discuss or 
cite to any applicable law. [See March Order, R. 006073]; [See July Order, R. 
005222]. However, given that MEI was the only party that discussed Utah Code 
§ 70A-9a-203 and the rule of nemo dat qui non habet, that DAT&K never 
challenged this law, that the trial court endorsed this rule of law at the May 2008 
hearing, and the trial court's March Order applied the rule, it is obvious that in at 
least the March Order, the trial court reached the correct conclusion as to the 
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The issue is resolved by determining whose money it is. If it is the 
clients' 60%, those clients can direct the sum go to MEI and Barton 
was their agent for that purpose. If the funds are GBS's 40%, 
DAT&K's security interest gives the money to DAT&K. 
[March Order at 8 (emphasis added), R. 005215]. The Court recognized the 
determinative importance of the source of the Escrow Funds by basing its March 
Order upon the (erroneous) conclusion that the Escrow Funds originated from 
the contingency fees in which GBS had an interest: 
. . . the Court concludes the Texas firm accounting directs that the 
$442,768.03 escrowed amount is not client funds and DAT&K's 
prior security interest attaches to them. 
[March Order at 12, R. 005211]. Thus, the trial court's March Order applied the 
correct rule of law, albeit based upon an incorrect factual conclusion, discussed 
in the next section. 
C. The Trial Court's July Order 
After issuance of the March Order, MEI asked the Court to reconsider its 
ruling as to the source of the Escrow Funds, based (among other things) upon 
the trial court's clear misunderstanding of the stipulated and undisputed facts as 
to the origin of the Escrow Funds. [See Reconsideration Memo., R. 005530-13]. 
In response to MEI's reconsideration motion, the trial court corrected itself. 
Specifically, on July 21, 2009, the trial court issued the July Order, in which it 
acknowledged its mistake, and made a specific finding that the escrow funds 
"came from the 60% of the recovery attributed to the clients' accounts" and 
applicable rule of law. Finally, DAT&K did not challenge or appeal the application 
of this rule. 
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that the "parties stipulated to this fact and the Court amends its findings 
accordingly to reflect the stipulation."15 [July Order at 1 (emphasis added), R. 
006073]. In that ruling, the trial court did not expressly reject its previous, implicit 
acceptance of the law of nemo dat qui non habet. [See July Order at 1 -2, R. 
0006073-72]. 
However, the trial court's finding in its second order of July 2009 that the 
Escrow Funds were from the client's portion of the Fen-Phen settlements 
requires as a matter of law that the Escrow Funds belong to MEI, unless one of 
two exceptions to the rule of nemo dat qui non habet apply. Thus, the trial 
court's conclusion that DAT&K should still be given the Escrow Funds maybe an 
indication that the trial court was reversing itself and rejecting the rule of law that 
a secured party cannot have a greater interest in collateral than that which the 
debtor held. To the extent the trial court reached such a conclusion, the trial 
court was in error, as a matter of law, and this Court should so rule, in order to 
clarify and make clear the record and the law of this state. 
II. THE "REIMBURSEMENT" AND "WAIVER" EXCEPTIONS TO THE 
DOCTRINE OF NEMO DAT QUI NON HABET DO NOT APPLY 
Given that the doctrine of nemo dat qui non habet, and the trial court's 
finding in its July Order that the Escrow Funds were from the client's portion of 
the Fen-Phen settlements, there are only two remaining possible scenarios under 
15
 Also notable, DAT&K has not challenged or appealed this finding by the trial 
court. 
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which GBS (and thus DAT&K) could have rights to the Escrow Funds superior to 
those of MEI: First, that GBS has some right to the Escrow Funds because GBS 
advanced monies owed by the clients to MEI for the Full Study 
echocardiograms.16 and therefore has a right to be reimbursed. Second, that 
MEI waived or surrendered its right to be paid directly from the clients, when it 
entered into the MEI-GBS Settlement Agreement and/or the Security Agreement. 
However, because the only evidence presented to the trial court 
established that neither of these happened, the trial court must be reversed. 
A. Where the Parties to Agreements Testify Consistently, the 
Intent of the Parties is Established As a Matter of Law 
As noted, the trial court concluded at the end of the May 5, 2008 hearing 
that there was a dispute of fact and the documents were ambiguous. The trial 
court later awarded DAT&K the escrow funds based upon the various 
agreements. [See July Order at 2, R. 006072 (referring to "the various 
agreements involving the Texas Firms," "the accounting specified in the 
Settlement Agreement," and "agreements and other evidence"). 
Where documents are ambiguous, the courts necessarily turn to extrinsic 
evidence to resolve the ambiguity. In particular, courts look to the intent of the 
parties: 
16
 As explained infra, not only did GBS not advance monies to MEI, but even 
those monies that were paid by the Texas Firm's were not advance monies for 
the Full Study echocardiograms, but rather were for past-due payments for Initial 
Screenings and other of MEI's claims in the MEI-GBS Lawsuit, and thus could 
not trigger the "reimbursement" exception to the rule of nemo dat qui non habet 
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U 17 The underlying purpose in construing or interpreting a 
contract is to ascertain the intentions of the parties to the contract. 
Peterson v. Coca-Cola USA, 2002 UT 42, H 9, 48 P.3d 941; SME 
Indus., Inc. v. Thompson. Ventulett, Stainback & Assocs., Inc., 2001 
UT 54, IT 14, 28 P.3d 669." 'In interpreting a contract, the intentions 
of the parties are controlling.'" Dixon v. Pro Image, Inc., 1999 UT 89, 
1T13, 987 P.2d48 (quoting Winegar v. Froerer Corp., 813 P.2d 104, 
108 (Utah 1991)); see also Peterson v. Sunrider Corp., 2002 UT 43, 
U18,48P.3d918.). 
In this case, the only evidence as to intent necessarily came from the 
parties to the relevant agreements - MEI and GBS. Under these circumstance, 
the trial court was obligated to interpret the agreements consistent with the intent 
of MEI and GBS: 
The leading modern authority suggests that - in the rare case 
where evidence shows the two parties to an agreement to have 
a common understanding of a disputed provision at the time of 
contracting - the Corbin-Restatement-subjectivist rule has prevailed. 
See 2 Famsworth on Contracts § 7.9, at p. 246 (1990) ("Such 
authority as there is supports giving effect to a common 
meaning shared by both parties in preference to an objective 
meaning"). For instance, the Third Circuit has held that where 
"there is no dispute between the contracting parties over the 
meaning of the terms, extrinsic evidence should [be considered] ... 
as providing an explanation of the parties' contractual 
understanding. Their harmonious recital of what these words 
mean is conclusive." Sunbury Textile Mills v. Comm'r, 585 F.2d 
1190, 1196 (3d Cir.1978); see also Berke Moore Co. v. Phoenix 
Bridge Co., 98 N.H. 261, 269, 98 A.2d 150, 156 (1953) (similar). . . . 
. . . the Court concludes that the undisputed evidence as to both 
the contracting parties' subjective intent controls the 
interpretation of the ambiguous contract terms. . . . ) (emphasis 
added); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 201(1) 
("Where the parties have attached the same meaning to a promise or agreement 
or a term thereof, it is interpreted in accordance with that meaning."). 
on 
Here, the only testimony as to the intent of the agreements was consistent 
- GBS did not advance funds to MEI for Full Study echocardiograms and MEI did 
not waive its right to be paid directly by the clients. 
B. The Only Evidence Below Proved that the "Reimbursement" 
Exception to the Rule of nemo dat qui non habet Did Not Apply 
1. The Trial Court May Have Relied Upon a "Reimbursement" 
Theory 
If the trial court's July Order was not a rejection of Utah Code Section 70A-
9a-203,17 then the next possible basis upon which DAT&K could assert a claim to 
the Escrow Funds would be if GBS had a claim to those funds as specific 
reimbursement for Full Study echocardiogram costs that GBS had already 
advanced on behalf of the clients. Indeed, at the conclusion of the May 5, 2008 
hearing, the trial court hinted that it thought the Contingency Fee Agreement 
might support such a conclusion. [See 5-5-08 Transcript at 57-58 ("THE COURT 
. . . it seems like the contingency fee contract almost gets us there."), R. 006535]. 
In addition, the trial court's July Order hints18 at this conclusion, when it states 
that "the funds may be from the client's 60% but still allocated to go elsewhere, 
such as to reimburse Mr. Barton's firm or to pay for the firm's obligations from 
17
 And, as noted, if the trial court's July Order was a rejection of the rule of nemo 
dat qui non habet, then it was reversible error. 
18
 However, it is important to note that the trial court did not make an actual 
finding in this regard, even acknowledging only that this "may" be the case. [See 
July Order at 1, R. 006073]. Nor did DAT&K appeal the trial court's failure to 
make such a finding, and it cannot do so now. Thus, the Court can easily resolve 
this issue without further analysis. That said, MEI still marshalls the evidence, 
and then demonstrates how a "reimbursement" theory cannot be sustained. 
which it was holding its clients harmless under the contingency fee agreements." 
[July Order at 1, R. 006073]. 
Acknowledging the possibility of the marshalling requirement, MEI now 
reproduces the relevant language of the Contingency Agreement: 
(b) I (we) will incur various costs and expenses in performing legal 
services under this Agreement. You agree to pay for all costs, 
disbursements, and expense[s] owed by you in connection with this 
matter, or which have been paid or advanced by me (us) on your 
behalf and for which [you] have not previously paid or reimbursed to 
me (us), if I (we) reach a settlement or judgment on your behalf, or if 
our services are terminated for any reason by you. 
[Contingency Fee Agreement (emphasis added), R. 004040]. However, the plain 
language of this agreement is clear - GBS does not have a right of 
reimbursement unless GBS had already advanced payment for the costs at 
issue. In other words, the client does not have any obligation to pay (i.e., 
reimburse) GBS any costs, unless those costs have already been advanced by 
GBS. 
Thus, to prevail, DAT&K would have had to present at least some 
evidence that the $601,000 or other monies paid to MEI were paid by GBS. for 
Full Study echocardiograms. But, DAT&K had no witnesses of its own at the 
February 6, 2009 hearing. Instead, DAT&K tried to present testimony from the 
Receiver. However, as even the March Order explained, the Receiver had no 
evidence to support that the Escrow Funds were a reimbursement, noting that 
"[t]he receiver repeatedly stated he had no first hand, or even second hand, 
knowledge of the category into which the escrowed funds would fall - client 
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funds, reimbursement for advanced costs, or attorneys fees." [March Order at 9, 
R. 005215 (emphasis added)]. 
Thus, as to whether the money previously paid to MEI was for Full Study 
echocardiograms or was for something else, the only competent witnesses were 
- not surprisingly - the parties to the MEI-GBS Settlement Agreement, i.e., MEI's 
President, Alan Fidler, and Keith Barton, who signed the agreement both 
personally and on behalf of GBS. The testimony from Barton19 and MEI was 
clear and simple - the funds paid to MEI under the MEI-GBS Settlement 
Agreement did not come from GBS, and were not advance payments for the Full 
Study echocardiograms. 
2. There Can Be No "Reimbursement" Exception to the Rule of 
nemo dat qui non habet. Because the Monies Paid to MEI 
Were Not Paid by GBS 
First, it was undisputed that the monies paid to MEI originated from the 
Texas Firms, and were not advance payments by GBS. [See 2-6-09 Trans, at 
20-21, 29-31, 35, 37, R. 006536]; [See Supplement to Referral Agreement at 2, 
R. 004031]. Indeed, DAT&K cannot point to a shred of evidence in the record to 
19
 Barton was not represented by MEI's counsel. In fact, Barton had every 
reason to be a hostile witness - he had been sued personally by MEI, resulting in 
a settlement in which he personally guaranteed a payment of more than $2 
million. In addition, if DAT&K obtained the Escrow Funds, those monies would 
relieve Barton and GBS of debt owed to DAT&K, at a much higher (25% interest) 
rate. In other words, economically, it would have been better for Barton to 
support DAT&K. However, he did not, because - as he testified - the truth was 
the truth. The trial court committed error when it ignored this, and the only other 
evidence, demonstrating that the prior payments to MEI were not advance 
payments for Full Study echocardiograms. 
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indicate that GBS paid MEI (for Full Study echocardiograms or for anything else). 
3. There Can Be No "Reimbursement" Exception to the Rule of 
nemo dat qui non habet. Because the Monies Paid to MEI 
Were Not for Full Study Echocardiograms 
Second, the only evidence was that the monies previously paid to MEI 
were not advances for Full Study echocardiograms. For example, the $601,000 
initially paid to MEI under the MEI-GBS Settlement was not an advance payment 
for MEI Full Study echocardiograms, but was rather payment for past-due 
amounts owed by GBS to MEI for - among other things - hundreds of thousands 
of dollars of work for "initial screenings." [2-6-09 Trans, at 20-21, 29-31, R. 
006536]. MEI presented evidence not only through testimony, but specifically 
with regard to the relevant documents, which included the MEI-GBS Settlement 
Agreement, and a security agreement and promissory note. [2-6-09 Trans, at 
29-30, R. 006536]; [See also MEI-GBS Settlement Agreement, R. 004024-4011; 
MEI Security Agreement, R. 004071-004061; and MEI-GBS Note, R. 004074-72; 
(identified at 2-6-09 Hearing as Exs. 8, 9,10]. In fact, there was no objection to 
the simple question to Barton regarding the $601,000:20 
Even though DAT&K very rarely objected to counsel's questioning of MEI and 
Barton, the trial court went out of its way to criticize MEI's counsel for asking 
"leading" questions, implying that the questions, or the witness, were perhaps not 
candid because the questions were leading in nature. [See March Order at 11, 
n. 2, R. 005212]. Certainly, counsel was not trying to mislead the trial court, or 
shade the testimony. Also, Barton was not represented by MEI's counsel, and 
had every reason to be a hostile witness. DAT&K's counsel did not object to the 
questions as leading. Finally, if the trial court was concerned about the form of 
questions, to which no objections were being raised, then the court could have so 
instructed MEI's counsel who would have gladly rephrased the questions. 
Furthermore, DAT&K's counsel asked at least as equally leading questions of the 
34 
Q. Okay. And let me ask you to go to Exhibit 10, which is the 
settlement agreement, and the third page. Are you with me? Third 
page. An initial payment was made as part of this settlement; is that 
right? 
A. That's correct. 
Q. And what's the amount? 
A. $601,000. 
Q. Now, was that initial payment an[] advance payment for full-study 
echocardiograms or was it for other monies that MEI was owed, or 
claiming it was owed, as part of the lawsuit? 
A. It was other monies that were owed. 
[2-6-09 Trans, at 29-30 (emphasis added), R. 006536]; [See also MEI-GBS 
Settlement Agreement at 3, R. 004022]. The only other party to the agreement, 
MEI, testified consistently with Barton. [See 2-6-09 Trans, at 104-111 
(discussing components of $601,000 payment); 111-119, 161-167 (discussing 
settlement agreement); 122-123, 13321, 145-148, 151, 155-156, 160, 164 
(discussing MEI-GBS Security Agreement), R. 006536]. 
Similarly, MEI went on to introduce documents, including communications 
leading up to the MEI-GBS Settlement Agreement, and testimony from Keith 
Barton himself, which accounted for the initial $601,000 payment and clearly 
allocated to payment to things other than the Full Study echocardiograms from 
Receiver, [2-6-09 Trans, at 230-231, R. 006536], yet the trial court did not 
critique this questioning and in fact purported to rely upon the testimony adduced 
by DAT&K. Again, the trial court was not even handed. 
QK 
which the Escrow Funds arose. [See 2-6-09 Trans, at 20-21, 30-31, 79-81, R. 
006536 and Ex. 20, R. 003457-55]. In particular, the last communication before 
the MEI-GBS case settled for (among other things) an initial payment of 
$601,000, detailed the amounts compromising the initial payment: 
Option H 2: 
Payable Nov* 
Initial Scree-lings, with Invest $205,443 
Stat Readings. S2.900CO (na interest) 
Material Costs nol rslmbursed" S1,075.96 (no interest) 
TochrodBTi Cost: S41,125.00 ;no interest) 
Rawling readings paid directly by MEI: $139,103 0Q (no Inte'esf) 
initial Screenings that die Tint 
receive Fu8 Sti-dy from MEI - hi>7 © $12G 3C0.62S (no interest) 
Pane T&kcts - New York $1.000 
Total Nov/: $G50,568.9G 
[Ex. 20, R. 003455, and 2-6-09 Trans, at 29-31, 79-81, R. 006536]. Again, MEI's 
testimony was consistent with that of Barton. [See 2-6-09 Trans, at 104-106 
(MEI performed about 10,000 "Initial Screenings," some of which were paid by 
$601,000 payment); 105-107 (discussing Ex. 20); 107-111 (discussing other 
components of $601,000 initial payment), R. 006536]. 
Barton was clear in his rejection of DAT&K's argument that the $601,000 
was an advance for the full study echocardiograms: 
Q. Okay. Have you thought the $601,000 in the settlement 
agreement was an advance payment for the full studies? 
A. It could not have been. 
21
 At this point in the testimony, DAT&K's lawyer did not like Mr. Fidler's answer, 
and so just decided to "move on." 
Q. And why not? 
A. That wasn't what we agreed to. 
[2-6-09 Trans, at 31, R. 006536, (emphasis added)]. Indeed, Barton testified that 
because the Escrow Funds originated from the client's portion of the Fen-Phen 
settlements, that if the money did not go to MEI, then ethically the GBS firm had 
an obligation to return the monies to the clients. [See 2-6-09 Trans, at 31-34, 87-
88, R. 006536]. The only exception to this ethical prohibition would have been if 
GBS had advanced payment to MEI, on behalf of the clients, but that never 
happened. [See 2-6-09 Trans, at 20-21, 87-88, 92-93 R. 006536]. 
As to additional payments to MEI beyond the $601,000, GBS and MEI also 
both testified consistently that these payments were also not advance payments 
for Full Study echocardiograms, and that therefore GBS did not have any 
recoupment or right to reimbursement.22 [See 2-6-09 Trans, at 40-41, 151-152, 
22
 Through cross-examination, DAT&K tried to advance the argument that 
because the Texas Firms had recouped monies they had paid to MEI from the 
contingency fee portion of the client's settlements, the result was a reduction in 
the amount due to GBS, which thus reduced the amounts ultimately paid to 
DAT&K. [See 2-6-09 Trans, at 91-2, R. 006536]. However, this argument is 
irrelevant - the Texas Firms reduced the overall contingency fees available to 
both GBS and the Texas Firms by first recouping non-recoverable client 
expenses "off the top", such as advertising or other expenses that were not 
allocable to the particular clients. The payments previously made to MEI fell into 
this category, and MEI was entitled to retain those payments without losing its 
independent rights to be paid for other services, i.e., the Full Study 
echocardiograms, directly from the client's portion of the Fen-Phen settlements. 
Indeed, DAT&K did not make any claim to the other "off the top" payments for 
things like advertising. Barton's testimony on these points went uncontested at 
the February 6, 2009 hearing. [See 2-6-09 Trans, at 88-92, R. 006536]. 
Furthermore, DAT&K reviewed the agreements between GBS and the Texas 
Q 7 
R. 006536]. 
Barton also testified as to the release by GBS and the Texas firms to the 
$442,768.03, and that the claims to this money were released because GBS and 
the Texas Firms understood and believed that DAT&K's arguments were wrong, 
and the money belonged to MEI. [See 2-6-09 Trans, at 42-43, R. 006536]; [See 
Escrow Agreement at 8, R. 004005]. 
Firms, and knew full well that the Texas Firms retained the right to repay 
themselves for advances made "off the top" before GBS would be entitled to any 
of the contingency attorney fees in which DAT&K was taking a security interest. 
[See 2-6-09 Trans, at 91-92, R. 006536]. In other words, DAT&K knew the risks 
of its loan, and cannot be heard to complain now. Nor has DAT&K suffered - it 
had made literally millions of dollars from this loan. 
Indeed, the questioning by DAT&K's own lawyer acknowledged that the 
money previously paid to MEI and recovered by the Texas Firms 'off the top' 
could only have been subject to DAT&K's security interest jf it had not been 
properly recouped by the Texas Firms: 
Q. And if there hadn't been that deduction and that money had been 
paid to Gregory, Barton & Swapp, or paid to you as receiver, would 
you have in turn paid that money to DAT&K? 
A. Yes, I would have. 
Q. And that would have been because that money would have been 
subject to DAT&K's security agreement, correct? 
A. Exactly. 
[2-6-09 Trans, at 178, (emphasis added) R. 006536]. The Receiver also testified 
that he understood and acknowledge the 'off the top' rights of the Texas Firms. 
[See 2-6-09 Trans, at 195-196, R. 006536]. Thus, even though DAT&K (and the 
Receiver and the trial court) did not like the fact that the Texas Firms had made 
payments to MEI which were not subject to DAT&K's security interest, the bottom 
line is that the doctrine of nemo dat qui non habet precludes DAT&K from making 
claim to the Escrow Funds, and the Texas Firms properly reimbursed themselves 
-3Q 
Similarly, Barton was the only witness as to the meaning and intent of the 
agreements between GBS and the Texas Firms, and testified unequivocally that 
these documents - in particular the last agreement between GBS and the Texas 
Firms, a "supplement" to earlier agreements, was not intended to (and the 
language did not support) that the payments made to MEI were advances for Full 
Studies. [See 2-6-09 Trans, at 35-40, R. 006536, R. 004032-25]. 
C. THE "WAIVER" EXCEPTION TO THE DOCTRINE OF NEMO DAT 
QUI NON HABET DOES NOT APPLY 
The final theory under which DAT&K could claim an interest in the Escrow 
Funds is a "waiver" argument. Again, the only evidence - from both MEI and 
GBS - was that MEI did not waive its rights to be paid directly from the client's 
portion of the settlements by signing the various documents with GBS. 
1. The Law of Waiver 
"A waiver is the intentional relinquishment of a known right.... [T]here must 
be an existing right, benefit or advantage, a knowledge of its existence, and an 
intention to relinquish it." Geisdorfv. Doughty, 972 P.2d 67. 72 (Utah 1998) 
(emphasis added) (quoting Soter's Inc. v. Deseret Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n., 857 
P.2d 935, 942 (Utah 1993) (other citation omitted)). The "the intent to relinquish 
a right must be distinct." Soter's, 857 P.2d at 942 (emphasis added). 
2. The July Order May Have Relied Upon a Waiver Theory 
As noted, the trial court's July Order is not a model of clarity. Furthermore, 
"off the top" for other payments made to MEI, before DAT&K's security 
agreement could attach to the contingency attorney fees. 
O Q 
it is even less clear whether the trial court relied upon a waiver argument in 
awarding the Escrow Funds to DAT&K. But, there is language in the July Order 
that refers to, or which can be interpreted to implicitly refer to, a purported waiver 
by MEI of its right to be paid for Full Study echocardiograms from funds withheld 
from the client's portion of the Fen-Phen settlements. [See July Order at 1-2, R. 
006073-72]. But, even if this Court were to generously construe the trial court's 
July Order to include a finding that MEI waived its right to be paid directly from 
the client's portion of the Fen-Phen settlements, the only evidence below was to 
the contrary. 
3. The Only Evidence Presented to the Trial Court Was that MEI 
Never Waived its Rights to Be Paid Directly From the Clients 
To the extent the trial court purported to rely upon a waiver theory, its 
analysis fails as a matter of law. 
First, there is no written waiver. Even under the "marshalling" standard, 
the most that can be construed to support a waiver by MEI is the language in the 
MEI-GBS Security Agreement, by which MEI acknowledged that DAT&K had a 
security interest in the GBS contingency fees (called "attorney fees" in the 
document) that came before MEI's interest in the GBS contingency fees: 
After an Event of Default has occurred, at the request of MEI, Barton 
shall receive, as the sole and exclusive property of MEI and as 
Trustee for MEI, subject to the Pennitted Liens, all monies, checks, 
drafts and all other payments for and/or Proceeds of Collateral which 
come into the possession or control of Barton and immediately upon 
receipt thereof, Barton shall remit the same (or cause the same to be 
remitted), in kind, to MEI or at MEI's direction, except as required 
pursuant to the Pennitted Liens. In other words, once the obligations 
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satisfied by the Permitted Liens are satisfied or otherwise resolved, 
then MEI is and shall be entitled to priority position against any and 
all other claim to the Barton Fen-Phen Fees, and shall be entitled to 
execute upon the security interest granted by this Agreement upon 
an Event of Default 
[MEI-GBS Security Agreement at 4-5 (emphasis added), R. 004068-004067]. 
However, this language is not clear and unequivocal, and at most reflects exactly 
what it is - an acknowledgment by MEI that DAT&K had a superior interest in the 
contingency attorney fees that were due to GBS. It simply cannot be read to 
mean anything more. 
Second, the trial court's rejection of exactly this same argument by 
DAT&K, at the end of the May 2008 hearing, was based upon a conclusion that 
the relevant documents, including the MEI Security Agreement, were ambiguous. 
[See 5-5-08 Transcript at 57-58 ("I can't determine that as a matter of law based 
on these documents . . . . " ) , R. 006535]. Because it was not a party to that 
agreement, DAT&K had no evidence to offer as to intent. And, as noted, where 
the agreement is ambiguous,23 and there is no dispute as to the intent of the 
parties, that intent controls: 
. . . the undisputed evidence as to both the contracting parties' 
subjective intent controls the interpretation of the ambiguous 
contract terms. . . . 
Abbott Laboratories. Inc., 871 F.Supp. at 98 (emphasis added); see also 
MEI continues to believe that the agreement is not ambiguous, and that it 
plainly does nothing more than acknowledge that DAT&K has a security interest 
in the contingency fees due to GBS only. Indeed, MEI could not -by its 
agreement - expand the scope of DAT&K's security interest. 
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RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 201(1) ("Where the parties 
have attached the same meaning to a promise or agreement or a term thereof, it 
is interpreted in accordance with that meaning."). 
In this case, the only evidence presented to the trial court was that the 
parties to the MEI-GBS Settlement Agreement did not intend that MEI was 
waiving or surrendering its right to be paid directly from the client's portion of the 
Fen-Phen settlements, and that the MEI-GBS Security Agreement which gave 
MEI a security interest in the GBS contingency fees was an additional means by 
which MEI was to be paid. First, the trial court was presented with the 
unchallenged deposition testimony of both Keith Barton and MEI's Alan Fidler, 
before the February 6, 2009 hearing. [See MEI's Pretrial Brief at 13-15, R. 
004811-004809]. Second, the testimony of Keith Barton and MEI's Alan Fidler at 
the February 6, 2009 hearing was also to this effect. In fact, both Barton and 
Fidler testified that the intent of the MEI-GBS Security Agreement (and other 
documents) was to give MEI additional rights, i.e., a secured interest in the 
contingency agreement fees, and this was never intended as a swap or 
surrender of MEI's independent right to be paid directly by the clients. [See 2-6-
09 Trans, at 32-34, 39-40, 58, 68-71, 82, 94-95, 112-113, 119, 162-164, R. 
006536]. 
Simply put, DAT&K did not present any testimony or other evidence below 
to demonstrate that the intent of MEI and/or GBS was other than that which Keith 
Barton and MEI's Alan Fidler testified - that MEI never waived its independent 
right to be paid directly from the client's portion of the Fen-Phen settlements. 
III. TO THE EXTENT IT RELIES UPON SOMETHING BESIDES i) THE 
"REIMBURSEMENT EXCEPTION; OR ii) THE "WAIVER" EXCEPTION, 
THE TRIAL COURT'S JULY ORDER MUST BE REVERSED 
As noted, the trial court's July Order is not a model of clarity. In particular, 
it makes ambiguous reference to (among other things) the Escrow Agreement, 
"accounting" and "other agreements." [See July Order at 1-2, R. 006073-72]. 
A. Any Argument That Does Not Fall Into i) the "Reimbursement" 
Exception; or ii) "Waiver" Exception, Fails As a Matter of Law 
As noted, the only possible exceptions to the applicability of Utah Code § 
70A-9a-203 and the rule of nemo dat qui non habet are the "reimbursement" and 
"wavier" exceptions. No other legal argument was presented by DAT&K, and the 
trial court did not articulate any law that would allow it to ignore the restrictions of 
Utah Code § 70A-9a-203-9a-203. [See Memorandum in Support of Motion of 
DAT&K, LLC for Order Releasing Funds Held by Clerk in Registry, R. 003302]; 
[See March Order, R. 005222]; [See July Order, R. 006073]. And, DAT&K has 
not appealed any of the trial court's orders or findings. 
Thus, the law of the case is that any evidence or findings by the trial court 
that do not relate to one of the two articulated exceptions to Utah Code § 70A-9a-
203 and the rule of nemo dat qui non habet, cannot be considered by this Court. 
Notwithstanding, as explained in the next section, any reliance by the trial court 
on the Escrow Agreement, any purported "accounting," any other "agreements," 
or any "other evidence," cannot support the trial court's orders. 
AT. 
B. Any Reliance By the Trial Court on the Escrow Agreement 
(which it termed the "Settlement Agreement") is Misplaced 
In its July Order, the trial court continued to rely upon the Escrow 
Agreement as providing an "accounting", giving a basis for its conclusion that 
DAT&K should be given the Escrow Funds. [See July Order at 2, R. 006072 
(stating that "[n]o party presented competent evidence . . . of a strength 
necessary to contradict the accounting specified in the Settlement Agreement... 
."); ("As reflected by the Court's finding, the settlement agreement and other 
documents indicated the nature of the funds.")]. However, the trial court did not 
explain its reasoning in detail - and in fact admits that its conclusion as to the 
source of the Escrow Funds in the March Order, based upon the "accounting" in 
the Escrow Agreement, was wrong. [See July Order at 2, R. 006072]. 
Regardless of its reasoning, any reliance by the trial court on the Escrow 
Agreement as a basis for awarding the Escrow Funds to DAT&K is not supported 
by the evidence, because i) the trial court's finding in its July Order that the 
Escrow Funds were from the client's portion of the Fen-Phen settlements, 
defeats reliance upon the Escrow Agreement as to "the nature of the funds;" ii) 
the context of the Escrow Agreement makes clear that it was not purporting to be 
an "accounting", but rather an interim agreement for escrowing the disputed 
funds; and iii) the only testimony as to the intent of the Escrow Agreement 
supports MEI. 
First, the trial court admitted that its initial conclusion in its March 2009 
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Order that the Escrow Agreement (termed the "Settlement Agreement" by the 
trial court) constituted the Texas firms' "accounting" and purportedly (and 
incorrectly) indicated that the Escrow Funds were not from the clients' portion of 
the Fen-Phen settlements, was incorrect. [See March Order at 11-12 (noting that 
"Settlement Agreement" contained "the salient acknowledgement that the 
deposited funds were not client funds." R. 005211]. The trial court's later 
reversal is a necessary concession as to the correct interpretation and meaning 
of the language in the Escrow Agreement. Thus, the trial court's apparent 
continued reliance upon the language of that agreement in the July Order is 
clearly misplaced. In other words, even marshalling the "evidence" that is the 
Escrow Agreement in favor of DAT&K, the trial court's own finding in the July 
Order renders it impossible to construe the Escrow Agreement in DAT&K's favor. 
To the extent this Court is interested in continuing to review the language 
of the Escrow Agreement (which it does as a matter of law, for correctness), the 
language and context of the agreement make clear that the document does not 
give DAT&K any claim to the Escrow Funds.24 The core sentence relied upon by 
the trial court in its March Order, from Section III (2) of the Escrow Agreement, 
must be read in its context, that of an interim, negotiated settlement agreement 
that recognizes that the parties (MEI and DAT&K) had an existing dispute that 
24
 Although not raised below by DAT&K, to the extent the trial court found the 
Escrow Agreement to constitute a waiver, such a finding is contrary to the 
language of the agreement and the evidence from MEI and Barton, that MEI 
never waived its right to be paid directly by the clients. 
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was going to be resolved by an interim solution of depositing the disputed funds 
into the trial court's registry, subject to final resolution. [See Escrow Agreement 
at 7-8, R. 004006-004005]; [See 2-6-09 Trans, at 42-43, R. 006536]. In other 
words, the sentence in the Escrow Agreement stating that the amount previously 
paid to MEI "equals the full amount withheld as MEI echocardiograph charges 
from Fen-Phen Clients' settlements" was not an "accounting" as to the source of 
the funds, as the trial court incorrectly concluded in its March Order, but instead a 
summary of the math used to determine the amount in dispute, i.e., the amount 
of the Escrow Funds. 
C. The Other Evidence Purportedly Relied Upon by the Trial Court 
- Financial Data, Agreements, and "Other Evidence" Cannot 
Support the Trial Court's Award 
Given that the trial court's continued reliance on the Escrow Agreement in 
its July Order cannot support the award of the Escrow Funds to DAT&K, the next 
step - even marshalling the evidence - is to consider the trial court's vague 
reference to "financial data, agreements, and other evidence." 
1. Financial Data 
As noted, the trial court purported to base its award of the Escrow Funds to 
DAT&K, at least in part, upon the "financial data" presented below. [See July 
Order at 2, R. 006072]. There were only two types of "financial data" below, and 
even marshalling such evidence, it cannot support the trial court's conclusion. 
First, the trial court was presented with some very basic accounting 
regarding the creation of the Escrow Funds, testified to by the Receiver, and 
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referenced as Exhibit 18. In short, this data could not be interpreted to support 
that the Escrow Funds came from the contingency attorney fees in which GBS 
had an interest, including because the Receiver himself acknowledged that he 
had no information on this point (as noted by the trial court). [See March Order 
at 9, R. 005213 ("The receiver repeatedly stated he had no first hand, or even 
second hand, knowledge of the category into which the escrowed funds would 
fall - client funds, reimbursement for advanced costs, or attorneys fees.")]; [See 
2-6-09 Trans, at 188, 190-191, R. 006536]. Nor can this Court so conclude, in 
light of the trial court's subsequent correction of its findings, that the "[escrow] 
funds came from the . . . client's account." [July Order at 1, R. 006073]. 
Second, the trial court was presented with accounting evidence from MEI, 
regarding the accounting of the funds previously paid to MEI under the MEI-GBS 
Settlement Agreement. In particular, MEI presented documents and testimony 
that the accounting of the prior payments to MEI were not advance payments by 
GBS/the Texas Firms for the full study echocardiograms. [See supra Section ll-B 
There was no other "accounting" evidence presented. Furthermore, the 
trial court's vague reference to other "accounting" evidence obfuscates the fact 
that even if there were other accounting evidence, such evidence would be 
irrelevant unless it could show that the Escrow Funds originated from the 
contingency fees due to GBS in which DAT&K had a security interest, which 
obviously cannot be so since the parties stipulated (and the trial court found in 
the July Order) that this was not the case. 
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2. Other Agreements 
The trial court also makes an ambiguous reference to "other agreements" 
in its July Order. [See July Order at 2, R. 006072]. Given the totality of the 
evidence in the record, these "other agreements" can only be the Contingency 
Fee Agreement, MEI Screening Form, the Lien Agreement, the MEI-GBS 
Settlement Agreement, the related MEI-GBS Security Agreement, the MEI Note, 
the DAT&K Security Agreement, and the agreements between GBS and the 
Texas Firms. Other than the Escrow Agreement already discussed above 
(termed the "Settlement Agreement" by the trial court), there are no other 
agreements. [See Stipulation to Admissibility of Documents, R. 004106]. 
These other agreements have all been discussed above, and none can 
support the award of the Escrow Funds to DAT&K, either based on their plain 
language (which this Court reviews de novo) or based upon the extrinsic 
evidence of intent (the only evidence of which supports MEI's position). And, the 
trial court's orders do not identify any such evidence (or even make such a 
finding). [See March Order, R. 005222-10]; [See July Order, R 006073-72]. 
3. Other Evidence 
The trial court did not elaborate upon what it meant by "other evidence." 
[July Order at 2, R. 006072]. However, given the utter lack of documentary, 
testimonial, or accounting evidence that might support the trial court's award to 
DAT&K, it is clear that there is no other evidence. Furthermore, as explained 
above, the only admissible and competent evidence presented to the trial court -
in fact the uncontested evidence presented to the trial court - indicated that the 
Escrow Funds never belonged to GBS (and thus could not belong to DAT&K), 
that the Escrow Funds came directly from the client's portion of the Fen-Phen 
settlements, that MEI never surrendered its right to be paid directly by the clients, 
and that monies previously paid to MEI were not for Full Study echocardiograms. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated, this Court should reverse the trial court's award of 
the Escrow Funds to DAT&K, and remand this case with an order to return the 
Escrow Funds (with interest) to MEI. See, e.g., Nicholson v. Industrial 
Commission, 14 Utah 2d 3, 376 P.2d 386 Utah 1962 (reversing commission's 
findings where "all the indicia including intent of the parties" was contrary to the 
findings of fact). 
DATED this 6th day of July 2010. 
MAGLEBYft GREENWOOD, P.C. 
James E. Magleby 
Attorneys for Appellant 
Mobile Echocardiography, Inc. 
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Addendum 1 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
IN THE MATTER OF THE APPLICATION 
OF BUDDY W. GREGORY FOR THE 
JUDICIAL DISSOLUTION OF GREGORY, 
BARTON &SWAPP,P.C. 
FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF 
LAW AND ORDER REGARDING 
INTERPLEADER FUNDS 
Civil No. 050401014 
Judge SAMUEL D. MCVEY 
The Court appointed receiver arranged to deposit $442,768 into escrow pursuant to the 
Court's allowing the funds to the interplead in this matter without the need for a separate 
interpleader action. There are two claimants to the funds: DAT&K, LLC, which holds a security 
interest in certain collateral of Gregory, Barton & Swapp, which is in receivership in this matter 
("GBS"), and Mobile Echocardiography, Inc. ("MEI") which claims the funds as payment for 
services rendered to GBS and its clients and also has a junior security agreement with GBS. 
The Court heard this matter at an evidentiary hearing on February 6,2009. GBS and MEI 
presented evidence. Keith L. Barton, Esq. also participated in the hearing. Roger G. Jones, 
Esq. represented GBS, James E. Magleby, Esq. represented MEI, and Douglas R. Short, Esq. 
represented Keith Barton. George Hoffman, Esq. appeared for the receiver. Following close of 
the evidence, the Court allowed counsel to present closing arguments in writing by February 13, 
2009. The Court has now received counsel's arguments and enters its findings of fact and 
conclusions of law. The Court appreciates counsel's indulgence. Normally, the Court gets 
findings out in a few days but press of business extended this ruling nearly three weeks. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. DAT&K is the secured party in a 2001 "Master Loan and Security Agreement" 
(the "2001 Security Agreement") in which GBS pledged collateral: 
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The Collateral shall consist of any and all of Borrower's present and future rights, 
title and interest in and to the following described property and rights, together with any 
and all present and future additions, thereto, substitutions therefor, replacements and 
proceeds thereof, and all supporting obligations with respect thereto: 
1. All accounts, general intangibles, payment intangibles, and all similar 
rights that Borrower may have of every nature and kind, including specifically and 
without limitation, all of Borrower's rights to receive payment or otherwise, for 
legal and other services rendered and to be rendered, and for costs and expenses 
advanced and to be advanced, and all other rights and interest that Borrower may 
have in and with respect to each and every Client Matter as defined herein; and 
2. All credits, moneys, and properties of Borrower now and in the future in 
Lender's possession or under Lender's control; and 
3. Rights under life-insurance and other policies of insurance with respect to 
individual Guarantors of Borrowers to Obligations, that may be assigned to 
Lender under such forms and under such terms and conditions as lender may 
require; and 
4. Such additional collateral as Lender may require from time to time of 
borrower and individual Guarantors of Borrower's Obligations. 
2. The terms "Client Matter" referred to GBS's present and future cases, which 
would include so-called "Fen-Phen" cases, the proceeds of which are in issue here. 
3. GBS would market and attract "Fen-Phen" clients. It would then screen these 
clients to see whether they might qualify to make a claim under the criteria of a class-action suit. 
It screened by having an initial "screening" echocardiogram ("ECG") on a client performed by 
MEL If the initial ECG resulted in the right evidence, GBS would have MEI perform a "full 
study" ECG on the client. Based on the results, GBS would send the clients' information to two 
Texas law firms which would actually make the claim against the class-action defendant with the 
expectation of getting a settlement. The Texas firms would collect the settlement and split the 
proceeds with GBS. Sometimes it would also pay costs from the proceeds. 
4. GBS agreed to pay MEI out of the clients' shares of the settlement proceeds. 
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5. GBS took the cases on a contingent fee for 40% of any recovery. Clients were to 
pay all costs, which would include the ECG expenses, from their 60%. If GBS advanced costs, 
clients would reimburse it from their portion of any settlement. The contingent fee agreement 
between GBS and its clients provided in relevant part: 
LEGAL FEES, COSTS, AND BILLS PRACTICES- As more folly set 
forth below, I (we) will only be compensated for legal services rendered if a 
recovery is obtained for you. 
(a) The fees to be paid to me (us) will be forty percent (40%) of the 
gross recovery (the term "gross recovery" means the total of all amounts received 
by settlement, arbitration award, or judgment). 
(b) I (we) will incur various costs and expenses in performing legal 
services under this Agreement. You agree to pay for all costs, disbursements, and 
expense owed by you in connection with this matter, or which have been paid or 
advanced by me (us) on your behalf and for which [sic] not previously paid or 
reimbursed to me (us), if I (we) reach a settlement or judgment on your behalf, or 
if our services are terminated for any reason by you. 
(c) To aid in the preparation or presentation of your case, it may 
become necessary to hire expert witnesses, consultants, or investigators be hired 
[sic]. 
LIEN- you hereby grant us a lien, as provided by Utah Code Ann. 78 -51 
-11 (1996) on any and all claims or causes of action that are the subject of our 
representation under this Agreement. I (our) lien will be for any sums owing to me 
(us) for any unpaid costs, or attorneys fees, at the conclusion of my (our) services. 
The lien will attach to any recovery you may obtain, whether by arbitration award, 
judgment, settlement, or otherwise. 
6. The 2001 Security Agreement gave DAT&K, for purposes of this case, a prior 
security interest in any attorneys fees, as well as in any costs advanced from those fees or from 
any other GBS assets. DAT&K's secured interest did not reach the clients' portion of 
settlements unless part or all of the portion went to GBS as either a reimbursement for advanced 
costs or as some other form of income. Under the contingency fee agreement, GBS became the 
client's agent for purposes of applying their portion of the settlement to costs before disbursing 
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the balance to the clients. Beyond that, GBS had no control over the clients' portion of the 
settlement other than being a mere trustee or conduit through which the 60% of the proceeds, 
minus costs advanced by GBS or to be paid to providers such as MEI, passed to the clients. The 
testimony of Mr. Barton on these points was somewhat inconsistent but the definition of 
"collateral" in the 2001 Security Agreement is clear as Mr. Barton's understanding does not 
contradict the terms of the agreement. 
7. MEI sued GBS and Barton for non-payment of funds before GBS went into 
receivership. In March, 2007, Keith Barton ("Barton"), GBS (then in receivership), DAT&K, 
and the Texas firms entered a "Settlement Agreement" referencing a lawsuit between MEI on the 
one hand and Barton and GBS on the other. That agreement recited in pertinent part: 
WHEREAS, in connection with the settlement of the MEI Lawsuit GBS 
paid MEI $601,000 and GBS and Barton executed and delivered to MEI that 
Promissory Note dated September 27,2004, payable to the order of MEI in the 
original principal amount of $2,050,000.00 ("MEI Note"); 
WHEREAS, since the execution of the MEI Note, MEI has been paid 
$372,510.22 of which only $87,974.16 was recovered from client settlements; 
WHEREAS, to secure payment of the MEI Note, GBS granted a security 
interest in any amounts owing to GBS under the Referral Agreement, which 
security interest is by its terms junior and subordinate to the security interest of 
DAT&K; 
8. The Settlement Agreement then contained the following relevant terms: 
E0L MEI 
1. Recovered MEI Echocardiogram Expenses. $982,543.00 was 
withheld as MEI echocardiograph charges from Fen-Phen Clients' settlements for 
those clients whose cases were included in the Final Settlements. $87,974.16 was 
withheld as MEI echocardiograph charges from Fen-Phen Clients' settlements for 
those clients whose cases were included in the Prior Settlements. The total 
amount withheld as MEI echocardiograph charges from the Fen-Phen Clients 
whose cases were included in the Final Settlements and the Prior Settlements is 
$ 1,070,517.16. MEI has previously been paid, as part of the settlement of the 
MEI Lawsuit, a total of $973,510.22 in payments on the MEI Note. The Parties 
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agree that [the Texas Firms] shall pay MEI $97,006.94 (the difference between 
$1,070,517.16 and $973,510.22). 
2. Registry Amount. Once [the Texas Firms] pay[] $97,006.94 to 
MEI, MEI will have been paid $1,070,517.16, which equals the full amount 
withheld as MEI echocardiograph charges from Fen-Phen Clients' settlements. 
Thus, GBS and DAT&K assert that under the Referral Agreement GBS is entitled 
to receive an amount equal to one-half of (T) $982,543.00, which was withheld as 
MEI echocardiograph charges from Fen-Phen Clients those clients whose cases 
were included in the Final Settlements less (ii) $97,006.94, which is the amount to 
be paid MEI under Section HI. 1. above. [The Texas Firms] ha[ve] agreed to pay 
$442,768.03 (plus accrued interest thereon from the trust account wherein the 
funds are being held) into the Registry of the Receivership Court (the "Registry 
Amount") and release any and all right, title and interest therein or claim thereto. 
Similarly, GBS, Barton and DAT&K have agreed to release any and all right, title 
and interest in, or claim to, the remaining $442,768.03 held by [the Texas Firms] 
(plus accrued interest thereon from the trust account wherein the funds are being 
held) which [the Texas Firms] ha[ve] agreed to pay to MEL The Registry 
Amount shall be disbursed only upon entry of an order from the Receivership 
Court. 
3. Non-Final Settlements and MEI. The Parties further agree 
that [the Texas Firms5] sole remaining obligation owed to GBS with regard to 
MEI is to forward to MEI any amounts recovered from client settlements for MEI 
echocardiograph expenses from the cases included in the Non-Final Settlements. 
GBS, Barton and DAT&K release any and all interest in or claim to any amounts 
recovered for MEI echocardiograph expenses from the cases included in the Non-
Final Settlements. 
8. The applicable amounts reflected in paragraphs HI. 1 &2 of the Settlement 
Agreement have all been paid out as specified: 1) the Texas Firms held $1,070,517.16 out of 
client funds and paid that amount to MEI (actually, MEI was paid the amoimt the Texas Firms 
withheld from clients for ECGs, $982,543.00 plus an additional $87,974.16 whose source was 
"prior settlements"; 2) one of the Texas firms (Williams Bailey) paid $442,768.03 into escrow 
with the Court but there is no competent evidence that amount came from the clients' portion of 
the settlement. 
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9. The Texas firm paid the escrowed funds out of a trust account. The receiver 
booked the funds as income to GBS when they were deposited with the Court. 
10. No party produced bank records or any testimony with any foundation 
demonstrating the precise type of Texas Firm trust account- IOLTA or otherwise- from which 
the escrowed funds were paid. Thus, there is no direct evidence from the Texas Firms showing 
whether the escrowed funds originated from the clients' 60% of the settlement proceeds from the 
lawyers' 40%, or some combination. 
11. There is no dispute someone owes MEI for past ECG work in an amount 
exceeding the escrowed sum. MEFs principal, Alan Fidler, however, gave conflicting testimony 
at the hearing and in his deposition regarding whether he had any legal (contractual or lien) claim 
on the 60% clients' share of the settlements. 
12. Keith Barton's intent was for MEI to have a contractual right with the clients for 
payment from their share of the settlement proceeds. However, he also expressly agreed in an 
initial written agreement with MEI that his firm would be responsible to pay all costs to MEL 
13. DAT&K's security interest is prior to MEFs to the extent both cover the same 
collateral. 
14. Keith Barton had actual authority from his clients to allot payments to MEI from 
the clients' 60% portion of settlement proceeds or to hold out reimbursement from the 60% for 
costs advanced to MEL. 
15. In a "Supplement to Referral Agreement" dated October 1,2004 (the 
"Supplement"), before the receiver was appointed, GBS, Barton and the Texas Firms 
acknowledged GBS' attorneys fee was subject to deductions for "non-reimbursable client 
expenses relating to the Fen-Phen cases which are to be paid out of attorneys fees prior to the 
division between the Texas Firms and GBS including, but not limited to . . . (c) monies used by 
GBS to pay certain expenses including costs associated with obtaining echocardiograms on 
behalf of Fen-Phen clients and potential clients,..." 
16. In a settlement agreement between Barton, GBS and MEI entered 29 September, 
2004 (the "MEI Settlement"), "Barton has informed MEI through its counsel of the existence of a 
security interest granted to Advocate Capital, Inc. which prohibits the granting of security 
interests in the collateral at issue..." This agreement also stated the Texas Firms would hold 
out $1,420.65 from each settlement and disburse them directly to MEI on a quarterly basis. In a 
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November 2004 letter sent shortly after the Supplement and MEI Settlement were executed, the 
Texas Firms indicated the amount they would hold out of each settlement for MEI was 
$1,809.35. By 2006, however, the Texas Firms were only holding out $953.00 for MEI from 
each settlement and that full withheld amount was paid to MEI in the total sum of $982,543. 
(The reason for this lower withholding is unclear, although it may have been to offset the higher 
holding reflected in the November 2004 letter-the reason is not material to the ultimate outcome 
of this case.) The Texas Firms' accounting thus allocated only $982,543 of settlement funds 
(plus another $87,974.16 from prior settlements) to go to MEI and retained the further funds for 
some reason other than to make future payments to MEI.l Mr. Barton was unable to swear from 
which pot of money the Texas Firms paid MEI, but could only speculate. However, he 
acknowledged the sums paid by the Texas Firms to MEI on GBS' behalf reduced the attorneys 
fees GBS would receive from settlements collected by the Texas Firms. 
17. The Court finds none of the witnesses very credible on the issues of intent of 
parties and classification of funding sources for the deposited funds, not because they were lying 
but because they had not sufficient foundation to do anything but speculate and state their 
"understanding," as opposed to knowledge, regarding fund sources. 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
The Court must decide this case without having been presented witnesses with adequate 
factual foundation to testify competently of the nature of the escrowed funds. All such witnesses 
probably reside in Texas and work for the Texas Firms. DAT&K's efforts to establish its interest 
in the funds and MEI and Barton's inability to say from which pot of money the Texas Firms 
paid the escrowed funds and advanced costs not just to MEI but to GBS and other service 
providers on behalf of GBS clients may have been avoided by a deposition or voluntary 
appearance by someone from the firm with knowledge of how it accounted for these funds. 
Perhaps "B.Birkholz" whose name appears on Exhibit 24 could have provided testimony. 
However, there may be reasons unknown to the Court why such testimony never came in. 
The Court must therefore look to the Settlement Agreement to resolve the case since it 
was actually acknowledged by the Texas Firms and thus provides a first hand rendition of their 
accounting of the funds. The issue is who gets how much of the $442,768 deposited with the 
1. Counsel for MEI and Barton should review paragraph 35 of Exhibit 10, the MEI settlement 
agreement, to ensure there is no conflict of interest between them and GBS in this matter considering their 
relationship to GBS as prior, retained counsel and as a partner or associate of a past member of GBS. No report 
back to the Court is necessary unless someone sees an issue. 
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Court. The issue is resolved by determining whose money it is. If it is the clients' 60%, those 
clients can direct the sum go to MEI and Barton was their agent for that purpose. If the funds 
are GBS's 40%, DAT&K's security interest gives the money to DAT&K. Further, if GBS 
advanced the funds for the clients to pay MEI, and the escrowed amount is reimbursement to 
GBS from the clients' 60%, DAT&K has a security interest in the money because the funds have 
passed from ownership by the clients to GBS by contract. If the money was held to: 1) reimburse 
GBS for sums advanced on its behalf by the Texas Firms; 2) reimburse the Texas Firms for any 
outlay made on the litigation to other contractors, cardiologists, couriers or whomever; or 3) as 
funds held to reimburse the Texas Firms for the sizeable loan to GBS; then DAT&K gets the 
money regardless of whether it is attorneys fees or client funds because it is reimbursement to 
GBS (or the Texas Firms) for advancement of costs or expenses and thus collateral under 
DAT&K's security interest. The funds could conceivably also come from the Texas Firms' 
attorney fees simply to settle any potential claims by DAT&K, Barton or GBS against them. 
Direct evidence of whether the funds fit these, or some other scenarios, will remain a mystery 
because no Texas Firm witness appeared to testify and help MEI and DAT&K carry their burden 
of proof- hence the Settlement Agreement's value in illuminating the nature of funds now in 
escrow. 
Mr. Barton's Arguments 
Mr. Barton seeks to have the funds given to MEI. Mr. Barton argues it is undisputed the 
escrowed funds came from the Texas Firms' client trust accounts. This fact does not resolve the 
issue. The trust account could have held the entire settlement proceeds pending their distribution 
including attorneys fees and costs. The Court has no idea what Texas law requires for client 
accounts, but notes it is common practice in Utah for a firm to accept settlement funds on 
contingent fees, place them in an IOLTA trust account and hold them there until they are 
distributed to the client, applied to costs, and paid to the firm. This does not constitute 
commingling funds since funds are yet to be allocated to fees, costs and client recovery. There 
just needs to be an accurate record of the different amounts in the account. (E.g. ABA Model 
Code of Professional Responsibility, DR 9-102.1.B.4 (2007)(even lawyer's anticipated portion of 
funds, if disputed, should be left in the trust account). After a written accounting of costs, etc. is 
made and the firm and client agree on the precise amounts to be distributed, the firm distributes 
the amounts determined or otherwise agreed upon from the trust account as soon as possible. 
The client's portion of the settlement need not be estimated in advance, pulled out and placed in 
a separately created IOLTA account for that client only. If there are third party claims to the 
funds, as in this instance, attorney fees should be left in trust. 
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To be clear, the mere fact funds have their origin in a trust account does not prove the 
whole amount or any of the account belongs to the client. In fact in this case, the contingent fee 
agreements recognized GBS could authorize on behalf of the clients payment of costs or 
reimbursement of costs GBS advanced, which would include advances made on behalf of GBS 
and the clients by the associated Texas firms. Such funds would be left in trust until resolution 
of disputes over them. 
No witness presented admissible testimony of how the escrowed funds should be 
accounted. Barton's counsel claims he was on the verge of obtaining this information from the 
receiver but was "cut off' by the Court from doing so. The Court disagrees. The receiver 
repeatedly stated he had no first hand, or even second hand knowledge of the category into 
which the escrowed funds would fall-client funds, reimbursement for advanced costs, or 
attorneys fees. He stated he simply assumed the Texas Firms accounted for those things and he 
did not audit, review or even see the particular results of that accounting in accepting the 
Settlement Agreement. It was therefore unnecessary to waste time on counsel arguing with the 
receiver over something he had no foundation to testify to. (Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 403). 
Had counsel brought in someone, presumably from Texas and, unlike the receiver, with 
knowledge of the precise accounting of the deposited funds, he would have been allowed to 
present that evidence to the Court. The receiver's lack of knowledge or foundation on which to 
form an opinion because he neither prepared nor reviewed the Texas Finns' financial records 
tracing the funds would have merely resulted in continued denials of knowledge on that point in 
response to counsel's questions. The lack of knowledge was precisely the reason the receiver 
had the funds deposited in court. The Court is not required to listen to repeated denials and 
counsel fails to state exactly how he would have produced admissible evidence from a witness 
who had no foundation to say what counsel wanted him to say. Denials do not become less 
convincing by their frequent repetition. 
Barton's counsel argues there was no logical distinction between the one half of funds 
withheld from clients to pay MEI and the other half withheld from clients to send to GBS. Of 
course, there is. The limited information the receiver had shows the amoimt withheld from each 
client matches the amount the Settlement Agreement says the Texas Firms sent to MEI (in 
addition to the amount from prior settlements.) Counsel presented no similar comparison for the 
escrowed funds so there is a distinction. Barton wants to raise in closing argument other issues 
and demands on the Court that have never been pled in this action notwithstanding the Court's 
earlier invitation to his counsel to file pleadings on its position, which invitation counsel did not 
accept. This method of case presentation denies other parties of notice and due process. 
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Counsel also presents the novel theory that the Court must join all of GBS' clients in this 
matter to protect them. This is an equitable dissolution action. If any clients wanted to submit a 
timely notice of claim, they could have done so. To the extent Mr. Barton has a duty to protect 
them, the Court supposes he is doing so and the Court has stated on at least three occasions he 
would be allowed to do so. The Court is unaware of what recent arrangements Mr. Barton has 
with his clients, if any, on the matter of the escrowed funds, although he has taken the position he 
is protecting their interests in this matter. GBS also must protect them but there is no legal 
authority the Court is aware of and none was presented to the Court requiring the receiver or the 
Court to join the thousand or so Fen-Phen clients. In any event, if the funds came from the 
clients' share, the clients will be protected. If the funds are from the attorneys' share or are 
reimbursement, the clients would have no standing to assert a right in them. The conduct of Mr. 
Barton and MEI in the litigation between them could indicate their intent that MEI could look 
only to Barton and his firm for payment (Bullough v. Sims, 400 P.2d 20,23 (Utah 1965). But 
none of counsel's assertions have an evidentiary basis and do not help us determine the source of 
the escrowed funds. The Court also questions counsel's narrow view of the Rules of Professional 
Conduct respecting trust accounts for the reasons stated above and does not believe they justify 
the veiled accusations of criminal behavior against the receiver. While Barton correctly 
identified the issue in the case perhaps better than anyone-tracing funds-he did not obtain 
evidence on that issue from a competent source and the tone of some of his comments against 
other parties in his closing argument does not make his case more persuasive. 
The Settlement Agreement 
Having addressed Barton's argument, the Court now looks to see what, if any, competent 
evidence demonstrates the source and purpose of the escrowed funds and thus whether 
DAT&K's security interest attaches to them. MEI argued frequently the only parties with 
admissible evidence on this matter were MEI and Barton. It turned out neither Mr. Barton nor 
Mr. Fidler had any foundation for saying which part of the client settlements generated the 
money now held by the Court, or whether the amounts were for reimbursement. They could only 
speculate based on their "understanding" and not on any concrete knowledge of how the Texas 
Firms accounted for the funds. The Texas Firms are actually the ones with first hand knowledge 
because they collected and distributed the funds. While no party brought them in to testify or 
provide a deposition, those firms agreed to statements in the Settlement Agreement which are the 
strongest evidence of their accounting. GBS, Barton and DAT&K acknowledged these 
statements, admitting them. MEI was not a party to the statements in the Agreement and they are 
10 
thus not MEI admissions. On the other hand, Mr. Fidler had no foundation for testifying to the 
source of the funds but, again, could only speculate.2 
The Settlement Agreement confirms: 
1) The Texas Firms previously paid MEI $973,510.22; 
2) The Texas Firms were going to pay MEI another $97,006.94 (the difference 
between the $1,070,517.16 amount and the $973,510.22 previously paid.); 
3) TTie $1,070,517.16 was the full amount withheld as MEI ECG charges from 
Fen-Phen client settlements; 
4) Since this payment was made, GBS would be entitled to receive one half of 
the $982,543.00 withheld as MEI ECG charges withheld from clients whose cases were in the 
final settlement (less the $97,006.94 to be paid to MEI); 
5) The one half amount would be $442,768.03; 
6) The Texas Firms would keep the other half and pay it to MEI; and 
7) GBS, Barton and DAT&K would release any interest in the one-half retained 
by the Texas Firms. 
It is important to note the Texas Firms paid the deposited money to GBS, not to MEI and 
the funds were paid as partial reimbursement for funds already held out of the Texas Firm-GBS 
association and paid to MEL The $1,070,517.16 paid to MEI was the full amount withheld as 
MEI ECG charges from the Fen-Phen clients' settlement, plus an amount from prior settlements. 
At the time of the Settlement Agreement, this sum had been paid to MEI with the exception of 
the $97,006.94 from prior settlements which was paid after the Settlement Agreement was 
entered. Thus, the Texas Firms, GBS and Barton confirmed all client funds that had been 
withheld for the purpose of satisfying MEPs bill were released by or shortly after the time of the 
Settlement Agreement. ($601,000 of the amount paid MEI was for initial screening ECGs). As 
a consequence, the funds paid thereafter came from settlement proceeds not held out for payment 
of MEI and thus from a source other than the clients' 60%. 
The Texas firms, it is true, paid the half of the funds they retained to MEL This could 
indicate an acknowledgment MEI was due the other half now held in escrow because that amount 
Here, the Court notes the leading questions characterizing of the direct examination of MM Barton and 
Fidler really made it sound like they were being coached to correct some previous statements made by them and this 
affected their credibility. Although there was no objection to the form of the questions, this case illustrates the 
danger of resort to extensive leading questions on direct examination. 
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was client money. If it was not, the Texas Firms would not have paid their half to MEL 
However, a statement in the Settlement Agreement indicates that is not the case: "Once [the 
Texas Finns] pay[] $97,006.94 to MEI, MEI will have been paid $1,070,517.16, which equals 
the full amount withheld as MEI echocardiograph charges from Fen-Then Clients ' settlements" 
(Emphasis added.) This statement appears to be the salient acknowledgment that the deposited 
funds were not client funds because the full amount of client fimds had already been paid to MEL 
While Mr. Barton testified, without foundation (also without objection) his understanding 
these funds did not come from his contingent fee, he could only speculate from what source the 
Texas Firms paid them. His understanding appears to contradict what he agreed to in the 
Settlement Agreement. In fact, Barton's understanding was the Texas Firms would "contribute" 
the $601,000.00 initial screening amount previously paid and then recoup it before it divided 
attorneys fees with GBS. He stated the $601,000 paid to MEI was taken "out of attorneys fees" 
along with another $129,000 for a total of $730,000. GBS thus allowed the Texas Firms the use 
of a considerable sum of its attorneys fees for the payment of MEI (and to resolve other claims 
with clients), expecting to be paid back for that amount from client fimds. Further, in the 
Supplement to Referral Agreement, Barton allowed the Texas Firms to use attorneys fees to pay 
MEI directly. Had those payments gone through GBS to MEI rather than directly to MEI from 
the Texas Firms, presumably the accounting would intercept and route them to DAT&K as 
attorneys fees to satisfy the DAT&K security interest. 
The Court concludes by a preponderance of evidence the Settlement Agreement 
language reflects the Texas Firms' accounting. Since no other client funds were being held to 
pay MEI the remaining amount from which the $442,768.03 was taken, that sum did not come 
from the clients' 60%. MEI has received what it was entitled to from client funds, plus some, 
and must collect the remainder from future funds held out from other clients and attorneys fees 
exceeding the amount of the DAT&K lien in the "Non-Final Settlements." Since the parties 
presented no direct evidence of the Texas Firms' accounting, and since the Settlement 
Agreement signed off by the Texas Firms is the most persuasive evidence of their accounting of 
settlement proceeds, the Court concludes the Texas firm accounting directs that the $442,768.03 
escrowed amount is not client funds and DAT&K's prior security interest attaches to them. 
Finally, MEI's theory that if the funds were subject to DAT&K's security interest 
DAT&K would have also sued the Texas Firms is unsupported by any evidence. Even if 
DAT&K has not pursued those firms, there would be any number of "innocent" reasons 
therefore, such as DAT&K choosing the sequence of battle, DAT&K releasing the Texas Firms 
in the Settlement Agreement to have a chance to gain access to the escrowed funds or DAT&K's 
lack of a security interest in the Texas Firms' accounts. 
12 
CONCLUSION 
WHEREFORE IT IS ORDERED the sum of $442,768.03 held in escrow by the court 
shall be released to counsel for DAT&K. No further order is necessary to implement the Court's 
ruling. 
Dated this 4th day of March, 2009 
' ^ n u e l D. Me$fey\\ 
District Court •Judge, i 
v t'"' J - f i 
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Addendum 2 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
IN THE MATTER OF THE 
APPLICATION OF BUDDY W. 
GREGORY FOR THE JUDICIAL 
DISSOLUTION OF GREGORY, 
BARTON & SWAPP, P.C., NOW 
KNOWN AS GBS LEGAL CLINIC, P.C. 
ORDER DENYING MEFS MOTION TO 
RECONSIDER AND GRANTING MEI's 
MOTION FOR CERTDJICATION AS A 
FINAL ORDER 
Case No: 050401014 
Judge Samuel D. McVey 
MEI has submitted its Motion to Reconsider the March 4, 2009 Order and Request to 
Certify Order Under Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b). The motion was briefed by MEI and by 
DAT&K. None of the other parties who appeared at the trial which resulted in the March 4, 
2009 order submitted memoranda. No party requested oral argument. 
DAT&K initially argues the Order may not be reconsidered for a variety of reasons. 
While Gillett v. Price, 2006 UT 24, \ 7,135 P.3d 861, 863 holds final orders may not be 
reconsidered (see also Drury v. Lunceford, 415 P.2d 662, 663 (Utah 1966)) the Utah Supreme 
Court's ruling in Gillett applies only to post-final-judgment motions {Gillett, supra, at 864). A 
district court is free to consider at any time the re-argument of issues in a case before entering a 
final judgment, Ron Shepherd Ins. v. Shields, 882 P.2d 650, 653-54 (Utah 1994). There is no 
final judgment in this matter, at least not until you get to the last sentence of this ruling. Thus, 
the Court will address MEPs motion on the merits. 
The vast verbiage of MEI's Motion to Reconsider motion is directed to the disputed funds 
coming from the client's portion of the settlement. It contains much repetition as emphasis. MEI 
is correct on this point in that having now reviewed the hearing transcript, the Court finds the 
funds came from the 60% of the recovery attributed to the clients' account The parties 
stipulated to this fact and the Court amends its finding accordingly to reflect the stipulation. 
However, that fact does not alter the Court's ultimate ruling because there is a great deal more to 
the story as stated in the original order which took care to point out it did not matter, without 
more evidence, whether the funds were in the client's trust account. The more evidence that 
would be needed would be the accounting. 
As stated in the Order, the funds may be from the client's 60% but still allocated to go 
elsewhere, such as to reimburse Mr. Barton's firm or to pay for the firm's obligations from which 
it was holding its clients harmless under the contingent fee agreements. The Court's findings 
indicate MEI had no privity with any contract that would give it a direct right of action against 
the clients and Mr. Barton's firm assumed liability for ECG costs incurred by MEI. Further, it is 
evident the disputed funds were not headed for the pockets of the Mr. Barton's Phen-Fen clients. 
nnfifm 
The accounting evidence stated in the various agreements involving the Texas Firms is important 
and designated the funds' final intended resting place. This evidence was the basis for the 
Court's order, as argued concisely by DAT&K. No party presented competent evidence, 
including Mr. Barton's understanding, of a strength necessary to contradict the accounting 
specified in the Settlement Agreement and other corroborative facts found by the Court. While 
admissible, a party's understanding is neither binding nor persuasive in this case given the 
second- hand knowledge enjoyed by Mr. Barton and the varying accounts of the MEI witness. 
Further, contrary to MEI's assumption, the Order was not based on a single sentence in 
the Settlement Agreement but incorporated findings based on financial data, agreements and 
other evidence. The subject matter of the new affidavit accompanying MEI's motion should have 
been presented at trial and may have been helpful but the Court cannot consider it post-trial. 
Further, it is hearsay. MEI also has not shown why the evidence was not known or knowable at 
the time of trial. 
The broad scope of DAT&K5 s security interest allowed it to attach to the funds as they 
went through GBS or its predecessor destined for someone other than the clients' personal bank 
accounts. As reflected by the Court's findings, the settlement agreement and other documents 
indicated the nature of the funds. 
The Court certifies the March 4, 2009 ruling as final in that are no other parties or claims 
that are affected by the order. 
DATED this 21st day of July, 2009 
BY THE COURT: 
SaSuel D. McVey J 
District Court Judge 
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THE COURT Thank you Please be seated And good 
morning I will call the case No 050401014 Counsel please 
State your appearances 
MR MAGLEBY Your Honor Jim Magleby and Blake 
Miller on behalf of Mobile Echocardiography Inc 
THE COURT Thank you 
MR JONES Roger Jones on behalf of DAT&K LLC 
THE COURT Thank you 
MR HOFMANN Your Honor George Hoffman appearing 
on behalf of Mark D Hashimoto receiver 
THE COURT Thank you 
MR SHORT And Your Honor Doug Short on behalf of 
Keith Barton 
THE COURT Thank you very much Anyone else7 
Okay All right Are counsel ready to proceed? 
MR MAGLEBY We are Your Honor 
THE COURT All right You may proceed 
MR MAGLEBY Your Honor would you like an opening 
statement or would you like us to just call witnesses'? 
THE COURT Well I think I understand the issue 
we re trying to see I think the - corect me if I mean wrong 
if you want to add anything else but we know what the 
documents say We re trying to make sure that - we re trymkg 
to see where these — these funds came from, where they went, 
whom they belong to, what types of possessory interests were 
they? Was Gregory, Barton & Swapp and their affiliates in 
Texas, were they merely a Bailey or a bank for these funds or 
did they actually have some interest in them? All of those 
types of things, I think, are an issue here today, is my 
understanding. There was enough ambiguity in the documents 
and so forth, that we needed to resolve those issues to see 
what the parties really were doing, so... 
MR. MAGLEBY: I think that's right, Your Honor. If 
the Court has had an opportunity to look at my pretrial brief, 
then -
THE COURT: I did, but -
MR. MAGLEBY: Okay. 
THE COURT: - even though there was no ex parte 
motion to file an overlength brief, I read it. Okay? 
MR. MAGLEBY: Thank you, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: All right. 
MR. MAGLEBY: Then that is a summary of our points. 
And I can give those again, but it sounds like the Court is 
familiar with those. 
THE COURT: All right. 
MR. MAGLEBY: If you'd like, we'll just call our 
first witness. 
THE COURT: That would be fine. Unless Mr. Jones 
wanted to say anything at this point. 
MR. JONES: They can go first, Your Honor. I have 
no opening statement. 
THE COURT: Okay. Go ahead. 
MR. MAGLEBY: All right. Your Honor, first witness 
would be Keith Barton then. 
THE COURT: All right. Sir, would you please come 
up and face the clerk and raise your right hand. 
KEITH BARTON, 
called as a witness by Mobile 
Echocardiography, being first 
duly sworn, was examined and 
testified on his oath as follows: 
THE COURT: Please have a seat right up here. 
MR. MAGLEBY: And, Your Honor, as I indicated in our 
briefing, we have prepared a binder of exhibits for the Court, 
the witness, counsel. If I may approach. 
THE COURT: Thank you. 
MR. MAGLEBY: Roger, you have a set, right? 
MR. JONES: I do. Thank you. 
DIRECT EXAMINATION 
BY MR. MAGLEBY: 
Q. Mr. Barton, even though we obviously know who you 
are, can you please state your full name for the record. 


























Q. And, Mr. Barton, are you a member of the Utah State 
Bar? 
A. I am. 
Q. And how have you been a member of the Utah State 
Bar? 
A. Since 1992 or '93. 
Q. And at some point in time, did you becmoe involved 
in litigating what are sometimes called the Phen-Fen cases? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And in the course of that, did you become acquainted 
with Mr. Allen Fiddler and his company, Mobile 
Echocardiography, Inc.? 
A. I did. 
Q. Can you tell us approximately when that was? 
A. I believe that it was sometime around 2000-2001, 
approximately. 
Q. And did Mr. Fiddler's company, MEI - I'll call it 
MEI, if that's okay - perform echocardiogram services for your 
law firm? 
A. They actually performed echocardiogram services for 
our clients. 
Q. For your clients. Okay. And what was the name of 
the firm at the time? 
A. Gregory, Barton & Swapp. 
Q. Now, I have heard references in the papers and the 
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testimony to different rounds of Phen-Fen cases, a first, 
second and third round. Are you familiar with that? 
A. I am. 
Q. Can you tell the Court generally what is meant by 
the first, second and third rounds of the Phen-Fen cases? 
A. They were a — they were a group of cases that we 
took initially. They were the - it seemed to me that they 
were the Mississippi cases. We referred to those as the first 
round. There were approximately 200 cases in that group of 
cases. 
We then had a group of cases that we calledl the 
Texas cases, which we referred to as Round 2 that settled. 
And then we have the - the last group of litigation, which 
involved several thousand cases that we referred to as Round 
3. 
Q. And that was a big group, right? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Okay. And did MEI perform echocardiogram services 
on the first and second rounds? 
A. My recollection is they did. 
Q. Okay. And then for the third rounds, did MEI and 
Gregory, Barton & Swapp do it a little differently, meaning 
they actually entered into a written agreement? 
A. I don't understand. 
Q. Let me back up. For the first two rounds, did you 
and MEI have a written agreement? 
A. I don't believe we did. 
Q. Okay. For the third round — well, let me ask you to 
take a look at Exhibit 7 in the binder in front of you and 
just ask if you recognize that document. 
6 | A. I do. 
7 | Q. What is Exhibit 7? 
A. It is a - it's a fee schedule. 
Q. And is it also, to your understanding, an agreement 
between you and your law firm on the one hand and Mobile 
Echocardiography on the other hand? 
A. It is as to price per screenings, for echo 
screenings and for workups. 
Q. Okay. And at this point, why don't we tell the 
Court the difference between an initial screening, or a 
screening and a full workup. 
A. When — when a new client would come into our office, 
we would go through what we call an initial screening process 
in which we would do a screening echo, which was a study that 
took approximately 10 to 15 minutes. We would then, through 
that mechanism, we would determine whether or not they 
qualified for a full study echo. A full study echo took 
approximately 30 to 40 minutes, depending on the - how 
difficult the study was to — depending on the patient. 
And so there was — we had — preliminarily, we did 
screening through the echo screenings to see if they had a 
case that qualified using the criteria that we were using. 
And, if they did, then we rescheduled them for a full study 
workup. 
Q. So if I'm correct, an initial screening is something 
quicker than a full study. 
A. Yes. 
Q. But at the same time, not everybody who gets an 
initial screening becomes a client of the firm. 
A. That would be correct. 
Q. Okay. And let me ask you to flip to page 20 - or 
tab twenty — I'm sorry, Your Honor. Let me move for the 
admission of Exhibit 7. 
THE COURT: Any objection to Exhibit 7? 
MR. JONES: No, Your Honor. It was stipulated to. 
THE COURT: All right. Thank you. Have all of 
these exhibits in your binder been stipulated or are there 
some that -
MR. MAGLEBY: Some have and some have not. 
THE COURT: All right. 
MR. JONES: The vast majority have, Your Honor. 
There are only three or four that have not. 7 is a stipulated 
exhibit. 
THE COURT: All right. Thank you. That will be 
admitted. 
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MR. MAGLEBY: And I will try to be mindful of the 
stipulation, but I just finished a three-week trial, so I may 
end up being overly formal on that. 
Q. Do you recognize Exhibit 21, Mr. Barton? 
A. I do. 
Q. And what is Exhibit 21? 
A. This is an echo screening worksheet. 
Q. Is this a worksheet that somebody would complete or 
which would be completed for a potential client when they came 
in for the screening? 
A. Yes, that's correct. 
Q. And, again, the screening is the — the quick and 
dirty or the initial look. 
A. The initial look, that's correct. 
Q. Okay. Let's see. And if we go down to the second 
paragraph of Exhibit 21, it says: "In the event my screening 
is positive and I choose to go forward with a full workup, the 
cost of the full workup will be deducted from my total 
settlement as related to my Phen-Fen claim. " 
Did I read that correctly? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Can you tell the Court what that meant? 
A. The client was - or potential client was agreeing 
that, if they - that after a - an initial echo workup, if they 
decided to go for the full study workup, they've — they've 
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indicated in here that they would - that we would postpone the 
collection of the monies for that full-study workup until the 
settlement of their claim. 
Q. And when the case settled, that money would come out 
of their portion. 
A. That's correct. 
Q. Okay. Now, this morning, I just was shown this 
binder. I believe that you found this in your files; is that 
correct? 
A. Yeah. Actually, we - we received a call from 
Gregory & Swapp, who had this in their - in their storage unit 
and was cleaning out their storage unit, and asked us to come 
and retrieve it. 
Q. Just tell us generally what kinds of documents are 
in that binder, 
echo screening information. 
Q. Similar to what we've got on Exhibit 21? 
A. Yes. 
Q. The ones in the binder, have they been actually 
filled out for clients? 
A. Yes. They were filled out by the clients. 
Q. Okay. And how is it you know or believe that every 
client would have filled out one of these Exhibit 21 echo 
screening sheets? 
A. It was our custom and practice to not allow anyone 
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to have an echo screening or a full-study done unless they 
were - unless they signed the - the paperwork that we put in 
front of them. 
Q. And was it in your financial best interest to get 
that paperwork signed? 
A. Well, it was m our financial interest to get our 
contract signed, certainly. 
Q. Was it also important for the clients to get those 
things signed? 
A. If - if they didn't want to have to pay for their 
echocardiogram full studies up front, which was a real benefit 
to them, then they needed to - to enter into an agreement with 
Mr. Fiddler, yes. 
MR. MAGLEBY: Your Honor, move for the admission of 
Exhibit 21. 
THE COURT: Any objection? 
MR. JONES: No objection to the admission of Exhibit 
21, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Very well. It will be admitted. 
MR. MAGLEBY: Mr. Barton, let me ask, what happened 
if a client who had completed a form of Exhibit 21 came back 
with an initial screening that indicated they were eligible 
for - to have you represent them in a Phen-Fen case? 
A. The general procedure was that we would - we would 



























looked like they were - that they would meet the criteria for 
a full-study screening and they would meet the criteria for 
the settlement as we understood it, or a potential settlement, 
based on the cases that we had already settled, we would then 
have them reschedule to come back and have a full-study workup 
done. 
Q. Okay. And, again, the full study is more 
comprehensive, correct? 
A. The full study took a lot more time, yes. 
Q. And then the full study — well, let me back up. 
For the initial screening, was that initial 
screening recorded or videotaped? 
A. My understanding - I don't recall. 
Q. Okay. With regard to the full study, was that 
videotaped or otherwise captured? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And were certain measurements made? 
A. Yes, they were. 
Q. Okay. And that was important to the Phen-Fen cases? 
A. It was - it was the basis of the settlements. 
Without that information or without that evidence, there would 
have been no case. 
Q. Okay. So pretty important. 
A. Yeah. 
Q. All right. Let me ask you to turn to Exhibit 11. 
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THE COURT: Before you do that, is there any 
significance to there being two pages to Exhibit 21? Are 
those - is there a difference in those, to save me time? I 
know they have different Bates stamp numbers at the bottom, 
but -
MR. MAGLEBY: I believe they are the same, Your 
Honor. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
THE WITNESS: Your Honor, if I could answer that. 
There's some — if you'll notice at the bottom, it says For 
Office Use Only on the - on the second one. Oh, actually, it 
says it on the first one, too. Yeah. They're identical. 
Q. (By Mr. Magleby) Were there different iterations of 
this document, Mr. Barton? Did it evolve over time? 
A. The - yeah, the first one that we initially had did 
not have the - the For Office Use Only down here in the 
bottom. That was something that we asked for Mr. Fiddler to 
include so that we could go through these quickly and assess 
whether or not they qualified in our minds for a full-study 
workup. 
Q. Okay. So the Office Use Only, something down there 
would be filled out which would be useful information for the 
law firm. 
A. Yes. 
Q. Okay. I understand. Going back to, then, Exhibit 
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11, can you tell the Court what Exhibit 11 is. 
A. This is a - a contigency fee contract for Gregory, 
Barton & Swapp. 
Q. And, let's see, if we go down under — is this kind 
of a form agreement? 
A. It's a form agreement as it relates to - as it 
related to the Phen-Fen clients. 
Q. And if we go to sub-heading 2 where it says Scope of 
Services, and if you'll read along with me, it says: "You are 
hiring me/us as your attorneys to represent you in the matter 
of your claims regarding the taking of weight loss pills." 
Did I read that correctly? 
A. That's correct. 
Q. And the weight loss pills, is that a reference to 
Phen-Fen? 
A. We — we said weight loss pills because it was more 
generic and there were some other weight loss pills out there 
besides Phen-Fen. 
Q. Okay. But you don't have any doubt this is a — for 
lack of a better word or a more precise term — the Phen-Fen 
contingency fee agreement. 
A. It is, yes. 
Q. Okay. Was it your policy and practice to make sure 
that every client that came m signed one of these? 
A. Every client that - that came through our office 
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that wanted a full-study echocardiogram done had to sign one 
of these prior to having that study done. 
Q. what procedures or protections did you put in place 
to make sure that that happened? 
A. we had - we had somebody from our office that was 
actually liaisoned with Mr. Fiddler. A lot of the 
echocardiograms were done in the building where we had our 
lease or where we resided. Those echocardiogram studies were 
done on a different floor. 
We had people, however, in our office that were 
required to check in clients or potential clients and have 
them sign all of the forms and all of the agreements so that 
our paperwork was in order. And if they did not sign this, 
they did not get the services. 
Q. And did your office - you or your office also inform 
Mr. Fiddler he was not to perform a full echo on anybody if 
they didn't have these documents signed? 
A. We did. They - they would not have gotten past our 
people without having these signed. 
Q. Okay. Going down, then, to subsection (4) - and, 
Your Honor, I believe this has been stipulated to, but just so 
there's no confusion. I don't know if stipulated exhibits all 
come into evidence or if you noly want to consider the ones 
that we actually move to be considered by the Court. So I'll 



























THE COURT: Any objection? 
MR. JONES: No, Your Honor. But it was my 
understanding that we would agree to the admission of all 
those that are stipulated to -
MR. MAGLEBY: That's fine with me. 
MR. JONES: So if we could just move to do that and 
dispense with dealing with each exhibit, that might save time. 
THE COURT: That's fine. I will do that. 
MR. MAGLEBY: And m the front of the binder, Your 
Honor, there is a - an index which goes through Exhibit 23. 
I added a couple more, 24 and 25, last night. I've showen 
them to Mr. Jones this morning, and I guess - I don't know if 
he stipulates or not, but -
Any objection to 24 and 25? 
MR. JONES: I do not stipulate to 24, but I do to 
25. 
MR. MAGLEBY: Okay. Fair enough. 
THE COURT: So everything other than 24 in this 
binder is stipulated to or are there some others that may not 
be? 
MR. JONES: No, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. JONES: 16 through 21 are not stipulated to, and 
24. 
THE COURT: Okay. Subject to those that are not 
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stipulated to, the remaining exhibits are, and that would be 
1 through, what -
MR. MAGLEBY: 15. 
THE COURT: 1 through 15. And then -
MR. MAGLEBY: 22 and 23. 
THE COURT: 22 and 23 and 25 are admitted. 
MR. MAGLEBY: Thank you, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Thank you. 
Q. (By Mr. Magleby) Mr. Barton, down under - back on 
Exhibit 11, sub (b), it says - read along with me: "I/we will 
incur various costs and expenses in performing legal services 
under this agreement. You agree to pay for all costs, 
disbursements and expense owed by you in connection with this 
matter..." 
And if you could read along with me carefully here: 
"...or which have been paid or advbanced by me/us on your 
behalf and for which have not previously paid or reimbursed to 
me/us if we reach a settlement." 
Did I read that roughly correctly? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Did you have an understanding that what this meant 
was the client was responsible to pay certain expenses out of 
the client portion of its settlement, his or her settlement? 
A. That's correct. 
Q. And those client expenses, those are different or 
the same as contingency attorney fees? 
A. Client expenses are different than contingency 
attorney fees. 
Q. Right. And if we look up under 4(a), in fact, that 
paragraph talks about the 40 percent contingency fee. That's 
the attorney fee, right? 
A. That's correct. 
Q. Okay. With regard to that client expense, then, 
does that get withheld from the client's side of the 
settlement? 
A. It does. 
Q. Does GB&S have any right to that money? 
A. No, we do not. 
Q. Now, it does say here "or which have been paid or 
advanced by me/us on your behalf." So if GB&S actually paid 
in advance for certain expense, it could then recoup that from 
a client, correct? 
A. Yes. 
Q. In this instance, you're familiar with this dispute, 
I assume. 
A. I do - I am. 
Q. All right. In this instance, did GB&S ever pay or 
advance the full-study echocardiogram costs which were later 
withheld from the client's side which are m the registry of 
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this court? 
A. The full-study echocardiogram costs, no, have not 
been paid. 
Q. Okay. And so, looking at this subparagraph 4(b), 
GB&S would have no right to recoupment under this paragraph as 
against those monies withheld from the client's side, correct? 
A. That would be correct. 
Q. All right. Now, let me ask you to flip ahead to 
Exhibit 17 and ask you if your recognize Exhibit 17. 
A. I do. It's a - it's a lien agreement. 
Q. Now, if I look at Exhibit 17 and I compare it to 
Exhibit 11, same - same law firm naem on it, right? 
MR. JONES: Your Honor, Exhibit 17 is not stipulated 
to, and we do have an objection to its admission. 
MR. MAGLEBY: Let me go ahead and lay that 
foundation, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
Q. (By Mr. Magleby) I'm sorry, Mr. Barton, I may have 
asked you this. I'm going to ask it again. I'm not quite 
myself today. 
What is Exhibit 17? 
A. It's a - it's a lien agreement. 
Q. Was Exhibit 17 presented to clients at the same time 




Q. How can you be sure? 
A. It was our custom and our practice to have this lien 
agreement signed along with our contingency fee contract, 
along with medical authorizations for our law firm to gather 
medical records. All that would have been done prior to 
them - prior to our clients having a full-study echo done. 
Q. So the same practice and procedure we've already 
talked about? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Do you have any doubt whether or not this form lien 
agreement was signed by the clients that came in to get an 
echo from MEI? 
A. I have no - no doubt about that at all. 
MR. KAGLEBY: Your Honor, Move for the admission of 
Exhibit 17. 
THE COURT: Mr. Jones? 
MR. JONES: Objection, Your Honor. Should I 
approach or -
THE COURT: No. That's fine. You can - we don't 
have a jury, so you can — unless you don't want the witness to 
hear your objection. 
MR. JONES: No, that's fine. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. JONES: Your Honor, we object to the admission 
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of this agreement - to go through some points here, Your 
Honor, about the agreement. 
One, it makes no reference to Phen-Fen, weight loss 
pills, it makes no reference to MEI. We can't tell whether 
this agreement was executed by a Phen-Fen client because it is 
redacted. And it's not executed by Gregory, Barton & Swapp. 
Now, Mr. Barton would like to testify that these 
documents were indeed executed. But, Your Honor, they haven't 
been produced. Mr. Barton was unable to produce any of these 
documents other than the one you're looking at. Mr. Fiddler 
was unable to produce any of these documents other than the 
one that you're looking at. 
13 | Mr. Fiddler and Mr. Bartonn disagree about this 
14 [ document. Mr. Barton transferred that Mr. Fiddler prepared 
it. Mr. Fiddler testified that Mr. Barton prepared, in their 
depositions. 
Your Honor, what we have here is an effort on the 
part of MEI to prove the contents of these agreements without 
the agreements themselves. There's been no testimony that 
these agreements have been lost or can't be located. In fact, 
Mr. Barton said he didn't know if he could locate these 
documents in his deposition. 
The best evidence rule would require, Your Honor, 
these documents to be produced to the extent that they wish to 
offer testimony regarding their contents. They have not been 
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produced. To the extent that they wish to pursue this as a 
summary of these documents, Your Honor, those documents would 
be required to be made available to DAT&K. They have not 
been. 
That's the basis for our objection, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: All right. Thank you. 
Did you want to respond on that? 
MR. MAGLEBY: Yes, Your Honor. Even without the 
document, I could have Mr. Barton testify about it and the 
Court could take notice of his testimony. It's admissible 
evidence. I've also got the document and his testimony as to 
what it's content is and who and when signed it. 
THE COURT: Right now, I don't think you've laid a 
proper foundation under Rule 1001. You do have to surmount 
the best evidence rule by showing that, for example, something 
has happened to the original and it can't be produced. Those 
types of things, all those kinds of things that are - that are 
indicated in the best evidence rule. So — 
MR. MAGLEBY: And one of the reasons why they were 
not produced, it's not that Mr. Barton couldn't locate them, 
it's that they raised an attorney-client privilege objection 
because they have a number of these agreements. 
THE COURT: Well, isn't this gentleman the attorney? 
MR. MAGLEBY: He is the attorney. 
THE COURT: So -
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MR. MAGLEBY: But it's not his privilege to waive. 
THE COURT: Well -
MR. MAGLEBY: Unfortunately, the privilege belongs 
to the clients. 
THE COURT: — it may not be his — it may not be his 
privilege, but have the clients asserted that privilege? 
7 | MR. MAGLEBY: No, they haven't been — the objection 
8 | was raised by — well, I guess I don't know because I don't 
represent Mr. Barton. 
THE COURT: Well, at this point, it sounds like 
there's no foundation, that there hasn't been adequate 
12 | foundation, so until you can - until you can lay that 
13 | foundation, this - and you can ask about this but it's not 
going to be admitted. 
MR. MAGLEBY: Fair enough. 
Q. Mr. Barton, with regard to the documents - strike 
that. 
With regard to the agreements that you would have 
obtained from your clients with your firm, was it important 
for you to get an agreement from the clients that the 
providers of certain services such as echocardiograms would 
have a lien or a right or a claim to be paid from the client's 
side of the settlement? 
MR. JONES: Your Honor, I object. Because what Mr. 
Barton is doing, he's testifying as to the contents of 
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agreements that are not admissible and have not been produced. 
The best evidence rule does not permit him to testify to the 
contents of these documents. 
THE COURT: And let me ask you also Mr. Magleby, is 
it true that Mr. Barton is going to - will say that he did not 
prepare this but, rather, Mr. Fiddler prepared it? 
MR. MAGLEBY: I don't remember the details of the 
deposition testimony. I think a lot of time has passed. 
THE COURT: That's what counsel is -
MR. MAGLEBY: Right. 
THE COURT: - is recalling at this point. So if he 
doesn't — if he didn't - has he ever seen this before? I 
mean, there are all kinds of questions out there. There's no 
foundation for this, so that objection's sustained at this 
point. 
MR. MAGLEBY: Let me try to lay some more 
foundation. 
Q. Mr. Barton, have you seen this agreement before? 
A. I have. 
Q. Is this a standard form agreement you use with 
regard to the Phen-Fen cases? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Was it your practice and procedure to have every 
client sign one of these? 
A. Yes. 
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Q. Was it in the best interest of you and your client 
and the service provider to get one of these signed? 
A. It was in the best interests of our client, yeah, 
and the service provider, yes. 
Q. Okay. And do you have any doubt that every one of 
these, every client that came in and got a full study from MEI 
signed one of these? 
A. They absolutely did. 
MR. JONES: Objection, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Right. And let me ask you again. Why 
would this be privileged? It's the client's name. The name's 
not - the name of the client is not privileged. 
MR. MAGLEBY: Your Honor, I didn't raise the 
objection. They weren't my documents. If I had them, I'd 
have produced them. 
THE COURT: Okay. But you're the sponsor of the 
document and I presume that, if you're going to surmount the 
best evidence rule, you've got to come up with a reason why 
the original could not be produced, why it was lost or 
something of that nature. 
MR. MAGLEBY: I couldn't produce it because 
privilege was asserted. And I didn't have possession. 
THE COURT: Did you - did you seek a - an order of 
the court -
MR. MAGLEBY: No. 
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THE COURT: Well -
MR. MAGLEBY: And neither did Mr. Jones. 
THE COURT: - to me, it would seem like such a 
privilege assesrtion might be bordering on frivolous because 
I don't see, really, anyitng here that would be - would be 
privileged. But anyway... 
MR. JONES: Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Yes, sir. 
MR. JONES: If I may add, Mr. Barton did not raise 
a privilege objection to these documents. Mr. Barton raised 
a privilege objection in his deposition. It's page 8 of his 
deposition, Your Honor - only to echo screening information, 
the information itself. 
What Mr. Barton testified to about these documents 
varies. Either he looked for them or he didn't look for them. 
When I asked him directly was he unable to locate his 
document - these documents, his only asnwer was "I don't 
know." 
THE COURT: All right. Well, the objection's 
sustained. 
MR. MAGLEBY: Okay. 
THE COURT: There's no foundation. 
MR. MAGLEBY: And it's a minor point, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Okay. Thank you. 
MR. MAGLEBY: So I'm happy to move on. 
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THE COURT: All right. 
Q. (By Mr. Magleby) Mr. Barton, let me have you take 
a look very briefly at Exhibits 8, 9 and 10, which are a 
promissory note, a security agreement and a settlement 
agreement and mutual relaese. 
Once you've done that enough that you can tell us 
whether or not you're familiar with those documents, let me 
know. 
A. I am familiar with these documents. 
Q. And are those at least some of the documents that 
were executed as part of a settlement involving you and 
Gregory, Barton & Swapp on the one hand and MEI, Mobile 
Echocardiography, Inc., on the other hand? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Okay. And let me ask you to go to Exhibit 10, which 
is the settlement agreement, and the third page. Are you with 
me? Third page. 
An initial payment was made as part of this 
settlement; is that right? 
A. That's correct. 
Q. And if we look down under subsection (11)(b), can 
you see a reference to that payment there? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And what's the amount? 
A. $601,000. 
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Q. Now, was that initial payment and advance payment 
for full-study echocardiograms or was it for other monies that 
MEI was owed, or claiming it was owed, as part of the lawsuit? 
A. It was other monies that were owed. 
Q. And let me have you flip ahead to Exhibit 20. Tell 
me if you've seen that document before. 
A. Yes. 
Q. And do you recognize Exhibit 20 as a settlement 
offer from my office to the offices of your attorneys that 
were working for you in the MEI-GBS lawsuit? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And if we go to the third page of that document, up 
at the top it says Option No. 2 Payable Now. Do you see that? 
A. I do. 
Q. And it references a number of payments and it comes 
down to a total of $650,000, correct? 
A. That's correct. 
Q. Now, if we compare that amount to Exhibit 10, the 
htird page where we refer to the $601,000, is there any 
relation? 
A. Yes. 
Q. What's the relation? 
A. The relationship is that the $601,000 that we paid 
was a reduced amount of the $650,000 that's being offered here 
for a settlement. 
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Q. And that payable now figure, did that represent 
monies for initial screenings? In other words, those quick 
looks that were done by MEI that did not result in somebody 
becoming a client of the firm and other out-of-pocket costs 
that MEI had literally paid on behalf of either the law firm 
or the clients? 
A. Yeah. These were for out-of-pocket expenses that 
MEI had in relation to his, as it related to initial 
screenings. 
Q. Okay. Have you thought the $601,000 in the 
settlement agreement was an advance payment for the full 
studies? 
A. It could not have been. 
Q. And why not? 
A. That wasn't what we agreed to. 
Q. Okay. Let's see, let's go down to, now, with regard 
to the escrow money in this case, you're familiar with the 
$442,000-some-odd that's deposited with the court's escrow, 
correct? 
A. I understand that that is depoisted with them, yes. 
Q. Okay. What is your understanding as to where that 
money came from? 
A. My understanding is that, pursuant to directives to 
pay that we had received from our clients, that our clients — 
that money was withheld from their settlements to pay for the 
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Mobile Echocardiography full-study workups. 
Q. If it hadn't been withheld - strike that. 
It didn't come from your contingency fee. 
A. No, it did not. 
Q. If it doesn't go to MEI, what's your understanding 
as to where the money has to go? 
A. It's client money. We were directed to pay that 
money by our clients for the services that were provided by 
Mobile Echocardiography. If it doesn't go to pay that, then 
it should be returned to the clients. 
Q. Okay. 
THE COURT: I'm sorry, what was that total again? 
MR. MAGLEBY: I think it's about $442,000. 
THE COURT: Thank you. 
MR. MAGLEBY: It's whatever amount is in the escrow 
report. 
Q. And in fact, Mr. Barton, do you think that Gregory, 
Barton & Swapp would have an ethical duty to return that money 
to the clients? 
A. I do believe that we have - we would have an ethical 
duty to — to return that money to — to the clients, and 
that's — that's why I'm here today. 
Q. And have you advised the receiver of that? 
A. We have on multiple occasions. 
Q. Okay. Now, with regard to the settlement agreement 
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security agreement, that was drafted through an exchange 
between lawyers representing you and GBS and lawyers 
representing MEI; is that correct? 
A. That's correct. 
Q. Okay. With regard to your understanding and intent 
in entering into that agreement, was it ever your 
understanding that Gregory, Barton & Swapp was taking over 
MEI's right to be paid directly from the clients? 
9 | A. No. 
10 | Q. Was it ever your understanding that MEI was waiving 
its right to be paid directly from the clients in the event 
12 | they hadn't already been paid under the settlement agreement? 
13 | A. Can you - can you repeat that question? 
Q. Sure. Was it ever your understanding that MEI was 
waiving its rights to be paid directly by the clients? 
A. No. 
Q. And did the settlement agreement, security agreement 
and the related documents, did they give MEI extra protection, 
extra rights, an ability to be paid from the fee side as 
opposed to the client side? 
21 | A. That was our intent. 
22 | Q. Okay. Now, at the time that the settlement 
documents were executed, GB&S owed a great amount of money to 
DAT&K, I guess. Is that fair? 
A. That's correct. 
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Q. Okay, notwithstanding that fact, you've just said 
it was your understanding that MEI was getting an interest in 
getting contingency fee money to pay this debt, if possible, 
or an extra way to get paid, right? 
A. My understanding of the — the agreement that we 
executed with MEI was that it was additional collateral or 
additional security, if in fact they did not receive payments 
from the clients. 
Q. Okay. And at the time that you executed it, was it 
your belief that there would be plenty of money to go around? 
A. Yes. 
Q. That, in fact, DAT&K could be paid, other creditors 
could be paid and MEI could be paid. 
A. That was my understanding. 
Q. And if the Phen-Fen cases in the third round had 
settled at the same - I don't - maybe rate or similar amounts 
as the cases that settled in the first and second round, would 
there have been plenty of money? 
A. Yes. 
Q. All right. Now, when the agreement was - the 
settlement agreement and the related documents, 8, 9 and 10, 
were signed, at the same time you entered into - or Gregory, 
Barton & Swapp entered into an agreement with the Texas firm; 
is that right? 
A. That's correct. 
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Q. Okay. And let me have you look at Exhibit 25, which 
Mr. Jones has stipulated as admissible, and tell me if you 
recognize Exhibit 25. 
A. Yes. It's a supplement to our referral agreement 
with the Texas firms. 
Q. Okay. And if we go to the recitals, let's just make 
sure we've got the parties. Do we have Williams & Bailey and 
Blue McCarthy. We call those thet Texas firms, right? 
A. That's correct. 
Q. Okay. And then it reference Gregory, Barton & 
Swapp, P.C., GBS. That's your old law firm, correct? 
A. That's correct. 
Q. Okay. And then we go down to the third Whereas 
clause, and it says: "Whereas the limited one-third attorney 
fee interest vesting in GBS is subject to and is limited by 
deductions for non-reimbursable client expenses relating to 
Phen-Fen cases." 
Did I read that correctly? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Tell the Court what is a non-reimburseable client 
expense? 
A. Non-reimbursable client expenses, as - as we defined 
them, meaning the Texas law firms, taken together as a whole, 
and Gregory, Barton & Swapp, were that there were certain 
expenses that we were going to have in pursuing this 
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litigation that would not be able to be reimbursed because it 
wasn't a cost that we could otherwise charge to the client. 
Things like the costs for the MEI lawsuit, costs for marketing 
that we had done collectively or - or separately. There may 
have been some travel expenses that we may not have been able 
to - to deduct. There are a lot of things that fall under a -
a what we would consider a non-reimbursable expense. 
Q. And, in fact, the expense for the initial 
screenings, the initial screenings, MEI got paid or was 
promised to be paid for those even those clients did not 
become clients of the firm, right? 
A. That's correct. That would have been a non-
reimbursable expense. 
Q. Okay. And if we go down to the end of this 
paragraph, referring to non-reimbursable expenses, and we go 
up one, two, three lines on the left-hand side, it says - it 
is a reference to echocardiograms on behalf of Phen-Fen 
clients and potential clients. Do you see that? 
A. I don't, I'm sorry. 
Q. So it's the third Whereas clause. 
A. Okay. 
Q. Third line up from the bottom. There's a reference 
to "echocardiograms on behalf of Phen-Fen clients and 
potential clients." Do you see that? 
A. Okay. Yes. 
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Q. And is that a reference in this paragraph about non-
reimbursable client expenses to echocardiograms that could not 
be withheld from the client's side. 
A. That — that's correct. Among other things, yes. 
Q. Among other things, right. Okay. Now, if we go to 
the next page and we go down to subheading B, it says: "The 
Texas firm's contribution." Are you with me? 
A. Yes. 
Q. It says: "The Texas firms have agreed to contribute 
the sum of $601,000 to cover the up-front payment in the MEI 
lawsuit." 
Did I read that correctly? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Is it your understanding that reference to that 
$601,000 is the same as the $601,000 referenced in the 
settlement agreement? 
A. That's correct. 
Q- Okay. And then it refers to some other litigation 
that was going on, but if you'll read with me down to about 
the middle of the paragraph where it says "these payments." 
Do you see that? I can come — 
A. Yes. 
Q. Okay. It says: "These payments are case expenses 
that arise out of the representation of the Phen-Fen referral 
clients." In other words, these are non-reimbursable case 
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expenses, right? 
A. That's correct. 
Q. And, in other words, the $601,000 is a non-
reimbursable case expense, meaning it's not for full studies. 
A. That would be correct. 
Q. Then if we go to the next page, up at the top, 
there's a paragraph 4(a). Tell me when you're there. 
A. Okay. 
Q. Okay. And it says: "Texas firm's contribution and 
right to recoup." If we go down to about the middle of the 
third line down where there's a reference, $730,000. Do you 
see that? 
A. Yes. 
Q. That's the figure that includes the $601,000 and 
some other monies for the other litigation, correct? 
A. Correct. 
Q. And it says: "...is and will be considered a case 
expense that shall be recouped by the Texas firms for any 
division of attorney fees is made under the referral 
agreement." 
Did I read that correctly? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And does that mean that this case expense is 
recovered out of the attorney fee or contingency fee side as 
opposed to the client cost side? 
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A. Yes. 
Q. And that gets recouped by the Texas firms before the 
contingency fees are divided. 
A. That's correct. 
Q. Okay. And then if we go down to the bottom of 
paragraph 4(a), maybe the second line up, it says: "Will be 
recouped before any division of attorney fees." Do you see 
that? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Again, a reference to these — the $730,000, 
including the six oh one, being attorney fees, not client 
costs. 
A. That's correct. We took those out of attorneys 
fees. 
Q. Right. Okay. And then if we go down to subsection 
5 - and I want you to go to about the middle of the paragraph, 
and it says: "Then the Texas firms will have the options." 
Tell me if you're there. 
A. Okay. 
Q. It says: "Then the Texas firms will have the option 
of paying directly to MEI out of the remaining attorney fees, 
if any. The balance owed to MEI under the MEI note as a case 
expense." Did I read that correctly? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And is that consistent with your understanding of 
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the settlement documents, which is MEI was gaining an 
additional right to be paid out of the attorney fees. 
A. That's correct. 
Q. Okay. And then if we go to the next page, paragraph 
7, and if you can go with me under subsection - subsection 
little (c). Are you there? 
A. Yes. 
Q. "The disbursement by the Texas firms' payment of any 
MEI note payments by the Texas firms utilizing any money 
that's withheld as a case expense from attorney fees." 
Again, is that a reference to attorney fees, 
contingency fees, as opposed to something from the client 
side? 
A. That's - that's correct. This is referencing the 
reconciliation. 
Q. Okay. Now, under the settlement agreement, there 
were also a series of orderly payments that were made to MEI. 
Do you recall that? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And we asked you in your deposition whether or not 
those payments were made as advance payments on full studies 
or something else. Do you recall that? 
A. I - I believe that that was asked me, yes. 
Q. Okay. Well, I'm sorry. Let me just ask it a 
different way. Those advance payments - or, excuse me, those 
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quarterly payments, were those being paid for full-studies or 
were those being paid for something else? 
A. For something else. 
Q. All right. And, in fact, isn't it true, under the 
settlement agreement, you got some additional benefits for our 
clients - for your Phen-Fen clients from MEI that MEI was not 
otherwise obligated to provide, correct? 
A. That's correct. 
Q. And that included redoing some measurements or 
adding measurements to a number of the full studies; is that 
right? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And that included agreeing to testify for a certain 
rate, which I can't remember. But MEI formally agreed to 
testify, if necessary, correct? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And were those potentially a good benefit to the law 
firms and the clients? 
A. without the information that was provided to us by 
MEI, we would not have been able to make a basis for these -
for these cases. It was the - that and the - I mean, that 
referencing the - the echocardiogram study and the testimony 
of the cardiologist that was actually reading those studies 
formed the basis for which DAT&K has been compensated in these 
cases and for which our clients were compensated. So, without 
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that, we didn't have anything. 
Q. Let me ask this: Did you ever explain to DAT&K, to 
Dan Tosic, what you've explained to the Court here today, that 
these escrow funds don't belong to GB&S, that they either have 
to go to MEI or they have to go to the clients? 
A. We've made — we've made that abundantly clear 
repeatedly. 
Q. Now, let me close by asking you to look at Exhibit 
14, which I believe has been stipulated to. And if you go 
to - it's title page 8 of 27, even though it's not the eighth 
page. 
By the way, do you have an understanding this was 
a — an agreement reached by Gregory, Barton & Swapp, the Texas 
law firms and DAT&K with regard to this about $900,000 that 
was withheld from the client side of the settlements? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Okay. And if we go to page 8 of 27, paragraph 2, 
next to the last sentence says: "Similarly, GBS, Barton and 
DAT&K have agreed to release any and all right, title and 
interest in or claim to the remaining $442,768.03 held by 
Williams & Bailey, BM&N, plus accrued interest thereon from 
the trust account where the funds are being held, which 
Williams & Bailey, BM&N has agreed to pay to MEI." 
Did I read that about right? 
A. Yes. 
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Q. All right. Was that because Texas believed these 
were client costs that they didn't have a right to? 
A. Absolutely. 
Q. They didn't want to touch them? 
A. That's my understanding. 
Q. All right. Was it your understanding that, under 
the theory asserted by DAT&K in this case, if Texas had joined 
in that theory, Texas would have a claim to that $442,000 that 
they gave to MEI? 
A. Yeah. Based on that, yes. 
Q. Yeah. But Texas never made that argument, did they? 
A. No. 
MR. MAGLEBY: No further questions, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Cross-examination? 
CROSS-EXAMINATION 
BY MR. JONES: 
Q. Mr. Barton, I believe the first question or one of 
the first questions that your counsel posed to you asked you 
whether MEI rendered services to your law firm. Do you recall 
that question? I think your response was that, no, those 
services were rendered to the clients. Do you recall that? 
A. I do recall that. 




Q. And if you'll look at the preamble paragraph 2, Mr. 
Barton. Do you see that sentence? 
A. I do. 
Q. "In 2002, a dispute rose between the parties 
regarding the services provided by MEI to Mr. Barton." Is 
that correct? 
A. I see that sentence. 
Q. Did you execute this agreement? 
A. Yes, I did. 
Q. And the parties to this agreement were — the Barton 
there is Gregory, Barton & Swapp and you personally, correct? 
A. I don't know what that Barton is referring to, if 
it's me personally of if it's the law firm. 
Q. We can look at the defined term in paragraph 1, Mr. 
Barton. 
A. Okay. 
Q. It defines it as Gregory, Barton & Swapp and Keith 
L. Barton. ~ 
A. Okay. 
Q. And so you executed a settlement agreement which 
states expressly that the services were not provided to the 
clients but, instead, were provided to your law firm. 
A. The services were provided to our clients. 
Q. So can you tell me why you executed and agreement 
that expressly recites that they were provided to your firm? 
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A. It was the settlement of a dispute. 
Q. Why would — why would this preamble be necessary to 
the settlement of a dispute, Mr. Barton? 
A. I don't know. You'd have to talk to the attorneys 
that drafted it. 
Q. Did you review it before you signed it? 
A. I'm sure I must have. 
Q. And I take it this did not catch your attention -
A. It did not, because — 
Q. — or to make a change in it. 
A. I didn't catch my attention because the services 
were provided to our clients. 
Q. Mr. Barton, the dispute that you settled here, it 
related to how much the - whether the clients really ought to 
pay, whether any money was owed to MEI for the work that they 
had done; is that correct? 
A. No. 
Q. Mr. Barton, didn't — wasn't there a dispute — we can 
go back and look at your testimony. The dispute was that -
regarding the quality of the work performed by MEI; is that 
correct? 
A. That's correct. 
Q. And so did you, at any time, tell MEI that you 
were — you were not going to pay or MEI was not going to be 
paid for the work that they had performed because of the 
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problems with the work that they had done? 
A. I tihnk in the process of our dispute that that -
there was an allegation of that, yes. 
Q. And that's what resulted in - in the litigation 
between Gregory, Barton & Swapp and MEI; is that correct? 
A. I don't know why Mr. - Mr. Fiddler filed suit. 
You'd have to ask him. 
Q. Well, isn't it true that Mr. Fiddler filed suit to 
collect the amount he claimed Gregory, Barton & Swapp owed him 
for the work that he had done? 
A. I guess that could have been part of that. 
Q. Okay. Was there some other part of it, Mr. Barton? 
A. I don't know. Do you have a question? 
Q. Well, you said that was part of it. I'm asking what 
other claims that were made. If that was not — if that was 
not all of it, what was it? 
A. You'd have to ask Mr. Fiddler. 
Q. You're not familiar with the pleadings or the 
documents in that litigation? 
A. I don't think it deserves a response, so... 
Q. So there was a dispute about whether MEI should be 
paid but, yet, the clients were not a party to that dispute, 
were they? 
A. Not to my knowledge. 
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Q. Were they a party to the litigation? 
A. No. 
Q. Were they a party to the settlement agreement? 
A. Not to my understanding. 
Q. So to the extent that you claim it was their money 
and it was their obligation to pay MEI, why were they not a 
party to this and why were they not a party to the lawsuit? 
MR. MAGLEBY: Objection. Lacks foundation. 
THE COURT: Overruled. It's cross-examination. 
You can answer, sir. 
THE WITNESS: Okay. 
Could you restate the question? 
MR. JONES: Let's provide some foundation. 
Q. Mr. Barton, were the clients made a party to the 
lawsuit between MEI and Gregory, Barton & Swapp? 
A. No. 
Q. Were the clients a party to the settlement agreement 
and mutual release marked as Exhibit 10? 
A. No. 
Q. I believe you testified that you believe the that 
clients had an obligation to pay MEI and it was their money. 
If that is the case, why were they not a party to this 
agreement or party to the lawsuit? 
MR. MAGLEBY: Same objection. 
THE COURT: Overruled. 
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THE WITNESS: I don't - I don't know why Mr. Fiddler 
didn't — didn't see them individually, if that's your 
question. 
Q. (By Mr. Jones) Did you think that the clients 
should be added as parties to this? 
A. What benefit would that be? 
Q. I believe, Mr. Barton, your argument is that it's 
their money; why wouldn't they be a party to determining how 
much of their money ought to be paid to MEI. 
A. So you're saying that I should have third-partied in 
all my clients? 
Q. Your testimony is it's their money. I don't want to 
be argumentative. Let's move on, Mr. Barton. 
Mr. Barton, could I ask you to take a look at 
Exhibit 7. 
A. Okay. 
Q. You testified about this document earlier; is that 
correct? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Do you recall that? Is this the only written 
agreement between MEI and Gregory, Barton & Swapp regarding 
the services to be provided by MEI? 
A. I believe that it's the only written agreement. 
Q. And does this agreement set forth the terms of 
payment for the services to be provided by MEI? 
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A. It sets forth the fee schedule. 
Q. Well, let's look more closely. It says: "Payment 
will be due 30 days upon receipt of statement." 
A. That was for echo screenings. 
Q. Actually, if you read the prior sentence, you'll see 
that it also includes the full workup and there's no reference 
in that sentence to just echos. 
A. Well, I can tell you what our practice was, and our 
practice dealt with echo screenings. 
Q. But the document that you signed provided for 
payment of both 30 days upon receipt of an invoice from MEI. 
A. I believe that we're here today to - to have 
evidence given about what the intent of the parties was. And 
I can tell you that the intent of the parties and the 
operation and how we — how we actually operated with these 
agreements was something different. 
Q. And so what you're telling me is that the intent of 
the parties xs contrary to the express terms of their written 
agreement. 
A. I'm telling you that the - the intent of the parties 
was different than this document and, xn practice, it was 
different as well. 
Q. Mr. Barton, did MEI provide monthly invoices to 
Gregory, Barton & Swapp? 
A. I believe that they did. 
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Q. So they billed Gregory, Barton & Swapp on a monthly 
basis in accordance with this agreement. 
A. Well, we received the - the billing statements, but, 
again, those statements were for our clients. 
Q. What do you mean the statements were for your 
clients? 
A. The statements that we would have received would 
have been a - an obligation of our clients and so we would -
would have — we would have duly noted that and... 
Q. You would — so you received an invoice from MEI. 
How did Gregory, Barton & Swapp account for an invoice once it 
was received? 
A. We put it in as a - as a - something that needed to 
be paid out on the file ultimately so that we would be able to 
protect that. 
Q. Did you - did you include it in the accounts payable 
of Gregory, Barton & Swapp? 
A. I don't remember. 
Q. You don't recall? 
A. I don't recall. 
Q. Is it possible that you included in the — on your 
general ledger or your balance sheet as an accounts payable 
owing by Gregory, Barton & Swapp? 
A. I have no idea. 
Q. Can I ask you, Mr. Barton, to take a look at the 
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contingency fee agreement. 
A. Which number -
THE COURT: Which exhibit is that? 
MR. JONES: The form. It's 11. 
THE COURT: 11? 
THE WITNESS: Okay. 
Q. (By Mr. Jones) Do you know whether this was the 
form of document that was used with respect to all the Phen-
Fen clients? 
A. I believe that it was, yes. 
Q. Do you know? 
A. Sitting here today telling you, yes, I would tell 
you that - that there was an agreement like this executed in 
every case. 
Q. Was this your standard form contingency fee 
agreement or was it modified for the Phen-Fen fee cases -
Phen-Fen cases? 
A. It was modified for the Phen-Fen cases. 
Q. And can you tell me what modifications were made to 
this document for the Phen-Fen cases? 
A. Under the scope of services generally let, that's — 
that's left blank. And, here, we've modified it to say that 
it — that "we're representing you in a matter of your claims 
regarding the taking of weight loss pills." 
Q. Right. You mentioned that earlier. Were there any 
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other changes to this document from your standard form? 
A. There was a change to the - to the fees. Normally, 
we would have a scaling fee that would go from thirty-three 
and a third percent to forty percent. There would be language 
m there that talked about that. We took all of that out and 
put 40 percent because we knew that all of these cases were 
goxng to litigation. 
Q. Mr. Barton, do you see anywhere in this agreement 
where you informed clients as to whether or not - as to - that 
they would be responsible for paying MEI for the work done, 
even if there were not a recovery in the case? 
A. I don't see anything like that in this document, but 
I think there's plenty of other documents that have that 
information in it. 
Q. But there's nothing in this document that tells them 
that, is there? 
A. It says: "You agree to pay all costs, disbursements 
and expenses owed by you in connection with this matter." I 
would consider that - that the MEI matter would be an expense 
that the client was obligated to pay. 
Q. Doesn't it - doesn't it go on to say: "If we reach 
a settlement or judgment on your - your behalf, or if our 
services are terminated for any reason by you"? So there's a 
qualifier there, isn't there, Mr. Barton? 
A. Yes. 
52 
Q. So there was no disclosure to clients that they 
might be liable to MEI if there was no recovery. 
A. That's not true. 
Q. No disclosure in this document? 
A. That mischaracterizes my testimony. 
Q. Okay. Well, would you point me to the disclosure in 
this document? 
A. In this particular document — 
Q. In this document. 
A. Okay. In this particular document, no. But if you 
take the - the documents as a whole, which I think we're -
we're here to do that today, to get to the bottom of it, to 
get to the truth of what it is, then — then taken as a whole, 
then those documents expressly indicate that those are the 
clients' responsibility. 
Q. Well, the only two documents we have here today, Mr. 
Barton, are Exhibit 11 and Exhibit 21, which address the echos 
and do not even address the full studies. 
Are you familiar with the Rule 1.5 of the Utah Rules 
of Ethics? 
A. I think that there's another document in here that 
we looked at earlier today. 
Q. We did, but it wasn't admitted, Mr. -
A. This lien agreement. You — in your objection, 
though, you mischaracterized my testimony earlier. You said 
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that - that there was - that I had indicated that I did not 
look through my office for this. What I indicated to you, and 
it's in my deposition, was that it was complicated, because 
we'd a split of the firm. We'd asked the receiver on various 
occasions to help us get back all of the documents that were 
with Gregory, Barton & Swapp. And I can tell you that every -
that this document, this lien agreement, was signed in every 
single file, in every single case. 
Q. Mr. Barton, we've been through that and that's not 
my question. 
A. No, we haven't. Your objection -
THE COURT: Whoa, whoa. Let me assert some control 
here. He asks the questions, you answer the questions, then 
we'll get through this. This isn't an argument. Okay? 
Let's go ahead. 
Q. (By Mr. Jones) Mr. Barton, I'm just asking whether 
there's any disclosure in this contingency fee agreement, any 
obligation on the part of the client to pay in the event 
there's not a settlement or recovery. 
A. If the agreements are taken as a whole and - and all 
of the forms are integrated like they're supposed to be, there 
is disclosure, yes. 
MR. JONES: Your Honor, I'm try - tried to just get 
through a simple question. There is no — 



























Q. (By Mr. Jones) Mr. Barton, can you jpoint me to 
anywhere in Exhibit 11 where it is disclosed to the client 
that they will be liable to pay MEI even in the event there is 
no recovery in the case. 
A. That document taken in conjunction with other 
documents that were signed at the time that we — that the 
services were provided indicate that to the client, yes. 
There as disclosure. 
Q. Mr. Barton, is it in this document or some other 
document? 
A. It's in other documents that were signed. 
Q. But it's not in Exhibit 11, correct? 
A. (No response.) 
Q. Correct? 
A. Again, if you take it in conjunction with the other 
documents, then it's there. 
MR. JONES: We'll move on, Your Honor. 
Q. Mr. Barton, could I direct your attention to 
paragraph 6 of that document? 
A. Which document is that? 
Q. Paragraph 5, I'm sorry, of Exhibit 11. 
A. Okay. 
Q. Do you see that? This is the provision whereby the 
client has granted you a lien on their recoveries. Do you see 
that? 
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A. I see that. 
Q. And that lien, it states, is to secure unpaid costs. 
Do you see that? "Unpaid costs or attorneys fees at the 
conclusion of my services." 
A. I see that. 
Q. Okay. Well, I believe your testimony is MEI was an 
unpaid cost or there were substantial unpaid costs to MEI -
A. I think my testimony was -
Q. — at the end of these cases, correct? 
A. — that they could have been an unpaid cost. 
Q. And they actually were an unpaid cost, weren't they, 
Mr. Barton? 
A. They were an expense that was associated with the 
file. 
Q. How is that distinguished from an unpaid cost, 
Mr. Barton? 
A. A cost is — is something — and we've been over this. 
We've talked about this for years now, Roger. We talked about 
it Texas years ago when we satt down and talked with the Texas 
firms, we've talked about it in my deposition. But a cost is 
something that we actually pay out on a file. 
Q. And would you point me to where it says that m 
your - in paragraph 5? 
A. I'm telling you what the practice is. 
Q. If it was actually paid - if it was actually paid 
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out, it wouldn't be an unpaid costs, would it? 
2 | A. It would be an unreimbursed cost, an unpaid cost. 
3 | Q. Let's take a look at paragraph 4(b) for a moment. 
Do you see that? You testified about it earlier. 
A. Yes. 
Q. Mr. Magleby asked you a question that said "that 
paid in advance.B But, actually, the language is "paid or 
advanced." Do you see that? 
9 I A. I see that. 
10 | Q. Okay. So we have two — we have two possibilities 
here; one, reimbursement for a cost that was paid by GB&S, 
correct? And another possibility is one that was advanced by 
GB&S. Do you see that? 
A. I see that. 
Q. Okay. And so there — there's something other than 
just cost that GBS had paid that is to be reimbursed here; 
isn't that true, Mr. Barton? 
18 | A. I don't know what you're referring to. 
19 | Q. Well, you tell me. What does "advanced" mean in 
this document? 
A. If we advanced a cost. In other words, if we paid 
for a - a medical record or if we paid for a deposition, that 
would be a - an advanced cost. 
Q. Mr. Barton, isn't it true that an advanced cost 
would also include obligations that the firm had incurred? 
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Isn't that an advance? 
A. I don't believe so. Not in the context that you're 
trying to use it in. 
Q. Why not, Mr. Barton? 
A. Because that's not the way it's done in practice. 
Q. Let's go back through this. 
You have entered into an agreement with MEI to pay 
them on a monthly basis for the services that they provide. 
We looked at that. And we'll — 
A. They were services that — for the — for the echo 
screenings not for the full studies. This agreement was only 
to operate as additional collateral for the full studies. 
Q. Additional collateral for the full studies? I'm 
sorry, Mr. Barton, I have no -
A. Additional security, I'm sorry. 
Q. What agreement? 
A. The agreement that you're referring to, the 
settlement agreement. 
Q. No. I'm not referring to the settlement agreement. 
I'm referring to the November 14th, 2000 agreement where MEI -
THE COURT: Could you state that exhibit number 
again? 
MR. MAGLEBY: Exhibit 7, I believe. 
MR. JONES: It's Exhibit 7, Your Honor. I'm sorry. 
THE COURT: All right. 
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Q. (By Mr. Jones) Exhibit 7 is your November 14, 2000 
agreement with MEI. 
A. That's a fee schedule. 
Q. Okay. And so - but Gregory, Barton & Swapp was 
obligated to pay MEI, was it not? 
A. We were directed by our clients to pay MEI, yes. 
Q. Was GBS obligated by contract to pay MEI? 
A. I did not believe so, no. 
Q. How do you explain this agreement that says exactly 
that, Mr. Barton? 
11 I A. No. 7? 
12 | Q. Yes. 
A. We were obligated to pay for — we were obligated to 
pay for echo screenings, we were obligated to - to help with 
the readings, we were obligated to pay some employee salaries, 
but the echo full workups were to be paid by our clients. 
Q. Aren't they - aren't the echo full workups expressly 
provided for in this agreement, Mr. Barton? 
A. They are - they are expressly provided for in this 
agreement, yes. But I can tell you that, in practice, it was 
something completely different. 
Q. We have the agreement, but that was not the 
practice. 
A. I've already testified to that, yeah. 




Q. You've seen this exhibit before, haven't you, 
Mr. Barton? 
A. I believe I have. 
Q. And is this the proof of claim that MEI filed in the 
receivership case? 
A. It appears to be. 
Q. And attached to that, Mr. Barton, are the note and 
security agreement that your counsel asked you uabout earlier, 
correct? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Okay. If you'll note, Mr. Barton, the amount of the 
claim is less than the - is less than the face amount of the 
note, which would indicate, Mr. Barton, I believe, some 
payments were made on this note after its execution. Can you 
tell me what payments were made on this note after its 
execution? 
A. I think I've already testified that there was - that 
there were payments that were made, six hundred and one 
thousand. 
Q. Mr. Barton, $601,000 was paid prior or concurrently 
with the execution on this note, and so that was not made 
after the payments were credited to the note. So I'm asking 
about payments that were made on the note itself. 
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A. I believe that there were some payments made. 
Q. Do you know the amount of those payments? 
A. I don't. 
Q. Do you know who paid those payments? 
A. it would have been Willlims and Kurker and the Texas 
firms collectively. 
Q. Williams Bailey would have paid those amounts? 
A. Yes. 
Q. If I could direct your attention to Exhibit 14, 
which is labeled page 2 of 27. 
MR. JONES: Your Honor, I would note this is not a 
complete agreement; it is the agreement that was noticed in 
the case and there were confidentiality issues, so it is a 
redacted agreement. 
THE COURT: Thank you. 
Q. (By Mr. Jones) You see page 2 of 27? 
A. Yes. 
Q. At the time this agreement was entered into in 2007, 
the Whereas at the top of the page says "Since the execution 
of the note, MEI has been paid $372,510.22. " Do you see that? 
A. I see that. 
Q. And you signed this agreement, did you not, 
Mr. Barton? 
A. I did. 
Q. Okay. So are those the payments that were made on 
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this note by the Texas firms? 
A. I don't know xf they were payments on the note or 
what they were for, but they were payments that were made. 
Q. It says they were payments on the note. Do you 
dispute that? 
A. I have no reason to. 
Q. That recital also, Mr. Barton, recites that 
$87,974.16 was taken from the clients' settlements. Do you 
see that? 
A. I see that. 
Q. So those - those monies were taken from client funds 
and paid on the MEI note; is that correct? 
A. I don't know if that's correct or not. It just says 
that $87,974.16 was recovered from client settlements. 
Q. Isn't that what that means, Mr. Barton? 
A. I don't know what it means. 
Q. Did you read it before you signed it? 
A. I"m sure I did. 
Q. So you have no idea what that means. 
A. Not sitting here today. 
Q. Okay. If monies were not paid from - it says 
$87,974.16 was recovered from the client settlements, what was 
the source of the remainder of the $372,000 in payments? 
A. I have no idea. 
Q. You have no idea. 
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A. I didn't make the payment. 
Q. Okay. Well, why would Williams Bailey make a 
payment? 
A. I don't know. You could have asked them. You could 
have deposed them. 
Q. You don't know why Williams Bailey made payments of 
$372,000 on an obligation on which you are personally 
obligated. You don't know that. 
A. I believe that there's something in here that 
indicates that there were quarterly payments to be made, 
Roger. 
Q. So was it made pursuant to an agreement between 
Gregory, Barton & Swapp, MEI and you? 
A. I suspect. 
Q. Do you know, Mr. Barton, whether those payments were 
considered, to the extent they were not from client portion of 
the recovery, were those loans to Gregory, Barton & Swapp? 
A. I think that they were considered non-recoverable 
expenses that were paid out. 
Q. Okay. To the extent that they were considered a 
non-recoverable expense, would they have been - would that 
amount have been subtracted from the attorneys fees that 
Gregory, Barton & Swapp otherwise would have been paid? 
A. No. They would have been - they would have been 
subtracted from the full - from the full amount of the 
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attorneys fees before attorneys fees were split by all the 
parties. 
Q. The monies that - you're talking about the $372,000. 
Are you suggesting that, to the extent that those were not 
from client recoveries, that 50 percent of that was Gregory, 
Barton & Swapp and 50 percent of that was the Texas firms? 
A. I don't - I don't know what percentage. I have no 
reference point for that. 
Q. Mr. Barton, we can look at the settlement agreement. 
But the settlement agreement provides that those payments are 
going to be recovered off the top from — 
A. I think that's what I said. 
Q. — the attorneys fees that otherwise would have been 
paid Gregory, Barton & Swapp. 
A. No. They were off the top from the attorneys fees 
from all of the parties. 
Q. Go back and take a look at that just a second, 
Mr. Barton. What about the $601,000 that the Texas firms 
advanced to make payment to MEI? Was that $601,000 deducted 
from the amount of attorneys fees that otherwise would have 
been paid Gregory, Barton & Swapp? 
A. I think that that $601,000 was treated as a non-
recoverable expense. 
Q. Well, didn't - didn't you go through with your 
attorney on Exhibit 25 that the six oh one and the other 
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expenses paid added up to $730,000 were going to come back in 
full to - to the Texas firms from your portion of the 
attorneys fees? 
MR. MAGLEBY: Your Honor, I'll just object. I'm not 
5 | Mr. Barton's attorney. 
6 | THE COURT: Well, I - I caught that. I understand 
that. 
THE WITNESS: Yeah. I think it indicates in here 
that those are a - a non-recoverable expenses. 
Q. (By Mr. Jones) I direct your attention to page 3 of 
that document is document 25. Exhibit 25, 4(a). Do you see 
that provision? 
A. I do. 
Q. Doesn't it expressly say that that money's coming 
off the top before any division of attorneys fees? 
A. I think that's what I've already stated. 
Q. Okay. So the effect of Williams Bailey making 
payments for you on the note or providing the $601,000 
ultimately reduced the amount of attorneys fees or the amount 
of money that GBS would receive under the referral agreement; 
isn't that correct? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And that, in turn, reduced the amount of money that 
DAT&K would receive, because it had a security interest in 
those amounts; isn't that correct also? 
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A. The only thing that DAT&K had a security interest 
was in our attorneys fees and any costs that they had 
advanced. 
Q. We can look at the prior court's order and the 
documents on that. That's inconsistent with both. But — 
MR. MAGLEBY: Your Honor, objection. Argumentative. 
THE COURT: Sustained. 
Q. (By Mr. Jones) Mr. Barton, let's just assume for a 
moment that - that DAT&K had a security interest in all monies 
to be paid Gregory, Barton & Swapp under the referral 
agreement. The fact that those payments were made to MEI 
reduced the amount that would have been paid to GBS under the 
referral agreement and reduce the amount that would have been 
paid to DAT&K. 
A. DAT&K had an interest in our attorneys fees. They 
also had a - they also had an interest in the - in the costs 
that we had advanced. 
Q. That's not my question, Mr. Barton. 
A. I understand, but -
Q. My question is: Did these payments result in a 
corresponding reduction in the amounts that would have been 
paid Gregory, Barton & Swapp and, in turn, pay DAT&K, assuming 
they had a security interest in all amounts — 
A. Well, non-recoverable expenses -
Q. — owed on the referral agreement? 
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A. Non-recoverable would have reduced everybody's -
would have reduced everybody's take. But DAT&K has received 
and is continuing to recive the monies that they contracted 
for. 
Q. They've continued to receive the monies they 
contracted for. 
I believe the answer to the question is yes. There 
is a reduction in the amount that was paid as a result of 
those advances to MEI, correct? 
A. DAT&K has an interest in our attorneys fees and they 
have an interest in the — in the amounts or the expenses that 
we would have actually advanced on behalf of the client. 
Q. Mr. Barton, can I ask you to take a look at Exhibit 
1. Is that the master loan and the security agreement between 
Advocate, DAT&K's predecessor, and Gregory, Barton & Swapp? 
A. It appears to be. 
Q. If I could ask you to take a look at page 3. The 
Description of Collateral. Do you see that, Mr. Barton? 
A. (No response.) 
Q. If you read paragraph 1 under the description of the 
collateral, can you tell me where that description would limit 
D&TK — DAT&K's collateral to just the expenses that they 
advanced? 
MR. MAGLEBY: Objection. Calls for a legal 
conclusion, document speaks for itself. 
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THE COURT: You can ask what his - you could ask for 
his understanding on this. That's happened throughout this 
proceeding. So he can answer the question. 
THE WITNESS: My understanding is that they have a 
right to legal and other services rendered and to be rendered 
for costs and expenses advanced. 
Q. (By Mr. Jones) Advanced by Gregory, Barton & Swapp; 
isn't that correct? 
A. Advanced by Gregory, Barton & Swapp. 
Q. Thank you. Can I ask you to take a look at - take 
a look at Exhibit 9. I believe you testified about this 
document earlier, Mr. Barton. Do you recall it? Is this the 
security agreement that Gregory, Barton & Swapp executed in 
favor of MEI? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And this was executed pursuant to the settlement 
agreement that we discussed earlier, correct, Mr. Barton? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Okay. Could I call your attention to a couple of 
paragraphs in this document. Do you see paragraph E on page 
2? 
A. Okay. 
Q. There's a definition of permitted liens there that 
expressly provides that the security interest being granted 



























A I see that 
Q And tath would have included Advocate/DAT&K would 
it not? 
A Yes The purpose of this - this security agreement 
was to privide additional security 
Q It would ha/e - those permitted liens that were 
senior to this interest would have included Advocate/DAT&K 
isn t that correct Mr Barton' 
A Yes 
Q Now Mr Barton was Gregory Barton & Swapp in 
defualt of its obligations to Advocate/DAT&K at the time this 
document was executed' 
A I believe that they were - they could have been I 
don t know 
Q I call our attention to paragraph 2 11 which 
expressly says "Barton herein provides notice that Advocate 
Capital s assignee is taking the position that Barton is in 
default with respect to the loans made to Barton " Do you see 
that' 
A I m sorry where are you at' 
Q Paragraph 2 11 on page 5 
A I m sorry what was your question' 
Q It expressly provides that you disclose to MEI that 
Gregory Barton & Swapp was m default of its obligations to -



























that Advocate Capital Inc s assignee has taken the — the 
position that Barton is in default with respect to certain 




Do you dispute that' 
Why would I' 
Okay And what was the — what were the defaults 
under Gregory Barton & Swapp s obligations to Advocate/DAT&K' j 
A 
Q 
I don t remember 
Had Gregory Barton & Swapp received any 




I m sure that they probably had 
Can I ask you to take a look at Exhibit 10 











Could I call our attention to paragraph 12 on what s 
of 15 Do you see that? 
Yes 
And this recites that - the note and that is the 
MEI note recites collateral for that note Do you 
I see that 
And it recites that that collateral is a defined 
Barton Phen Fen fees Do you see that' 
I don t know where you re 
Do you see the defined term "Barton Phen Fen fees"' 
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It s used elsewhere m the document I just want to make sure 
you see that definition 
A Okay 
Q Okay? Now the Barton Phen Fen fees refers to 
monies — to "attorneys fees and other monies Do you see 
that' 
A Where are you reading from' 
Q The note shall be secured by all fees or other 
monies that shall become due Barton " Do you see that' 
A I see that 
Q And that s defined as the Barton Phen Fen fees 
A Again this -
Q Mr Barton I m just going to -
A - this provision of the security interest never 
really came into play And I — I testified to that m my 
deposition 
Q Yeah Well -
A — this was additional security 
Q I m trying to ask the questions Mr Barton 
A Okay 
Q In paragraph 15 I believe you testified earlier 
that there was a mechanism or an agreement whereby the acres 
firms Williams Bailey would make payments on the MEI note 
Do you recall that? 
A Yes 
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Q Is this that agreement' Paragraph 15 of the 
settlement agreement' 
A No it is not that agreement 
Q Okay What does this agreement provide for this 
paragraph 15 provide for Mr Barton' 
A This paragraph 15 provides that in the event that 
everyone else has been paid - m other words the other 
security interests that are ahead of — of MEI have been paid 
And there are additional fees that are left over That those 
additional fees before the shareholders take any money those 
additional fees will be used to satisfy this note 
Q Mr Barton that s not what paragraph 15 provides 
Why don t we take a look at it 
MR MAGLEBY Objection Your Honor Argumentative 
THE COURT Sustained 
Q (By Mr Jones) Mr Barton doesn t paragraph 15 
provide a mechanism for making quarterly payments on the MEI 
note by the Texas firms' Isn t that what paragraph 15 does' 
A I don t see that 
Q You don t see that' 
A I don t believe that s what it means no 
Q What do you believe paragraph 15 means' 
A I ve already told you what I believe paragraph 15 
means 


























any quarterly payment as it becomes due, then Barton will make 
up the difference." 
The quarterly repayments referred to there, aren't 
they the MEI note, Mr Barton' It's the quarterly payments on 
the MEI note 
A I don't see where you're reading, no. 
THE COURT: What page are you on, Mr Jones' 
MR. JONES: Pardon' 
THE COURT: Which page are you on? 
MR. JONES I am on the bottom of page 15, the 
bottom of page 5 and the top of page 6. 
THE COURT. Okay. Thank you 
Q. (By Mr Jones) Why don't you just read that 
provision, Mr. Barton' 
THE COURT: You're, again, a little bit vague on the 
provision you want him to read. 
MR. JONES: Paragraph 15, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: We're at paragraph 15. Do you want him 
to read the whole paragraph or just -
MR. JONES: Yes. 
THE COURT: - down to the part that - okay. 
MR. JONES: Paragraph - the entire paragraph. 
THE WITNESS- Okay. 
Q. (By Mr. Jones) The fourteen - the $1,420.65, the 
monies to be withheld there, were those monies to be withheld 
73 
from the clients' portion of the recovery' 
A. Those were — those were monies that were supposed to 
be withheld from the clients' portion of their money, yes. 
Q. Okay. 
A. As directed by the clients. 
Q. And if there wasn't enough money — if there wasn't 
enough withheld from the client portion, it says here that 
Barton would make up the difference. Do you see that? 
A. I see that, yes. 
Q But you testified earlier that Gregory, Barton — 
niether you nor Gregory, Barton & Swapp made any payments on 
the notes. Did the Texas firms make up that deficiency on the 
quarterly payments 
A. Well, if there was a deficiency, first of all I 
mean, the — if any payments were made, they were withheld from 
client funds, as directed by the clients And so those were 
client funds to pay for the echocardiogram studies. If there 
was a deficiency on that amount - in other words, if the total 
amount that was - that was withheld from the clients did not 
amount to the payment that was to be made, then there was an 
additional amount that would have been due. 
Q. Right. And this provided that Gregory, Barton & 
Swapp would pay it. But I'm asking you- Did they do that' 
A. I did not, but — I didn't make a payment, no. 
Q. Did Gregory, Barton & Swapp make a payment' 
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A. I don't believe that Gregory, Barton & Swapp made a 
payment 
Q. Did the Texas firms make up that shortfall' 
A I believe that they did. 
Q. And then the Texas firms then recouped that money, 
as we talked about earlier, correct' 
A That's correct 
Q Now, Mr Barton, it uses the term "As an 
accommodation, the Texas firms will withhold and set aside 
from the Barton Phen-Fen fees earned through their 
representation." So the monies withheld and set aside and 
included within the definition of Barton Phen-Fen fees were 
the amounts deducted from the client portion of the 
settlement; isn't that correct' 
A. Those weren't fees. If it was deducted from the 
clients' portion of the settlement, it was client money that 
was directed to be paid. 
Q. I'm just asking about the definition of Barton Phen-
Fen fees m the document. 
A. That's my definition 
Q. The document - that's your definition' 
A. My definition and the definition that everybody in 
this, except for you, Roger, has indicated that - I mean, the 
Barton Phen-Fen fees doesn't - doesn't have anything to do 




























THE COURT: Are you going to have a lot more 
questions for Mr. Barton' 
MR. JONES: Just a few more. 
THE COURT: I'm just wondering about taking a recess 
here. 
MR. JONES: That's fine 
THE COURT: Okay. Why don't we take a ten-minute 
recess. I'll come back in the courtroom at a quarter till. 
MR. JONES: Thank you. 
THE COURT. Court's in recess. 
(Recess, 10:34 to 10-45 a.m.) 
THE COURT: Those present when the court recessed 
are again present. Mr Barton remains on the witness stand 
under oath. 
You may proceed. 
MR. MAGLEBY: Your Honor, we were just discussing -
we weren't sure if Mr Barton, had actually been sworn 
THE COURT: I had him come up and face the clerk and 
raise his right hand, yes. 
MR. MAGLEBY: Okay. Both Roger and I forgotten 
that, so... 
THE COURT: Okay. All right. Thank you. 
Q. (By Mr. Jones) Mr. Barton, I only have a few more 
questions And, again, I'm looking at Exhibit 10 that we were 
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looking at before the break. 
Do you see paragraph 14 in that agreement, 
Mr. Barton? It's on page 5 of 15. 
A. Yes. 
Q. This reflects, Mr. Barton, does it not, that you 
were aware and MEI was aware that the execution of the 
security agreement in favor of MEI was prohibited under your 
agreements with Advocate; isn't that correct? 
A. I believe that this - this paragraph speaks for 
itself. 
Q. And despite that prohibition in your loan documents 
with Advocate, you and MEI decided to go ahead and execute the 
security agreement; is that correct? 
A. We disclosed to - to MEI exactly what the nature of 
our security agreements were with Advocate Capital and we made 
no warranties regarding their proprietary or enforcability. 
Q. Mr. Barton, could I ask you to look at the last 
sentence of paragraph 15 on the following page? Do you see 
that? "In the event legal action by any third party..."? 
A. I do. 
Q. Does that refer to Advocate? 
A. I don't believe so. 
Q. Okay. Other than Advocate, who did you believe -
who did the parties believe might object to these costs taken 
from client funds and paid to MEI, who did the parties believe 
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would object to that, if not Advocate? 
A. I'm - I'm not sure what you're referring to. There 
were no costs that were taken from client funds. The clients 
directed us to pay for the - for the echocardiogram studies 
that were performed. 
Q. I understand, Mr. Barton. We've already talked 
about the $1,420.65 being withheld from client recoveries, 
have we not? 
A. We have, yeah. 
Q. Okay. And the next sentence says: "In the event of 
legal action by a third party which would take issue with the 
withholding or disbursing of these funds," I'm just simply 
asking you if that sentence does not refelct a concern about 
Advocate having a claim to those funds, who - what does it 
reflect? 
A. Well, we had been in protracted litigation with MEI 
for several years. And so it's - it's quite possible that we 
just needed this issue resolved for the benefit of our 
clients, for the benefit of the litigation going forward. 
Because, without that, we would not have been able to - to 
settle these claims. 
Q. That's not my question, Mr. Barton. My question is: 
Who, other than Advocate would have had a right to object to 
the payment of these funds to MEI? 
A. I think it was - I don't know if - I don't know that 
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we drafted that specifically with Advocate in mind. I don't 
believe that we did. I think it was, really, any litigation. 
Q. Okay. Can you think of anyone else -
A. Does it matter? 
Q. Yes. I'm just - you can - if the answer's no, the 
answer's no, but I — I'm asking whether you can think of 
anyone else who would have potentially asserted a claim to 
those funds other than Advocate. 
A. Well, I can tell you that it wasn't drafted with 
Advocate in mind, so... 
Q. You can tell me that, even though you don't know — 
you can't think of anyone else who might have had a claim. 
A. (No response.) 
MR. JONES: I have no further questions, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Thank you. 
Redirect. 
MR. MAGLEBY: Yes, Your Honor. 
REDIRECT EXAMINATION 
BY MR. MAGLEBY: 
Q. At the beginning of the examination, Mr. Jones asked 
you whether part of the dispute with MEI was originally over 
the quality of the echocardiograms. Do you recall that? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Was part of the dispute also over payment for other 
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things, such as several hundred thousand dollars with of 
initial screenings, $139,000 that MEI had paid out of pocket 
to Dr. David Rawling and other out-of-pocket costs? 
A. Yes. 
And were those the costs reflected in the $601,000 Q. 
payment? 
They were taken into - to consideration with that, 
yes. 
Q. Okay. And then Mr. Jones asked you some questions 
about the language, the specific language of Exhibit 7 and 
what the meaning of that document was. Do you recall that? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Did you draft that document? 
A. I did not. 
Q. Aside from that document, the prior two rounds, had 
you worked with a handshake with Mr. Fiddler? 
A. I had. 
Q. And even though you signed the document that's 
Exhibit 7, you had an understanding as to what the terms of 
your agreement with Mr. Fiddler were beyond the scope of that 
document, correct? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And if we take a look at this Exhibit 7, paragraph -
second paragraph from the bottom, it says: "It is my 
understanding that the echo screening will be included in the 
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price of an echo full weekup should an echo full workup be 
necessary." 
Does that tmean the echo screening, then, would not 
be immediately due and payable by the GBS firm? 
A. That's what - that's how we used that in practice, 
yes. 
Q. Right. And then it says: "Payment will be due 30 
days upon receipt of statement." Is that a reference to the 
echo screenings that are not included in the cost of a full 
workup? 
A. That's correct. 
Q. And is that how you proceeded? 
A. Yes. 
Q. All right. And, in fact, when you got billing 
statements from MEI, they reflected both initial screenings 
and the full studies, right? 
A. Yes, they did. 
Q. But what you upaid was the initial screenings. 
A. That's correct. 
Q. Now, you were asked some questions about the amount 
of money withheld from this third roiund. Do you recall that? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Or withheld from the client side, I should say. 
All right. Let's go to Exhibit 24. And tell me 
when you're there. 
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Is it your understanding that the amount that was 
actually withheld from the client side was not the $1,400 
reflected in the settlement agreement but, rather, it was 
$953, as reflected on Exhibit 24? 
A. That's correct. 
Q. Okay. So when Mr. Jones asked you about the $1,400 
refleclted on the settlement agreement, that $1,400, is that 
reflected or intended to be just client costs or is it 
actually an additional way for MEI to be paid from attorney 
fees if everybody else is paid first? 
A. It is an additional way - or was it was intended to 
be an additional way for MEI to be repaid once everybody else 
had been paid. 
Q. All right. You were asked some questions about the 
lien agreement, and I want to ask some follow-up. 
Is it my understanding, based on what Mr. Jones told 
you, that you believe that there are additional copies of the 
lien agreement in the possession of either Gregory, Barton & 
Swapp or your old partners that you haven't been able to 
locate? 
A. That's correct. 
Q. And you've asked them for them and they haven't 
provided them? 
A. We've asked them for them repeatedly. We've - we've 
asked the receiver to provide the recods that were being kept 
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by Gregory & Swapp repeatedly, and we haven't been able to get 
anything. 
MR. MAGLEBY: With that, Your Honor, going back to 
the lien agreement, whatever exhibit - I think it was 17 - the 
documents are unavailable. I didn't realize that Mr. Barton 
had tried to get those. 
THE COURT: Well, I - I know that he hasn't tried, 
but I guess you're the proponent of the document. Have you 
tried to get it? I guess that's the - that's the issue. 
Don't you have to do that under the ten hundred series of the 
Utah Rules of Evidence? Are you supposed to — since you're 
sponsoring the document, don't you have to try and get it and 
then explain why you couldn't get it? 
Seems to me this document would have been pretty 
easy to get over that -
MR. MAGLEBY: I guess -
THE COURT: - over that attorney-client privilege 
objection with a — with a motion to compel or something of 
that nature and a subpoena. But, then, I'm just - I'm just 
speculating, so I acknowledge that. So - so go ahead and 
respond to my question. 
MR. MAGLEBY: Your Honor, I guess you know the rule 
far better than me. That's what I'm realzing as I stand here. 
And so I will defer to the Court. But my point is this: I 
have just learned they really were not available, that Mr. 
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Barton tried to get them. He is also a proponent of the 
document m that sense. And if the receiver was asked and 
refused to turn them over, and if Mr. Barton's former partners 
were asked and refused to turn them over, that's why we don't 
have them. I think that is enough to meet the rule. 
THE COURT: Well, of course, the receiver, I don't 
think, would have any ability to turn them over or not. Maybe 
he would, but — but all it would take, it seems to me, would 
be a subpoena. And then when they said it's attorney-client 
privilege and you bring in a document like that and claim it's 
privileged, I don't think there's much chance of that argument 
succeeding. 
What effort - was there any effort made by the - by 
the claimant in this matter, MEI, to obtain those documents, 
I guess is what I'm asking. 
MR. MAGLEBY: Well, Your Honor, there are two 
claimants. There is also DAT&K. 
THE COURT: No. I mean, the -
MR. MAGLEBY: DAT&K -
THE COURT: - the claimant - the claimant - okay. 
Let's - don't - bad choice of - bad choice of words, okay? 
MR. MAGLEBY: The proponding - proponding the 
document, yes. 
THE COURT: Yeah. Yeah. MEI. Was there any - was 
there any attempt by MEI to obtain these documents by subpoena 
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or getting the assistance of the court? 
MR. MAGLEBY: There was not, because Mr. Jones asked 
for all documents — 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. MAGLEBY: - and -
THE COURT: Now, now what about the argument that 
Mr. Jones has, essentially, opened the door for this coming in 
through his examination. 
MR. MAGLEBY: I think that as well. I mean, he 
asked Mr. Barton about it and what they meant and whether or 
not clients really agreed to this. 
THE COURT: Right. 
MR. MAGLEBY: So I think, by cross-examining him, 
certainly the testimony as to what the practice and procedure 
and whether a lien was given comes in. And I think the 
document comes in as well to refresh Mr. Barton's recollection 
and rehabilitate his testimony. 
THE COURT: Okay. Mr. Jones, do you want to respond 
on admissibility of — I mean, it could be admissible for a lot 
of different reasons, if nothing else, but — 
MR. JONES: I did not inquire of Mr. Barton as to 
the lien agreement, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: It's Exhibit 11, was it, or -
MR. JONES: I inquired of the contingency fee 
agreement. 
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THE COURT: Oh, you're right. Exhibit -
MR. JONES: I did not inquire of the lien agreement. 
Mr. Barton offered testimony non-responsive to my questions 
about the lien agreement -
THE COURT: Right. 
MR. JONES: - but I did not. 
Your Honor, I couldn't tell you what Mr. - I cannot 
tell you what Mr. Barton has done since I tried to get these 
documents, but I can tell you that in his deposition testimony 
he told me he did look for the documents. 
"Were you able to locate any lien agreements executed by 
the Phen-Fen clients? 
"I know that we located at least one. 
"Okay. Were you able to locate any others?" 
His answer was: "I don't know." 
Mr. Barton never once testified that these documents 
were unavailable or he had sought information and couldn't get 
it. He said he didn't know. 
MR. MAGLEBY: Your Honor, he has now testified to 
that effect, but -
THE COURT: Well, at this point, I think the 
documents are out there fairly easily available if proper 
discovery had been done. I'm going to continue to sustain 
that objection. And Mr. Jones is correct, I — I was thinking 
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that we were — that he had asked a bunch of questions on — I 
was referring, actually, to — to the contingency fee contract 
in my mind. So I apologize for that. 
Okay. Go ahead. 
MR. MAGLEBY: Sure. 
Q. Mr. Barton, if you can turn to Exhibit 11. And 
Mr. Jones asked you questions about paragraph 5, the attorneys 
lien. Do you see that? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Is it your understanding that the attorneys lien 
only applies to costs that were paid — actually paid out-of-
pocket by the firm? 
A. That's my understanding. 
Q. And, of course, to your attorney fees. 
A. That's correct. 
Q. Right. And in this case - Mr. Jones asked you a 
number of questions about how this could be interpreted. Do 
you recall that? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Under Mr. Jones' interpretation that you would be 
entitled to money out of the client side that you had not -
that GBS had not already paid, is it your understanding that 
would be a violation of your ethical obligations? 
A. That is my understanding. 
Q. And your interpretation that you would not be 
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entitled to get that money from the clients if you hadn't 
actually written a check, is that consistent with your ethical 
obligations? 
A. It is consistsent with those ethical obligations. 
The only exception to that is when we have a lien from a 
health care provider or a services provider would the client 
has signed off on, the services provider has signed off and we 
have signed off on stating that we will withhold money from 
their settlement, and that's what we have in the case of — of 
the Mobile Echo studies. 
Q. But that lien is not a lien in favor of Gregory, 
Barton & Swapp, monies owed to Gregory, Barton & Swapp, it^s 
a lien in favor of the service provider, correct? 
A. That's correct. 
Q. All right. Let's go to Exhibit 14, page 2. First 
Whereas clause. 
"Whereas, since the execution of the MEI note, MEI's 
been paid $372,510.22, of which only $87,974 was recovered 
client settlements." Do you see that? 
A. Yes. 
Q. It doesn't say that this $372,000 plus the eighty-
seven was an advance on the full studies, does it? 
A. No. 
Q. And this eighty-seven thousand, this was comprised 


























the $1,400, as we saw on the settlement agreement, correct? 
A. 
Q. 
I don't know. 
Okay. Fair enough. 
Mr. Jones asked you some questions about non-











Do you recall that? 
I do. 
Did DAT&K ever sue Texas to get those monies? 
Not to my knowledge, no. 
Did they ever make a claim on those monies? 
Through the court system? 
Yeah. 
Not that I'm aware. 
Okay. And then you were asked - let's see here, 
25. The $601,000, that was treated as a invoice 






Okay. And it got accounted for between Texas on the 
and GB&S on the other hand, in the same way as any 





Now, with regard to that, other non-recoverable 
would inlcude things like money you had paid to 



























echocardiograms, money you had paid to copy services, those 
kinds of things, right? 
A. No. A non-recoverable expense would be something 
that we could charge back to the client. 
Q. Right. Okay. Got you. So with - but this expense, 
the $601,000 was treated as a non-recoverable expense, right? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Okay. So give me two or three expenses of a non-
recoverable expense. Advertising? 
A. Advertising costs. 
Q. Okay. Give me another example of a non-recoverable 
expense. 
A. Litigation costs — 
Q. Okay. 
A. - that are an outside litigation. 
Q. Okay. How about - I'm trying to think of something 
you wouldn't charge your clients for. I mean, your general 
overhead. Do you — did you have to rent any space that was a 
non-recoverable cost? 
A. If we did have to rent space, that would be a non-
recoverable cost. 
Q. Okay. 
A. It would be very difficult to allocate it between 
clients. 
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Q. Right. Right, right, right. And DAT&K has never 
sued or claimed or argued that, for example, the non-
recoverable advertising costs shouldn't have been paid and 
that they ought to get that tmoney back, have they? 
A. Not — not to my knowledge. 
Q. And you said some of these litigation costs. They 
have never sued any of the people that got that money to get 
it back, have they? 
A. Not that I'm aware of. 
Q. Okay. So if we were going to treat the non-
recoverable $601,000 the same as these other non-recoverable 
expenses taken off the top by Texas, we would have expected to 
see DAT&K sue all those other companies? 
A. I would imagine. 
Q. Okay. And Mr. Jones asked you questions about, 
"Well, isn't it true, Mr. Barton, that when Texas withholds 
this money off the top, that decreases the amount of money 
ultimately available to GBS for a contingency fee," right? 
A. That was the question, yeah. 
Q. Okay. But when DAT&K did this loan, they knew you 
were working with Texas, right? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And they had at least every opportunity to see your 
referral agreements and all of the agreements under which they 
were ultimately going to be able to secure repayment, right? 
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A. That's correct. 
Q. So they knew that Texas had a right to withhold 
money off the top that their security agreement wouldn't 
attached to, wouldn't you say? 
A. I believe that they understood that, yes. 
Q. Okay. And they still made the loan anyway, didn't 
they? 
A. Yes, they did. 
Q. You were asked a couple of questions about Exhibit 
1, the master loan and security agreement between GB&S and 
DAT&K. And I don't need you to look at it; just one simple 
question. 
Was MEI a party to that agreement? 
A. No. 
Q. And then you were asked some questions about the 
lien or the collateral that was given as part of that Exhibit 
1. Has it ever been your understanding that the collateral 
you were pledging applied to costs that came out of the client 
side? Under Exhibit 1? 
A. Under Exhibit 1. My understanding was is that, if 
we advanced a cost that - that those advanced costs, once 
taken out of the clients * portion would have been a part of 
the collateral that DAT&K had. But a lien like this for a 





























not an advanced cost from us it's not a cost that 
we've paid for out of pocket I mean to me, the ultimate 
proof is Did he get paid7 And he hasn t been paid 
Q 
Texas or 
And with regard to, let's say, monies advanced by 
paid by Texas, you couldn t give a security agreement 







How do you mean? 
You couldn't sign on behalf of Texas? 
No 
And DAT&K knew that when they made you the loan 
I believe that they understood that 
Certainly, Texas is not a party to Exhibit 1, 








Let's take a look at Exhibit 10 And it was page 4 
Paragraph 12, MEI's Security Interests. Are you with 
Yes 
It says "The note shall be secured by all fees or 





With regard to the client costs, those don't become 
due to Barton unless you've actually advanced them, correct? 
A That's correct 
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Q And ;just to make sure I understand what you're 
saying, let's go to pages 5 and 6 Let's talk about the 
Echocardiogram Expense Hole-Back 
So the hold-back money, to the extent it's not paid 
out of client costs, is extra contingency fee money And what 
you re saying is, by giving MEI what you gave it here, MEI 
would get paid before the partners of the law firm 
A My understanding — and I was — I may have been 
confused earlier about paragraph 15 and paragraph 12 But my 
understanding when we put this note together was that MEI 
would have an additional security interest for being paid 
And my understanding, or the way that I understood it, the way 
it was explained to me was that, if everything went well that 
everybody would be paid And if there was a shortfall - in 
other words, if there weren t sufficient monies that had come 
from the clients to pay down this note that we had agreed to 
pay with MEI, that - that this was additional security 
interest for MEI so that, before the partners of the firm got 
paid that money would go to - to satisfy this obligation 
Q And I don t know if you remember this or not, but do I 
you remember that one of MEI's concerns was, "Hey we d better 
get paid before Barton gets paid"? 
A I remember that there was a discussion about that 
Q Sure And the way that this is set up, was it your 
understanding, if, for example, say, some of the Phen-Fen 
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cases came in and they were big winners and DAT&K and 
everybody else got paid off, but all of the cases hadn't been 
settled, so MEI hadn't been paid out of every little client 
settlement and you had extra money as a result of that and 
these other security interests had been taken care of then 
was it your understanding that extra money had to be paid out 
under the note? 
A Yes 
Q That didn t happen, did it? 
A It hasn't happened so far 
MR MAGLEBY All right No further questions, Your 
Honor 
THE COURT Thank you 
Recross-exammation? 
RECROSS-EXAMINATION 
BY MR JONES 
Q Just one follow-up 
Mr Barton, when the $601 000 was paid pursuant to 
the settlement agreement, you 11 recall did that — did that 
satisfy Gregory, Barton & Swapp s obligation with respect to 
the screenings? 
A My understanding is that it did satisfy that fore-
screenings that had taken place where we didn t have follow-up 
full echo study 
Q What aoout - what about where you had - what about -
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so that had been paid So the monies that came m after that 
on the note would have had to relate to full studies would 
they not? 
A Full studies Full studies and, I think under our 
fee schedule up here in Exhibit 7, I think that my 
recollection is is that what we did is, if we had a — if we 
had an echo - a screening or a pre-screenmg echo that didn't 
turn into a full study, then we were obligated to pay that 
right away If it turned into a full study, then we included 
that cost of the screening in the full study 
Q I understand But in your — when Mr Magleby asked 
you a question about the $372,000, you said that that was non-
applicable to the full studies But it was wasn't it, 
because the screens had been paid at the time those payments 
were made 
A Which three hundred and twenty thousand are you 
referring to? 
Q The question he asked you, Mr Barton was in 
relation to Exhibit 14 top of the second page, 2 of 27 He 
asked you whether that $372,000 related to the full studies, 
and you said no But it does, doesn't it Mr Barton? 
A It says that since the execution of the MEI note 
MEI has been paid $372,000 It doesn t say that that money 
has been paid pursuant to the MEI note It says that $87,974 
was recovered from client settlements 
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Q. Right. All of that related to full studies, did it 
not, Mr. Barton? 
A. No. 
Q. Okay. Then what payments would have been made if — 
the echoes had been paid for, all we have left is the full 
studies. So what would that have been applied to if not the 
full studies, Mr. Barton? 
A. The - in other words, the $372,000 that's - that 
it's referencing here? 
Q. Yes, Mr. Barton. 
A. Yeah. I don't believe it's - it's referencing full 
studies. I think the $87,974, which was recovered from client 
settlements has to do with full studies. 
Q. And the — MEI wasn't owed any money for the echo 
screening at this point in time other than those that were 
incorporated into the full studies; isn't that correct? 
A. I don't - I'm not sure what - what the time frame 
was that you're talking about here. 
Q. But you testified that the echoes, other than those 
incorporated into the full studies, had been paid, did you 
not? 
A. What I said was that the - the pre-screening 
echoes — the pre-screening echoes were part of our settlement 
agreement. If it - if it moved on, if the case moved on and 
it had a pre-screening echo, then that pre- screening echo was 
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pulled up into the full-screen echo and it wasn't due at the -
at that time. 
Q. So - Mr. Barton, I'll just ask one last time. So 
the $372,510.22 had to relate to the full studies, did it not? 
A. I don't believe that's what it says. 
Q. I didn't ask you what it says. I asked you: Didn't 
the $372,000 and change relate to the full studies? 
A. If you can give me an accounting of it, I'd be happy 
to - look at that and answer your question. 
Q. What else could it have related to, Mr. Barton, if 
not the full studies? Give me an alternative explanation for 
that payment. 
A. It's - I don't have a context or a reference for it. 
Q. You have no alternative explanation for that? 
A. No. It's not that I don't have an alternative, it's 
just that I don't have - I don't have any information that 
you've given me that I can intelligently answer it. 
MR. JONES: Thank you, Mr. Barton. 
THE COURT: Redirect? 
MR. MAGLEBY: Yes. 
REDIRECT EXAMINATION 
BY MR. MAGLEBY: 
Q. Mr. Barton, with regard to what these quarterly 
payments were for, a large part of it was interest, right? 
A. That was my understanding. 
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Q. And at the same time, under the settlement 
agreement, you got MEI to agree to do additional measurements 
on echoes, correct? 
A. That's correct. 
Q. And you didn't have MEI' s measurements or - you 
didn't have these additional measurements on the echoes at the 
time, did you? 
A. No. And that was part of the problem. Without 
those, we would not have been able to settle those client 
cases because we would not have had the proof. 
Q. And that was important. 
A. It was critical. The $10 million that - that DAT&K 
has received so far is a direct result of Mr. Fiddler and 
Mobile Echocardiogram. 
Q. And those - and that work. 
A. And that work that they performed. 
Q. And we looked at Exhibit 25, and you can look at it 
if you want to, but this is the agreement between your firm 
and you and Texas about how this money paid to MEI is going to 
be treated between the firms. Do you recall that? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And the quarterly payments treated under Exhibit 25 
is non-recoverable expenses, correct? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Not allocated to full study, are they? 
99 
A. No, they would not have been allocated to full 
studies. 
Q. Okay. So treated just the same as a non-recoverable 
expense from an advertising agency or a television station or 
a radio station in terms of how it was literally accounted for 
between the firms. 
A. That's correct. 
Q. All right. And to your knowledge, has DAT&K sued 
any of those entities to try to get the money back? 
A. Not that I'm aware. 
MR. MAGLEBY: No further questions, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Any recross? 
All right. 
Thank you, sir. You may stand down. 
May this witness be excused or would you like him to 
remain? 
MR. MAGLEBY: I think we would like him to remain, 
because I'm a pessimist, but... 
THE COURT: All right, sir. Thank you. 
MR. MAGLEBY: Your Honor, we would call Alan Fidler. 
THE COURT: Very well, then. Sir, would you please 



























called as a witness by Mobile 
Echocardiography, being first duly 
sworn, was examined and testified 
on his oath as follows: 
THE COURT: Please have a seat. 
DIRECT EXAMINATION 
BY MR. MAGLEBY: 
Q. Mr. Fidler, even though we know who you are, could 















that I do 
Alan Eugene Fidler. 
And, Mr. Fidler, what is your business? 
My business is doing echocardiograms for several 
, doctors and clinics throughout a multi-state area. 
And do you operate under a business name or a 
entity? 
I do. Mobile Echocardiography, Inc. 
And is your wife a co-owner in that company? 
She is. 
Okay. And does - and what's the name of your wife? 
Diane Fidler. 
Diane Fidler. And does she help you do the work 
do in that company sometimes? 
She does the accounting and billing for the echoes 
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Q. Okay. And for how many years - well, strike that. 
Let me ask a better question. 
When did you first start business as MEI or Mobile 
Echocardiography? 
A. In 1987. 
Q. And tell us briefly what MEI does. 
A. MEI contracts with — as I mentioned, hospitals, 
clinics and doctors throughout the area to perform 
echocardiogram tests on their patients. And we do it on a 
mobile basis. We take our -
Q. You go — go to the patient. 
A. Yes. We go to the clinic, hospital or office and I 
take my machine in — it's about 500 pounds — and we use an 
exam room where we do the test and then we take the readings 
from that test to a cardiologist to be read. That document 
from the cardiologist, his interpretation, is then sent back 
to the doctor and then he bases his treatment of that patient 
on that echocardiogram test. 
Q. And just tell the Court briefly, if you would, some 
of the physicians or facilities for which you've done 
echocardiograms. 
A. I did echoes for the Utah Heart Clinic, the LDS 
Cardiologists, their group, for over ten years. I've done all 
of Hill Air Force Base echoes, hospitals in Roosevelt, Vernal, 
Tooele, Nephi, Evanston. I've had 25 different cardiologists 
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throughout the valley use my work. I've had over 150 doctors 
that refer patients to me to do their echocardiogram tests. 
Q. So safe to say you were doing echoes before you met 
Mr. Barton? 
A. About 12 years before. 
Q. Okay. Now, at some point in time, you came to sign 
an agreement with Mr. Barton to provide echocardiograms for 
the third round? Does that sound familiar? 
A. Yes, it does. 
Q. And will you just look at Exhibit 7 and tell us if 
that's the agreement relating to the third round? 
A. I don't have a book up here. 
Q. Oh. 
A. But I'm sure it is. 
MR. MAGLEBY: Mr. Barton, did you take (inaudible)? 
MR. BARTON: Yes, I did, sir. 
MR. MAGLEBY: Your Honor, if I may approach the 
witness. 
THE COURT: Yes. 
THE WITNESS: Thank you. 
Q. (By Mr. Magleby) And I'll ask the question again. 
Is Exhibit 7 the - an agreement between you on the one hand or 
MEI on the one hand and Gregory, Barton & Swapp and Keith 
Barton on the other hand for these echo services relating to 
the third round? 
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A. Yes, it is. 
Q. Okay. Now, prior to that, you had done 
echocardiograms for the first and second round? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And that was on a handshake? 
A. Yes. 
Q. This third round — you've got this one-page 
agreement, but did you also have discussions with Mr. Barton 
about things that were not in the agreement? 
A. Yes, I did. 
Q. And was that fine with you? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Was it fine with Mr. Barton? 
A. Yes. 
Q. With regard to the initial screenings, was it your 
understanding, either under this agreement or otherwise, the 
initial screenings would be paid within 30 days and payment 
for the full studies would be deferred? 
A. That is correct. Keith and I agreed that I would 
not be paid for the full studies until the cases settled, at 
some point years in the future, and then I would be paid for 
the full-study echocardiograms. 
Q. Now, notwithstanding that fact, you did a bunch of 
initial screenings, right? 



























Q Were you able to do 10 000 initial screenings by 
yourself 
A No No I had eight other technicians that I hired 
throughout the valley echoe technicians and four assistants 
to help them - to help all of us 
Q Everybody did — 
A We were very busy 
Q And let me back up I missed a question Are you 
certified to perform echocardiograms? 
A I am 1 
Q Tell the Court what licenses or certifications you 
have 
A I m registered with the ARDMS which is the American 
Registry for Medical Diagnostic Sonographers It s a national 
registry that you have to be accredited through in order for 
insurance companies to pay for echocardiogram tests done on 
their — their patients And that s a recurring — I have to 
qualify yearly to maintain that currency 
Q Okay So prior to doing the work with Barton you 
did all or most of the echoes for MEI' 
































A A lot of them 
Q Let me just cut to the chase You re hands-on you 
did a lot of the work yourself right9 
A Yes I did 
Q Okay I should have just asked that question 
And then let s talk a little bit about then the 
settlement agreement which is Exhibit 10 And if you go to 
the third page there s a reference to a $601 000 payment Do 
you see that7 
A Yes I do 
Q All right And then I m going to ask you to turn to 
Exhibit 20 which is an email from me to Mr Barton s 
attorneys Do you recognize that document' 
A I have seen it yes ] 
Q Okay And did you see it and approve the settlement 
offer m it before we sent it out the door' 
A I did 
Q Very glad you said that 
And in fact wasn t it always our practice — well 
strike that I m not going to get into attorney-client 
communications 
Let s go to the third page It says Option No 2 
Payable Now Do you see that' 
A Yes 
Q And it says "initial screenings with interest 
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$395 443 " Do you see that entry' 
A I do 
Q Those are the initial screenings that you billed Mr 
Barton for every month' 
A Yes 
Q And I take it at this point in time there were a 
number of those bills that hadn t been paid is that right' 
A Yeah We were several months m arrears of getting 
payments for the screenings 
Q Now when you didn t get paid for the screenings 
did MEI still have to go ahead and pay out of pocket its 
technicians and all of the other expenses associated with 
hiring six to eight technicians to work at Mr Barton s 
office? 
A Yes I did 
Q All right Was it important to you to get this 
initial screening money as part of the initial settlement 
payment' 
A I don t understand the question I m sorry 
Q Strike that I 11 just go back 
Let s go down to - let s go to "Technician Cost " 
A Uh-huh (Affirmative ) 
Q Fourth entry down $41 125 Can you tell us what 
that represents' 
A On our contract that we signed Keith agreed to pay 
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$50 000 for one of my technicians that I hired and she hadn t 
quite worked a year so that represented her time -
Q Pro-rated 
A Yes 
Q And did you in fact pay that - you had already paid 
that $41 125 out of pocket' 
A Yes 
Q Yes Okay And then there s one that says "Rawlmg 
readings paid directly by MEI $139 400 " Do you see that 
entry' 
A I do 
Q Okay And then I m going to ask you to go to 
Exhibit 15 and go to the back of Exhibit 15 and flip a few 
pages forward four or five until you come to something 
called Statement of Account for David A Rawlmg 
A It s way back there 
Q I can come help you if you have trouble finding it 
A Okay Got it right here 
Q Okay And is that an invoice from David A Rawlmg 
that was given to Mobile Echo for reading full studies' 
A Yes During the course of the third round I paid 
for Dr Rawlmg to read 697 echocardiograms at $200 each And 
I made him kind of semi monthly payments the total of which 
adds up to $139 400 
Q So again that was an actual out-of-pocket expense 
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that you had made. 
A. Yes, it is. 
Q. All right. Now, going back to Exhibit 20, there is 
an entry on the third page for "Stat readings, $2,900." 
What's that entry? 
A. Occasionally, Mr. Barton's office would ask for a 
quick reading of one of their patients. Dr. Rawling was a 
little behind with all the extra work that we gave him to do 
on top of his regular study, and he agreed to expedite 
readings on echocardiograms for a certain fee, and Mr. Barton 
would ask us occasionally for an expedited reading on some of 
his clients, and that's what that money represented that I 
paid. 
Q. So, in other words, you paid that out of pocket? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And you wanted that money back when you were 
settling this case. 
A. Well, I assumed I would get it back, yes. 
Q. But, I mean, when we were settling, it was one of 
the things that you specifically wanted back. 
A. Oh, yeah. Yes. 
Q. Okay. And then there's Materials, Costs Not 
Reimbursed, $1,075. Tell us in one or two sentences what that 
reflects. 
A. That reflects table paper, gowns, the super VHS 
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tapes that we used were twenty bucks apiece, gel, just the -
the costs in performing the test itself. 
Q. And, again, were those literally out of your pocket? 
A. They are. 
Q. Okay. And the next to the last entry, there's 
another initial screening entry, $69,625. Does that reflect 
a request to be paid for additional initial screenings that 
you had not been compensated for? 
A. It does. 
Q. All right. And then, finally, there's one that says 
"Plane tickets, New York, $1,000." 
A. Uh-huh. (Affirmative.) 
Q. Is that familiar to you? 
A. Yes, it is. 
Q. Does that $1,000 number there have anything to do 
with the $1,000 that is tacked onto the $600,000 reflected in 
Exhibit 10? 
A. That is the $1,000 in addition to the six hundred. 
Q. And tell me why that $1,000 was added onto the 
settlement agreement. 
A. That was put there by my wife. Basically, we had 
paid for plane tickets for you and I to travel back to New 
York to depose cardiologists. They were non-refundable plane 
tickets that came out of Mobile Echo. At the last minute, Mr. 



























fly back there. We lost the money for those and my wife was 
very upset about that and wanted that back. 
Q. Right. So -
A. So we added - I had to add that in. 
Q. So does that $1,000 directly tie this option No. 2 
Payable Now to the settlement agreement? 
A. Yes. 
Q. All right. And, in fact, you recall that the offers 
went back and forth, and every time they went back and forth, 
we'd add a thousand dollars to it. 
A. Yes. 
Q. So the offer that - the next to the last offer was 
$600,000 and we added a thousand dolars to it. 
A. That is correct. 
Q. All right. Do you have any doubt that that $601,000 
that was paid to you as part of the settlement agreement was 
for these other things that we've been talking about? 
A. That's — 
Q. For the initial screenings, the materials costs -
A. That covered what we have written down as our 
expenses for the initial screenings. 
Q. Okay. 
A. And the readings for those full studies that I did. 
Q. Okay. 
Whoops, I'm on the wrong outline. I apologize. 
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Now, with regard to the settlement agreement, which 
I believe is Exhibit 10 - and you can turn to it, but let me 
ask some background questions. 
Are you a lawyer, Mr. Fidler? 
A. No, I'm not. 
Q. Did you draft the details of the language in the 
settlement agreement? 
A. No, I did not. 
Q. Notwithstanding that fact, did you have an 
understanding of, generally, what you were getting and what 
you were giving as part of this settlement? 
A. I do have a general understanding. 
Q. Did you ever think you were giving up your right to 
be paid directly from the client portion of a settlement? A 
No. That - that was my guarantee, that I would be paid for 
the echoes that I did and that this settlement agreement, as 
Mr. Barton has testified, was another means whereby he could 
pay me for the client costs for their echocardiograms. 
Q. Okay. So additional protection for MEI? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And was one of the concerns when we were negotiating 
this agreement, "Look, Keith Barton better not get paid before 
I do"? 
A. Definitely. 
Q. Yeah. In fact, that was kind of a touchy point, 
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wasn't it? 
A Yeah At the time 
Q All right And so the echocardiogram hold-back 
that's reflected in here, was that an additional protection 
for MEI' 
A Yes 
Q And have you ever waived your right to be paid 
directly from clients' 
A. I have never waived that right I've known that 
to - in my understanding, to be mine and mine only, and no one 
else can come in and claim the — the compensation for the work 
that I did 
Q All right And then when we negotiated Exhibit 10 
well, let's talk about - Mr Jones was asking Mr Barton about 
a term called Barton Phen-Fen Fees Do you recall that' 
A Yes 
Q. Oh, and if you go to page 4 of 15, there it is m 
paragraph 12 
Now, at the time this settlement agreement was 
executed, did you have any idea how much money Barton was 
going to get in contingency fees as a result of the Phen-Fen 
cases? 
A We'd discussed that just generally, and the hopes 
were that he would be getting upwards to $100 million 



























A Uh-huh (Affirmative ) 
Q You have to say yes or no , 
A Yes, it was 
Q Okay And so did it seem a real possibility to you 
at the time this settlement agreement was executed that Barton 
might get enough contingency fees that he would be able to pay 
you back faster than the cases settled' 
A More than enough 
Q Okay Now under the settlement agreement, you 
agreed to do some additional things for Gregory Barton & 
Swapp and the Texas firms, is that right' 
A That's correct 
Q All right Let's flip ahead to paragraph No 16, 
which is on page 6 of 15 Tell me when you're there 
A What exhibit' 
Q Oh, I'm sorry, Exhibit 10 
A Exhibit 10 Okay And paragraph 16' 
Q Paragraph 16 
A Okay 
Q And it says 'Duplicate echocardiograms and 
measurements" is that right' 
A That's correct 
Q And it says "MEI will make one copy and perform 
additional measurements on request for no charge up to 75 
echocardiograms " and then it goes on, is that correct' 
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A Yes. 
Q Now, tell me, what does it mean by doing - or what 
did it mean, in your understanding, that you would have to do 
to put these additional measurements on these echocardiograms' 
A Well, these were on VHS tapes, and so we would have 
to find the tape, find the patient and go through that 
person s echocardiogram to the point in the study where they 
wanted extra or additional measurements made I could then 
stop the recording and, through some post-processing of my 
machine, be able to make these measurements and then copy them 
off for the — 
For the lawyers' 
— for the attorneys Yes 
Okay So did that take a fair amount of time' 
Oh, yeah 
Longer — more or less than doing a full study' 
Probably about the same 
And how come' 
Well, to get the tape, to put it in, to wind it 
forward and then to basically almost do the full study over 
again with the measurements that were on there is a little 
cumbersome and it takes some time to do that 




















Q And in fact, originally, you had done something 
like 3,000 full studies, your company' 
A We did approximately 2500 full studies 
Q Twenty-five Okay So, in your mind, was this a 
significant contribution that you would be making to the Texas 
firms and the Barton firm' 
A Yes And as Keith said I mean, without those 
measurements, their cases were in jeopardy and that s what we 
needed to do 
Q And you weren't obligated to make those measurements 
under your prior agreement with Mr Barton' Exhibit 7? 
A Correct 
Q. So you were given something extra 
A Yes 
Q And you wanted to be paid for that something extra 
A Yes 
Q And that was part of the agreement that we got - we 
have here in Exhibit 10, correct' 
A Yes Yes, it is 
Q Okay Then, next page, page 7 of 15, there s a 
paragraph called Original Echocardiograms Do you see that' 
A Yes 
Q And you agreed to retain all of the original 
echocardiograms, but also to keep them safe and make them 
available as needed, is that right' 
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A. That's right. 
Q. And then paragraph 18, MEI Testimony, you agreed 
that, if you were asked to do so, you would testify for, it 
looks like, a rate of $150 an hour; is that right? 
A. That's right. 
Q. And that was something you had not previously agreed 
to do; is that correct? 
A. Correct. 
Q. And, in fact, you agreed that you would travel, if 
you had to, to do that; is that right? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Did you have an understanding that it was possible 
that would be a lot of work? 
A. Yes. 
Q. All right. And this work, this testimony and making 
the duplicate measurements and all that, would that have 
detracted from your regular business? 
A. it did. 
Q. Okay. 
A. Yes, it would. 
Q. And then, finally, paragraph 19, Document Retention. 
Did you and your attorneys also agree that there were certain 
documents we would give back to the Texas law firms and 
Gregory, Barton & Swapp? 
A. in exchange for this agreement, we agreed to give 
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them back some of the documents they - that we had. 
Q. Yeah. Okay. Let's take a look at the security 
agreement that is Exhibit 9. Are you with me? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And go down to the bottom, page 2 of 11, 
subheading — I think it's little "j," but it's the bottom 
paragraph that says Barton Phen-Fen Fees. Do you see that? 
A. Yes, I do. 
Q. Okay. And it says: "All fees or other monies that 
shall become due to Barton under the August 6-8, 2002 Phen-Fen 
referral agreement between Barton and the Texas firms or any 
subsequent agreement between Barton and the Texas firms, the 
subject of which are the recoverable attorney fees arising out 
the Texas firms' representation of certain Barton MEI 
clients.n 
Do you see that? 
A. I do. 
Q. And is it your understanding that reference to 
attorney fees is a reference to the contingency fees, not the 
client side of the costs? 
A. Could you repeat that again? 
Q. Sure. 
A. Sorry. 
Q. Is it your understanding - taking a step back -
A. Yes. 
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Q. — what you know about these agreements — 
A. Uh-huh. (Affirmative.) 
Q. What you thought you were getting, what you thought 
you were giving. Did you have an understanding that what you 
were getting was additional security and Mr. Barton's attorney 
fees? 
A. That's what it says and that's what I thought we 
were getting, yes. 
Q. Okay. And, in fact, you were asked some questions 
by Mr. Jones in your deposition about this paragraph, weren't 
you? 
A. I was, and, unfortunately, I didn't turn the page. 
Q. Yeah. Mr. Jones didn't read to you the second - or 
the last part of the sentence that says: "...the subject of 
which are the recoverable attorney fees," did he? 
A. No, he did not. 
Q. Let me have you look at Exhibit 20. Oh, I'm sorry, 
21. Do you recognize Exhibit 21? 
A. I do. 
Q. What is Exhibit 21? 
A. This is the — the screening form that every person 
signed that came in to - to have an initial screening that had 
taken the Phen-Fen pills that wanted Mr. Barton to represent 
them. And — 
Q. You said it's something that everybody signed. How 
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do you know that? 
A. This — these forms were on a clipboard in the outer 
office. When someone came in and said, "I'm here for an 
appointment, " they would previously call and set up an 
appointment to come m and be screened. When they showed up, 
the secretaries for Mr. Barton's law firm would have everyone 
fill this form out to get their screening, and then we would 
put the results of that screening at the bottom. 
Q. And let me ask you about that. On the bottom where 
you put the results, would you - you had to have that form if 
you were going to report the results to the firm, right? 
A. Yes. 
Q. So even if somebody walked in and didn't have a 
form, would you have had to go get one and fill it out? 
A. Oh, yeah. 
Q. Do you have any doubt as to whether or not everybody 
who came in got this? 
A. I have no doubt that everyone did. 
Q. Now, with regard to the full studies, were you — 
what was the procedure for making sure people who came in for 
full studies signed the documents? 
A. After we did their initial screening and we wrote 
down what the — the measurements were that we discovered, we 
would take the patient and this form to one of Mr. Barton's 
paralegals who would sit down with them in the room and 
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explain to them that their test was positive, that we needed 
to do a full-study echocardiogram to - to document the damage 
that the Phen-Fen caused and that, if you wanted to retian our 
law firm, we had a contingency fee contract and a lien 
agreement that you needed to -
MR. JONES: Objection, Your Honor. 
THE WITNESS: - to sign. 
MR. MAGLEBY: Well, I think you can talk about what 
happened. 
THE COURT: Objection? 
MR. JONES: My objection is, again, we were — we're 
moving — we're talking about the lien agreement, which the 
Court has already ruled on in terms of its admissibility. 
MR. MAGLEBY: He's not talking about the contents of 
the document, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: All right. As along as he doesn't 
address the contents, the objection's overruled. 
MR. MAGLEBY: Thank you. 
Q. I'm sorry, so, Mr. Fidler, just to recap, every time 
somebody came in, they had to fill out certain documents. 
A. That's correct. 
Q. And one of them was a contingency fee agreement, one 
of them was a lien agreement. 
A. Yes. 
Q. And had you been instructed that you couldn't do a 
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full study on anybody unless they had actually signed these 
documents? 
A. That's correct. 
Q. And did you have a financial interest yourself in 
having people sign these documents? 
A. That was - yes, by having the client portion of 
their settlement was what I was to be paid out of for the 
full-study echocardiogram. 
MR. JONES: Objection, Your Honor. That speaks to 
the content of the lien agreement. 
THE COURT: Sustained. 
Q. (By Mr. Magleby) Aside from the document, 
Mr. Fidler, did you have an understanding that you, as a 
service provider to MEI, were getting rights to be paid by the 
client? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And did those rights attach to the client portion of 
the settlement? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And not necessarily to Mr. Barton's contingency fee. 
A. No, they didn't attach to his contingency fee. 
Q. Now, when we negotiated the settlement agreement and 
the security agreement, did we get some rights attaching to 
his contingency fee? 
A. That was my understanding, yes. 
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Q. But you did understand we were after DAT&K in that. 
A. Right. And I -
Q. And others. 
A. And at no point did I give up my rights to receive 
payment from the client costs for their echocardiograms. 
Q. That was an extra. Getting paid from Mr. Barton's 
contingency fee was a bonus. 
A. Yes. 
MR. MAGLEBY: All right. No further questions, Your 
Honor. 
THE COURT: Cross-examination? 
Mr. Hofmann: Your Honor, if I may for a moment? 
Inasmuch as this is concerning sealed information, there are 
people in the courtroom we don't know who they are or why 
they're here, and they probably should not be here during this 
hearing. 
THE COURT: Well, who would be — are we reserve -
are you just observing there in the back? Is that what you're 
doing today? 
MALE: Yes, sir. 
THE COURT: All right. We'll probably -
MR. HOFMANN: No offense to them, but -
THE COURT: Yeah. Yeah. This is a - this is a 
proceeding that's under seal because it's a dissolution. So 
if you could go find — if you could go find — maybe you could 
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go find somewhere else that you could watch a proceeding. 
FEMALE: Okay. No problem. 
THE COURT: I think there's a - there was a jury 
trial going down right below us in courtroom 202. I don't 
know if that's final yet, but that might be an interesting one 
for you. 
Thank you. 
MR. HOFMANN: And I was going to say that might be 
more interesting. 
THE COURT: Yes. 
CROSS-EXAMINATION 
BY MR. JONES: 
Q. Mr. Fidler, I think you testified previously that 
you visited the office building where Mr. Barton's offices 
were located to conduct the full studies; is that correct? 
As — were those done — 
A. What do you mean visited? 
Q. Were they conducted at Mr. Barton's offices or in 
the office building where he was located? 
A. Most of them were. 
Q. Okay. 
A. The full studies or the screenings or - again, I 
don't. 
Q. Well, let's do both. The screenings? 
A. Most of the screenings were done in his office. 
Q. And the full studies as well? 
A. The full studies, some were done in the 
cardiologist's office, but most of them were done in the — in 
Mr. Barton's office. 
Q. Okay. And with respect to those that were done in 
Mr. Barton's offices, were you present for all of those? 
A. No, I was not. 




Of what, screenings or full studies? 
Let's do both. 
A. Of the 10,000 screenings, most of them were done in 
his office. And of the full studies -
Q. No. How many of - of each were you present for, you 
personally? 
A. I can only speculate. I didn't keep track of every 
one I did for the two years that I was there doing them. I 
would have to say, for a majority, most of them, I was there. 
Q. Of the echoes? 
A. I was present for most of them. But I had other 
technicians doing them. But I was still there doing - doing 
others on my own. 
Q. What about the full studies; were you present for a 
majority of the full studies? 
A. Not a majority, but I did several hundred. 
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Q. Okay. Do you recall, Mr. Fidler, I asked in your 
deposition how many full studies were conducted? Do you 
recall that? And you told me 2500. Is that correct? 
A. Approximately, to — 
Q. Approximately? 
A. - to my recollection. 
Q. And I asked you how many you were physically present 
for, and you told me two to three hundred; is that correct? 
A. I was — 
MR. MAGLEBY: Your Honor, if he's going to ask him 
about his deposition, I'd like him to show him the copy of it 
rather -
THE COURT: Not necessary under the rule. You can -
you can go ahead. 
THE WITNESS: I personally did that many. But if 
you want to know — there were others going on while I was 
present. And I can't tell you, but I can say it was probably 
a majority of the echoes that were done, I was present for, 
but I didn't personally do them. I personally did, you know, 
four or five hundred. I was supervising my four other 
technicians that were doing them full time and all of my 
assistants. 
Does that answer your question? 
Q. (By Mr. Jones) Well, I'm confused. Your 
deposition, page 54. I'll be happy to show it to you. 
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I said: "So you were present for two to three 
hundred of these. Who also was there when you were present? 
"Answer: It was just the attorneys, the paralegal. The 
patient and myself were in the room when they would have them 
sign this." 
So if you were — you testified earlier about 
patients or clients being taken into a room where documents 
would be signed? 
A. Yes. 
Q. So, in how many cases of the 2500 were you actually 
in that room? 
A. I don't know. More than a hundred. 
Q. More than a hundred? So a hundred or so out of the 
2500? 
A. Yes. We would wait for the — the patients to sign 
the documents and then, a lot of times, they could do the full 
study at the time. And then we would take them back again and 
do that. But a lot of them, we had to reschedule to come 
back. 
Q. Did - at the time that you first met the 
client/patient, did you gather any information from them in 
terms of billing information? 
A. We had all of that billing information - well, it's 
not billing information - personal information from the echo 
screening sheet. The secretary would — would bring the 
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patient back from Mr. Barton's office, introduce us to the the 
patient and give us this echo screening form, which had their 
name, address, city, date of birth. 
Q. Mr. Fidler, in your deposition, I asked you: "So 
did you gather billing information for each of the persons 
that you performed services for at Mr. Barton's office? 
"No." Your answer: "No. We never billed the patients." 
Is that correct? Was your testimony correct at that 
time? 
A. Yes. 
Q. I believe, Mr. Fidler, that you have testified that 
you - rather than billing the patients or the clients, you did 
bill on a monthly basis Gregory, Barton & Swapp; is that 
correct? 
A. Just for the initial screenings and - and we did 
send them a bill if we did a full study. That was to be paid 
when their case was settled. 
Q. To be paid when - the bill for the full studies, you 
sent it on a monthly basis, but it was to be paid when the 
cases settled. Is that - is that correct? 
A. That was the understanding that Keith and I came to 
agreement on. 
Q. Okay. Do you recall when you camne to that 
agreement? Do you recall whether it was before or after the 








referred to, I believe, as Exhibit 7, but I stand to be 
corrected. Exhibit 7. 
A. That's the time, approximately, when we came to the 
agreement that I would be paid for the full studies when their 
cases settled. 
Q. Okay. You gave me a description of that in your 
prior deposition. I'll just read it to you and ask you if 
that was correct. 
"As for the time that they were to be paid, it 
does not stipulate when the full studies would be 
paid." Again, speaking of Exhibit 7. "We had a 
verbal understanding that the full studies would be 
paid when he received payments on their cases when 
they settled. He didn't have the money at the time 
to be paying for full studies. And as we discussed 
earlier, all the financial obligations, he had to 
borrow from Texas. And he came to me and he told 
me, 'I can't pay you for the full studies until I 
get paid.' And I agreed to postpone the payment 
until that time." 
Is that correct? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Is that an accurate statement of your agreement? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Your agreement was you would get paid whenever 
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Gregory, Barton & Swapp got paid. 
A. Well, when the - the cases settled and they got 
their payment, then they would pay me from the clients' 
portion for the echo. 
Q. I just asked you if that was an accurate statement 
of your agreement. You said that you'd get paid whenever they 
get paid, right? 
MR. MAGLEBY: Objection, Your Honor. He's arguing 
with the witness. 
THE COURT: Overruled. 
THE WITNESS: I get paid when the clients' 
settlement pays out of their portion of the settlement was our 
agreement. 
Q. (By Mr. Jones) So you — I asked you — let's come 
back. 
What if — what if there was no settlement recovery, 
how would you get paid? 
A. Mr. Barton told me that I would be paid for that. 
And, quite frankly, there was never a case that didn't settle. 
And so that was kind of a moot point. It was like, you know, 
"This really isn't going to happen, it hasn't happened, but if 
it — if it does for some weird reason, don't worry, I'll take 
care of paying you for the echo." 
Q. So if there was no recovery in a case and no client 
funds from which payment could be made, then Mr. Barton, or 
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Gregory, Barton & Swapp would pay you; is that correct? 
A. That's what the agreement, as I recall, was is 
that - I don't know how he would do it, but that's how - that 
I would be paid for it somehow. 
Q. And Mr. Barton told you that. That was part of your 
agreement. 
A. Right. 
Q. Did it make any difference to you whether Mr. Barton 
got paid or not because, in either event, I mean, whether 
there was a recovery by the client or not because, in either 
event Mr. Barton, Gregory, Barton & Swapp was obligated to pay 
you; isn't that correct? 
A. Only if the cases didn't settle. I was — again, I 
was going to be paid from the clients' portion of their 
settlement. And if that - those costs didn't come up to the 
full costs for all the echocardiograms, Mr. Barton would make 
up that difference. 
Q. You recall in your deposition, Mr. Fidler, I asked 
you the following question: "So it's accurate to say what 
happened -
MR. MAGLEBY: Roger - Your Honor, it's fine if he 
doesn't want to give the witness a copy, but if he could -
THE COURT: Well, he does not have to do that under 
the rule. 
MR. MAGLEBY: I understand. I'd like him to tell me 
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what page and line. 
THE COURT: That would be fine. 
MR. JONES: I'm on page 44. 
MR. MAGLEBY: And what line, Roger? 
MR. JONES: 16. Thank you. 
Q. "So is it accurate to say what happened in the 
underlying lawsuits in which Gregory, Barton & Swapp represent 
these clients, you were looking at Gregory, Barton & Swapp to 
get paid. It didn't make any difference whether there was a 
recovery or not, Gregory, Barton & Swapp owed you the money; 
is that correct?" 
Your answer: "Basically." 
Do you recall that? 
A. I recall that in reference to the settlement 
agreement. 
Q. Do you just recall that testimony? Is that an 
accurate statement? It's what you testified to before. 
A. I'd have to look at what the question was to know if 
that was an accurate statement. But from the answer that you 
read me, that was based on our ability to receive payment from 
Keith in addition to the client costs, if they didn't come up 
to the - to meet the - the cost for the echoes. 
Q. How did my question or your answer in any way relate 
to the settlement agreement or the security agreement that 
you're talking about, this additional collateral or support 
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that you received? I don't understand that, Mr. Fidler. 
Maybe you could explain it. 
A. Well, why don't you give me a copy of what the 
question was and I can read, you know, what — what you're 
asking me and then I can try and explain my answer again. 
Q. Happy to do that. 
MR. JONES: May I approach, Your Honor? 
THE COURT: Yes. 
THE WITNESS- Okay. 
Q. (By Mr. Jones) Do you have any further explanation 
with respect to that answer? 
MR. MAGLEBY: Objection. Ambiguous. 
THE COURT: It's - he seems to understand the 
question. So you can answer, if you can. If you can't 
understand it, we can have the question rephrased. 
THE WITNESS: Yeah. Ask me the question again. 
Q. (By Mr. Jones) I think, Mr. Fidler, you said that, 
if you had a chance to look at it, you might be able to - to 
tell me how this answer in any way related to the security 
agreement or the settlement agreement by which you obtained a 
junior security interest to secure payment of the note. 
A. Well, those were the two means by which I would be 
paid for my echocardiograms. The client cost and the security 
agreements... 
Q. I'll move on, Mr. Fidler. 
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Mr. Fidler, you — you spoke earlier of a right to be 
paid by the client. Could you tell me what right you had to 
be paid by the client for the work that you did? 
A. Mr. Barton explained to me that the costs for the 
clients for their echocardiograms would be deducted from their 
settlements and that those costs would come to me directly to 
pay for their echocardiogram. 
Q. So Gregory, Barton & Swapp would be paid by the 
client and, in turn, pay you; is that correct? 
A. I don't know how that works. I — I just know that 
the costs would be deducted from their settlement and that 
they would come to me. Whether through the law firm or the 
client, I don't know. 
Q. You didn't have any right against the client for 
payment, did you, Mr. Fidler? 
A. I felt I did. With the screening information sheet 
and the contingency fee contract and the referral contract, 
I — I believed that, as a provder of services to the clients, 
that I was - they were legally bound to pay me for those 
services when their cases settled. And that no one else -
Q. Mr. Fidler -
A. - had a right to those payments. 
Q. Mr. Fidler, do you recall that I asked you that 
question in your deposition at page 74, line 14? Mr. Fidler, 
you testified: 
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"You did not think you have any right to proceed against 
the clients directly to receive payment, correct? That was 
your understanding, correct? 
Your answer: "Yes." 
A. What rights are you talking about in getting — 
Q. I asked you whether or not you had — it was your 
understanding, "Did you think you have a right to proceed 
directly to receive payment from the client?" 
And your answer was: "No." 
Your answer was and my understanding is correct, you 
did not have a right to receive payment from the client or to 
proceed against the client. Isn't that what you testified to, 
Mr. Fidler? 
A. I have a right to be reimbursed by the client for 
the cost of their echocardiogram. I don't know if I have a 
right to go out and personally sue them. I probably do, if I 
want to. 
Q. When I asked you that question in your deposition, 
your answer was to the contrary. 
MR. MAGLEBY: Objection. Argumentative. 
Q. (By Mr. Jones) Can you explain that? 
THE COURT: Overruled. 
THE WITNESS: I :just must have misspoke then. 
Because I do have a right. And the contracts that we signed 
give me that right. 
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Q. (By Mr. Jones) Okay. 
A. Or that the law firm signed in behalf of the clients 
give me that right. 
Q. We've — we've looked at some exhibits today that 
include the contingency fee agreement, which was executed by 
the client, and we've looked at the Exhibit 21 for the echoes. 
I think you testified you think the contingency fee 
agreement gave you that right to payment directly from the 
clients? Is that your testimony? 
THE COURT: Where is that agreement? 
MR. MAGLEBY: I believe it's 11, 17 and - well, let 
me find them. 
MR. JONES: It's Exhibit 11. 
THE WITNESS: All of these agreements, Keith said 
collectively, give me the right, as I understand it, by law 
for the payment of the echocardiogram costs by the client. 
Q. (By Mr. Jones) Can you point me to anything in 
Exhibit 11 that would afford you a right to receive payment 
directly from the clients? 
A. No. 4, subparagraph (b), "If we reach a settlement 
or judgment on your behalf" - let see. "We will incur various 
costs and expenses in performing legal services under this 
agreement." I believe that those costs and expenses included 
the echocardiogram that you - and it says "you agree to pay 
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for all those costs ' That part of it refers to the service 
that I performed for them 
I mean I don't see Williams & Bailey mentioned m 
here but they got half of the money 
Q So, Mr Fidler, unlike Mr Barton you believe that 
paragraph 4(b) of the contingency fee agreement does cover the 
monies owed MEI for echoes That's what you just testified 
to, isn't it, Mr Fidler' 
A It partially does And I think that the screening 
contract we signed also brings the - the client in to be 
paid — or for them to pay me for the — their services 
12 | Q I want to - we'll get to Exhibit 21 I just want to 
13 | focus back here 4 (b) is the provision that provides for 
reimbursement of -
15 | A Well, and I have to say 4(c), too 
16 | Q Okay 
A To aid in the preparation or preparation of our 
case, it may become necessary to hire expert witnesses " 
Q I understand So you believe that 4(b) and (c) 
apply to the services you provided, the echoes that you 
provided, is that correct7 
? In part Again, you know, this was m the scope 
of - regarding to taking weight loss pills I'm not a - a 
legal expert on this, so I just have to depend on a lot of 
what my attorneys tell me, and that's what they tell me 
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Q I understand That was your understanding I don't 
want a legal conclusion, I just want your understanding That 
was your understanding, correct' 
A My understanding was that the contracts that we 
signed that the clients signed gave me the right to be paid 
from the fees - the client costs 
Q I wasn t asking about that, I was just asking about 
Exhibit 11 That s fine I'll just move on Mr Fidler 
Let s move on to something else 
Could we move on, Mr Fidler, to Exhibit 9 You 
recognize this document, don t you, Mr Fidler' 
A Yes I do 
Q And this is the security agreement that was executed 
by Gregory Barton & Swapp in favor of MEI pursuant to the 
settlement agreement, is that correct' 
A Who did you say executed this' Was this — 
Q It is executed by Keith L Barton and Gregory, 
Barton & Swapp P C m favor of MEI, isn t that correct' 
A Yes 
Q You recall this agreement You re familiar with it, 
right' 
A Yes, I do 
Q Do you recall discussion regarding Advocate 
Capital's security interest in the assets of Gregory, Barton 
& Swapp at the time this document was executed' 
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A Yes 
Q And what discussion do you recall? 
MR MAGLEBY I just want to make sure the witness -
I'm going to object to the extent it calls for attorney-client 
communications 
MR JONES Your Honor I'm not asking for anything 
privileged 
MR MAGLEBY And I just want to make sure the 
witness understands that Because -
THE COURT All right Don't talk about anything 
that you ve said to your attorney or he said back to you 
But, rather, just discussions that have been made to other 
people, okay? 
THE WITNESS All right 
Q (By Mr Jones) Do you recall any discussions other 
than with counsel' I 11 phrase it that way 
A No 
Q Okay What was your understanding of the position 
of Advocate Capital/DAT&K at the time this document was 
executed' 
A That - my understanding was that Keith had some 
debts that were - that were ahead of what he owed me security 
interests that were ahead of Mobile Echo -
Q And one of those debts was Advocate Capital/DAT&K, 
is that correct' 
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A Right They were ahead of us in - in the payment of 
their debt 
Q And that s reflected is it not, Mr Fidler, on page 
2, paragraph E the discussion of permitted liens' Do you see 
that' 
A I'm sorry for my stomach there 
Q Oh that's okay 
A Permitted liens to - where does it say Advocate in 
there' 
Q Well it doesn't say Advocate m there but it does 
say particular liens - liens that were already in effect and 
perfected as of August 26, 2004 Mr Fidler, didn't you 
understand that to refer to Advocate Capital? 
A No probably not 
Q Well, then let s look over at section 2 6 of the 
agreement on page 4, Mr Fidler 
A Okay 
Q Do you see section 2 6, which expressly refers to 
Advocate Capital' 
A There I see that 
Q Okay And this provision says that Advocate has a 
senior security interest m , and that the execution of this 
agreement would be a violation of that agreement does it not, 
Mr Fidler' 
A What was — could you restate your question now 
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again? 
Q. Did you have an understanding that - you said before 
you didn't understand the permitted liens provision to refer 
to Advocate Capital as havaing a senior lien. But it's — 
Advocate is expressly addressed in section 2.6; is it not? 
A. It is. It is. 
Q. And doesn't it also say that Gregory, Barton & 
Swapp's agreement with Advocate prohibits the execution of 
this agreement? 
A. That's what it says, but, you know, that was 
Mr. Barton's problem and not mine. 
Q. But you were aware of that at the time you executed 
this agreement, weren't you? 
A. I believe I was aware that Advocate had a security 
interest ahead of Mobile Echo's. 
Q. Were you also aware that Gregory, Barton & Swapp was 
in default of its indebtedness to Advocate? 
A. Not at this time. I didn't know what this -
Q. Mr. Fidler, could I direct your attention to section 
2.11 of that agreement? 
A. That's right. 
Q. Page 5 of 11. 
A. Yes. 
Q. Do you see what I'm referring to, Mr. Fidler? 
A. I know I read that in here. Where is it exactly? 
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Q. 2.11, second sentence: "Barton herein provides 
notice that Advocate Capital, Inc.'s assignee (DAT&K) has 
taken the position that Barton is in default with respect to 
certain loans made to Barton." 
Do you see that? 
A. I do. 
Q. So you knew the loan was in defualt. 
A. With Advocate? 
Q. Yes. 
A. Yes, I did. You're right. 
Q. Mr. Fidler, you also knew, did you not, that any 
collateral that you received a security interest in pursuant 
to this agreement was subordinate to the security interest 
Advocate already had? You knew that, didn't you? 
A. Well, Mr. Jones, this is all legal stuff that — I'm 
not an attorney, I don't — I don't pretend to understand it 
completely. I just trusted my attorneys that they knew what 
they were doing. 
THE COURT: All right. So you just have to say what 
you know. I'm not asking you to interpret the agreement, just 
say what you understood, okay? 
THE WITNESS: All right. And -
Q. (By Mr. Jones) And I mean, just asking you: Was it 
your understanding that the security interest you were 
receiving m collateral pursuant to this agreement was 
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subordinate to the security interest of Advocate Capital in 
the same collateral? 
A. I don't know about what the colalteral is you're 
talking about, but I know that we were subordinate to 
Advocate. 
Q. I'm just talking about the colalteral as it's 
defined in this agreement. Whatever it — whatever it says in 
here, that's all I'm talking about. 
A. I — I just — I can't feel a hundred percent 
confident in just saying yes, because I don't understand — 
Q. Okay. 
A. - completely. 
Q. We'll let the document speak for itself. 
Mr. Fidler, could I ask you to take a look at page 
2 of 11. It's paragraph J that your counsel asked you about 
earlier. 
A. Page 2 of 11. Okay. 
Q. Okay. You see a - there's a definition here, and 
it's the definition of Barton Phen-Fen fees. Do you see that? 
A. I do. 
Q. And it refers to fees and other monies that shall 
come due to Barton under the August 6-8, 2002 Phen-Fen 
referral agreement. Do you see that? 
A. I do. 
Q. You read that entire language earlier, but what I 
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want to ask you about is, very specifically, it says "all fees 
or other monies." So it addresses attorneys fees. What are 
the other monies that come to Barton under the Phen-Fen 
referral agreement that's included as a part of the collateral 
in this agreement? 
A. Other monies that Mr. Barton would - that would come 
to his firm, if he so chose to use those to, you know, pay the 
costs for the echocardiograms if the client cost didn't pay 
for them. He could use — as it's defined in this, it's 
recoverable attorney fees. 
Q. I know it refers to attorneys fees, but I'm focusing 
on it refers to "attorneys fees and other monies that shall 
become due Barton." 
What was your understanding of the other monies that 
may become due Barton under the Phen-Fen referral agreement? 
A. Well, none -
MR. MAGLEBY: Objection. 
THE WITNESS: - under -
THE COURT: Just a moment. 
MR. MAGLEBY: Objection. Compound, assumes facts 
not in evidence, document speaks for itself. 
THE COURT: Well, the document speaks for itself. 
We've already covered that. We're just asking for his 
understanding. But the - why don't you rephrase the question? 
I believe it was compound. 
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Q. (By Mr. Jones) Mr. Fidler, what was your 
understanding of - what would you - what did you think was 
included within the phrase "other monies" when you signed this 
agreement? What was your understanding? 
A. Other monies could mean other attorney fees that he 
got from other cases. If his grandmother died and left him 
some money, he could use that to — to pay the note. Just 
other monies. I don't - it doesn't define what that means. 
I specifically just - it just is a vehicle for him to be able 
to pay this - the note, you know, in addition to our other 
client - the fees from the clients. 
Q. Mr. Fidler, isn't it true that we do know that it 
included monies that - from client recoveries? 
MR. MAGLEBY: Objection. Argumentative. 
THE COURT: Overruled. 
THE WITNESS: I don't know that we know that. 
What -
0- (By Mr. Jones) Well, why don't we take a look at 
the documents and we can — we can quickly find that out. 
I'11 ask you to take a look at paragraph - Exhibit 
10. 
A. Uh-huh. (Affirmative.) 
Q. This document, just like the security agreement, 
uses the phrase Barton Phen-Fen Fees and defines it the same. 
Are you familiar with this agreement? 
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A. Yes. 
Q. And you're familiar with its use of the term Barton 
Phen-Fen Fees. 
A. Yes. 
Q. And you're also familiar, are you not, Mr. Fidler, 
with the fact that this agreement provided that certain monies 
would be withheld or set aside from the Barton Phen-Fen fees 
and paid to you; isn't that correct? 
A. If Mr. Barton received enough money from his 
attorney fees to pay off everyone, includeing Advocate 
Capital, then those fees would come to us and to pay off the — 
what he owed me for the echocardiograms. And that was our 
understanding. That's my understanding and, you know, other 
than that, that's — I'm going to stick by that. 
Q. Let's talk about that for a second, because 
paragraph 15 that we're looking at here, Mr. Fidler, which 
addresses Barton Phen-Fen fees, it's addressing - it's 
addressing payments that are going to be made and monies aht 
are going to be withheld prior to all this money coming in and 
paying off everybody, is it not? 
A. I don't see that it - it means that. You know -
Q. Let me ask the question -
MR. MAGLEBY: Your Honor, he' s -
MR. JONES: -Mr. Fidler. I'll follow up. 



























know he — 
THE COURT: Well, I think the witness was finished. 
I You can go ahead. 
Q. (By Mr. Jones) Mr. Fidler, I'm just asking, the 
payments that we're talking about here in paragraph 15 or — 
are the — 
A. Where are we? Where's 15? 
Q. Page 5 of 15. 
A. What exhibit? 
Q. It's Exhibit 10. 
A. 10? 5 of 15. Okay. 
Q. Now, that paragraph is addressing the quarterly 
payments to be made under the note that was executed at the | 
same time as the security agreement; is that not correct, 
Mr. Fidler? 
A. Okay. Question again? I'm sorry. 
Q. Doesn't this paragraph address the quarterly 
payments that were to be made under the MEI note that was 
executed at the same time the security agreement was executed? 
A. Well, it talks about the amounts that were to be 
withheld. 
Q. Those amounts to be withheld, they were to be held -
withheld from the client recoveries, were they not, 
Mr. Fidler? 
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A. My understanding is that's after there was a 
deficiency, if the client cost didn't pay for my 
echocardiograms, then this cost would be withheld from the 
attorney fees to, you know, pay off the — the indebtedness 
that I was owed for the echocardiograms. 
Q. And that would have been when all the cases were 
settled? 
A. Well, like it was explained earlier, if some of — if 
we - there was a greater amount of recovery by a few cases 
that Mr. Barton had the option to, you know, pay off the rest 
of the echocardiograms, before we waited for every one of them 
to settle on down the line, that this money would be withheld. 
Q. The $1,420.65, that was to be withheld from client 
recoveries, was it not, Mr. Fidler? 
A. I don't know. 
Q. You don't know? Okay. 
A. I don't know. 
Q. Could have been? 
MR. MAGLEBY: Objection. 
THE WITNESS: Well, it would have been -
THE COURT: He said he doesn't know. 
THE WITNESS: I don't -
MR. JONES: That's fine. 
THE COURT: We're withdrawing the question, looks 


























MR. JONES: I'll withdraw the question. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
Q. (By Mr. Jones) Did you receive - did MEI receive 
some monies that were withheld pursuant to this provision? 
A. I don't know if it was pursuant to this provision, 
but we did receive some monies on a quarterly basis for a 
short period of time. 
Q. And who paid those monies to you? 
A. Those came from Texas, the Texas law firm. 
Q. Okay. Mr. Fidler, could I ask you to take a look at 
Exhibit 14. Do you recall this agreement? It's not an 
agreement that you're a party to, Mr. Fidler, it's the 
settlement agreement that was entered into in this case that 
resulted in the monies being paid in to the court and our 
hearing today. 
A. Do I recall? 
Q. Yes. 
A. No, I don't. 
Q. Do you recall — did you review this agreement when 
it was - when it was provided to the parties prior to this 
court's approval of the settlement agreement? Do you recall 
whether you reviewed it or not? 
A. I don't -
MR. MAGLEBY: Your Honor, may I voir dire? 
THE COURT: What was that? 
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MR. MAGLEBY: May I ask a couple voir dire 
questions? 
THE COURT: Yes. 
MR. JONES: I'll withdraw the question. 
MR. MAGLEBY: All right. 
Q. (By Mr. Jones) Come back to the Barton Phen-Fen 
fees we talked about earlier, both in the settlement agreement 
and in the security agreement. 
Do you recall me asking you about that, Mr. Fidler, 
in your deposition? 
A. I believe so. 
Q. I asked you a couple questions about that, and I 
asked you whether or not the phrase "other monies" referred to 
monies received from client settlements or client recoveries. 
Do you recall that? 
A. Not specifically, but — but go ahead, I guess. 
Q. Okay. I asked you a series of questions about that 
and, ultimately, your answer was: "I can't speculate on that. 
I don't believe it does, but I don't know." 103. 
So do you know whether the phrase "other monies" in 
the settlement agreement and in the security agreement, 
whether that included client monies from client recoveries or 
not? 
A. I don't know. 
Q. You don't know? 
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A. I don't know. 
I wish my attorneys could have defined this contract 
a little more, but we never thought, in our wildest dreams, 
that we would be here with DAT&K. Just had no belief that 
this would happen. 
Q. I think you testified about that in your — m your 
deposition as well. You said you had no idea that Advocate or 
DAT&K might come in and assert an interest in those monies 
being withheld and paid over — over to MEI. Do you recall 
that? 
A. Well, I recall -
Q. I think that what -
A. — thinking that, because there was so much money 
that Mr. Barton would receive, that this would never come up 
and be an issue. 
Q. Mr. Fidler, isn't it true that you were very much 
aware that Advocate may assert an interest in any monies held 
from client recoveries and not paid over to Advocate? 
A. No, I wasn't aware. 
Q. Okay. Then let's take a look, then, at paragraph 15 
of the settlement agreement again. 
A. I was aware that - I just didn't think that - that 
that would come into play, like I mentioned, because there was 
so much money expected to be recovered that this was like a 
moot point. It just didn't — didn't matter. 
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Q. I understand. I -
A. Because you guys would be paid off and everyone 
would be happy. 
Q. I understand that, Mr. Fidler. I'm trying to come 
to a little bit different point. I'm not talking about 
whether you understood that Advocate had a senior security 
interest, I'm asking the question: Didn't you understand that 
Advocate might assert an interest in the client recoveries, 
the very money that was being withheld pursuant to this 
agreement and paid to you? 
A. No. Those - the client - if you're talking about 
the client fees for the echocardiogram costs, I had no reason 
to believe that you could begin to assert that. That came to 
me and me only, and you had claim on the - on the attorney 
fees but not the client costs. 
Q. Let's look at paragraph 15 of the settlement 
agreement for just a second, Mr. Fidler, again. 
A. What exhibit is it? 
Q. It's Exhibit 10. 
A. And page? Or paragraph 15? 
MR. MAGLEBY: Page 5. 
THE WITNESS: 5 of 15? 
Q. (By Mr. Jones) Paragraph 15. Let's look on page 6. 
We're looking at paragraph 15. And you see the — the 
reference to the withholding of monies from client recoveries 
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to be used to, m part, pay the MEI note. You see that, don't 
you? It's right there in the middle of the page, $1,420. 
A. Yes. 
Q. You see that, right? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Now, take a look at the last sentence of that 
paragraph. Doesn't that - doesn't that sentence expressly 
contemplate that someone may challenge MEI's right to those 
funds? 
A. To me, it just says that the firms have the 
discretion to disburse them however they want. 
Q. "In the event legal action by any third party which 
would take issue with the holding and/or disbursing of these 
funds is threatened." Do you see that? 
A. You're — you're way up above where I thought you 
were. 
Q. You see that? 
MR. MAGLEBY: Roger, if you could direct the witness 
to the specific language, please. 
THE WITNESS: Yeah, I see that. "In the event legal 
action by any third party which would take issue with the 
withholding and/or disbursing of these funds is threatened 
or..." (Reading.) 
I — I don't know what that means. I'm sorry, I 
really don't. 
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Q. (By Mr. Jones) Were you aware of any other - any 
party other than Advocate that might assesrt an interest in 
these funds? 
A. No. 
Q. Finally, Mr. Fidler, in your deposition, page 112, 
I asked you whether or not the Barton Phen-Fen fees included 
monies withheld from client recoveries. Do you recall that? 
A. Somewhat. 
Q. And -
A. The Barton Phen-Fen fees, meaning attorney fees? 
Q. Barton Phen-Fen fees as defined in these documents. 
I asked you a question. Now, loook at the language here. I'm 
confused, because it says: 
"These monies are withheld from Barton Phen-Fen fees." 
Doesn't that mean, Mr. Fidler, that the monies withheld from 
the client recoveries are part of the Barton Phen-Fen fees?" 
Your answer: "No. I'm talking about the defined 
term 'Barton Phen-Fen - you said no. Your answer: 
MR. MAGLEBY: Well, wait a minute. Your Honor -
Q. (By Mr. Jones) "Not the attorneys fees." 
My question: "No. I'm talking about — 
THE COURT: Just a momenht. We've got an objection. 
MR. MAGLEBY: If he's going to read from the 
deposition, he's got to read the witness's answer. Just 
because he doesn't like it doesn't mean he can skip it and go 
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on to his next question. 
THE COURT: Well, I think - I think that's his 
intent. He just got — 
MR. JONES: That was my - I just skipped -
THE COURT: — he just got mixed up. 
MR. JONES: I'll go back and read it. 
The answer: "Not the attorneys fees." 
"Question: No. I'm talking about the defined term 
'Barton Phen-Fen fees.' Says these monies will be held and 
set aside. We're talking about the amount here $1,420.65." 
And following an objection by Mr. Magleby, your 
answer: "I know that's what it says, but that's not what was 
understood between the plaintiff MEI and I." 
Q. Do you recall that? 
A. Well, I said that, I guess. 
Q. So the documents that we're looking at here, the 
security agreement and the settlement agreement, they all use 
the same term "Barton Phen-Fen fees," and you recognize that 
the documents include client cost recoveries within the 
definition of Barton Phen-Fen fees. 
A. No, I don't recognize that. 
Q. Isn't that what I -
A. Client costs are separate from attorney fees. 
Q. I didn't - again, that was the question. That's how 
we got lost before. I'm not asking whether it was included m 
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attorneys fees. What I'd asked you was whether it was 
included within the definition of Barton Phen-Fen fees. 
Your testimony and the definition — in the 
deposition was you know, that's what it says but it was not 
your intent. Is that correct? 
A. I'm sorry, I - Mr. Barton's interpretation of Barton 
Phen-Fen fees? You're asking me what my interpretation of 
what he - that - he thinks that is? 
MR. JONES: No further questions, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: All right. Thank you. 
Gents, how are you looking as far as getting your 
evidence in by - in the time that was allotted today? 
MR. MAGLEBY: Your Honor, I would do a short 
redirect of Mr. Fidler and then we're done. I don't know what 
Mr. Jones has planned. 
THE COURT: Okay. Do you have some evidence that 
you're going to be presenting, Mr. Jones, in terms of 
testimony? 
MR. JONES: I'd intended to briefly call 
Mr. Hashimomto, the receiver. 
THE COURT: Okay. Why don't we go ahead and proceed 
then. Go ahead, Mr. Magleby. 
MR. MAGLEBY: Thank you, Your Honor. 
REDIRECT EXAMINATION 
2 | BY MR. MAGLEBY: 
3 | Q. Mr. Jones asked you some questions about how many 
screenings took place and how often you were at the Keith 
Barton law offices. Do you recall that? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Were you working long days? 
A. And weekends. 
Q. And weekends? 
A. We would go till 9:00 at night. 
Q. And my next question: Did you go late at night? 
A. Yes. 
Q. You were working week after week, month after month? 
A. Year after year. 
Q. Year after year? Was that a strain on your personal 
relationships? 
A. Very much, yeah. 
18 | Q. So regardless of whether or not you know exactly how 
19 | many initial screenings or full studies you attended, you know 
you were there for a fair amount of time? 
A. I was. In fact, I even lost accounts from my 
regular business because I was there so much. 
Q. Okay. Well, all that time that you were there, you 




Q. All right. 
A. No. 
Q. And then we go on to talk about - Mr. Jones asked 
you some questions about how you were going to be paid if the 
cases didn't settle. Do you recall that? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And that was part of our dispute with Keith Barton. 
A. Right. 
Q. And was it your understanding that when we settled 
that dispute with Keith Barton, one thing we absolutely tied 
up was that, one way or antoher, we were going to get paid 
before the partners of the Gregory, Barton & Swapp law firm 
got paid? 
A. That's what you explained to me — 
Q. Okay. 
A. — through our contracts. 
Q. And then Mr. Jones asked you questions about — 
cross-examined you on your belief that you had the right to be 
paid by the client. Do you recall that? 
A. Yes. 
Q. What was the basis for your belief that you had a 
right to be paid by the client? 
A. Because of the contracts that we signed that 
stated -
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MR. JONES: Objection, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Yes, sir? 
MR. JONES: He's - I believe Mr. Fidler is 
testifying about the contents of the lien agreement. 
MR. MAGLEBY: He opened the door, Your Honor. 
MR. JONES: I did not. 
THE COURT: Well, let's - he can - he can testify 
what his basis was. That doesn't mean that the lien 
agreement's admissible or that I would consider its contents. 
He's merely testifying about what — the basis for his belief. 
Q. (By Mr. Magleby) The basis for your belief, 
Mr. Fidler, you were starting to say -
A. That all the - all of the collective contracts 
signed by Mr. Barton's people that had claims would guarantee 
that I'd be paid from the costs for their echocardiograms. 
Q. And, in fact, had there even been occasions, 
Mr. Fidler, when you were performing echocardiograms that you 
don't have any contract signed and people still paid? 
A. Definitely. Well — 
Q. And sometimes — 
A. -yeah. That's true. 
Q. And sometimes, do the people receiving the 
echocardiograms pay you directly? 
A. They do. 
Q. Okay. And is it your understanding somebody is 
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obligated to pay you for it? You don't work for free, do you? 
A. That's correct. 
Q. All right. And then you were asked a number of 
questions about the DAT&K and Advocate Capital security 
interest coming ahead of MEI; is that right? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And I want to make sure we understand what you're 
saying here. Are you saying their security interest comes 
ahead of you for the client costs or you're saying you believe 
it comes ahead of you for Mr. Barton's attorney fees? 
A. It only comes ahead of me for Mr. Barton's attorney 
fees. I have claim on the client costs and no one else -
Q. Okay. 
A. — is my belief and understanding. 
Q. Did you ever understand the clients owed Mr. Barton 




A. Those would come out of their settlement. 
Q. Now, let's go to Exhibit 11, page 2. 
A. Okay. 
Q. I'm sorry, I must have written it down wrong. It's 
not Exhibit 11. 
A. It is Exhibit 11. 
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Q. It is Exhibit — well, I know I've taken you to 
Exhibit 11, but that's not what my question was about. Let me 
see here. 
I got it. It is Exhibit - sorry, Exhibit 9, page 2. 
You were asked a number of questions by Mr. Jones 
about what Barton Phen-Fen fees means. Do you recall that? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Okay. And if we look at sub (j), it says: "All 
fees or other monies that shall become due to Barton." Do you 
see that? 
A. I do. 
Q. Did you ever have an understanding that the client 
side - the client settlement monies deducted to pay you for 
your MEI echocardiogram would ever be due to Mr. Barton? 
A. No. He told me that he had no right to those, those 
had to be paid to the provider that provided the service. 
Q. Okay. And then if we go on with that paragraph, the 
very bottom of that page 2, it says, comma, "the subject of 
which are the recoverable attorney fees arising out of the 
Texas firms' representation of certain Barton MEI clients." 
Do you see that? 
A. I do. 
Q. Okay. And I don't know if you were an English 
major, but do you have an understanding, looking at that, that 
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the comma, and then when it says "the subject of which are the 
recoverable attorney fees" is a phrase that modifies and 
discusses what preceded it in the sentence? 
A. I'm not an English major, but that, in my mind, 
defines what it is talking about preceding the comma. 
Q. Okay. And setting that aside — because you're not 
a lawyer, right? 
A. No. 
Q. With regard to your understanding of these 
documents, did you ever have an understanding that you were 
giving up, by this language, "Barton Phen-Fen fees," your 
right to be paid directly from the clients? 
A. No. Because it defines in here in the settlement as 
attorney fees not client fees - or client costs, excuse me. 
I never gave up that right, I never have, I never 
will, as long as this will go. 
Q. You were asked questions by Mr. Jones about your 
deposition. Do you have it up there? 
A. No. 
Q. Let me have you go to — 
MR. MAGLEBY: If I could give it to him, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Yes. 
Q. (By Mr. Magleby) Okay. You were asked some 

































Do you recall that generally? 
Generally. 
Okay. I want to take you back to a question on page 
Jones asked you — before the question, he asked you 
the depo: "Mr. Fidler, isn't it true that that 







Your answer: "I don't believe it does." 
Mr. Jones: "You don't believe it does?" 
Your answer: "No." 
Were those your answers? 
Uh-huh. (Affirmative.) 
Now, Mr. Jones — I'm sorry, you have to say yes or 
Yes. 
Mr. Jones asked you - in your opinion, did Mr. Jones 
ask you the same question a number of times? 
A. 
Q. 
Yes, he did. 











Q. Nonetheless, you did your best to answer them 
truthfully. 
A. I tried, yes. 
Q. Okay. 
A. I'm not an attorney. 
Q. Be glad. Probably asked this; I've got it in my 
notes. Did you ever think Advocate's security interest would 
apply to the client cost side? 
A. No. 
Q. Was the settlement agreement a means by which you 
obtained additional rights to be paid for Mr. Barton's 
contingency fees and other monies? 
A. Yes. 
Q. By the way, did you have an understanding that 
Mr. Barton was entitled to receive other monies from the Texas 
firms that were not Phen-Fen monies? 
A. He could have. 
Q. Did he ever talk to you about the hip implant cases? 
A. The Sulser hip implants, yes. 
Q. All right. And at the time that we did this 
settlement agreement, did you have an understanding he was 
wiating to be paid on those? 
A. Yes, and that he could use those funds if he wanted 
to • 
Q. Did you have an understanding Mr. Barton did a lot 
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of television advertising and took a whole variety of cases7 
A Personal injury cases m several different states 
Q And you were - to the extent that they were covered 
by other monies " he could use those to pay you 
A Yes I was hoping he d get some big truck injury 
cases 
MR MAGLEBY That will be all Thank you 
Mr Fidler 
THE COURT Thank you 
Further cross examination' 
RECROSS-EXAMINATION 
BY MR JONES 
Q Just to follow up on the most recent or the last 
question asked by your counsel Are you suggesting to me that 
other monies " as uoed m the definition of Barton Phen-Fen 
fees would include monies from cases not Phen Fen cases but 
all kinds of other cases' Is that what you re suggesting' 
A Yes 
Q Okay When you look at the definition Exhibit 10 -
Exhibit 9 can look in Exhibit 9 or Exhibit 10 of the Barton 
Phen-Fen fees Let s look at Exhibit 9 (j) 
A Uh huh (Affirmative ) 
Q Okay I m going to ask you two things about that 
Do you see anything in there that would include — or 
can you point me to any language that would expand that 
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definition to include monies other than those due under the 
referral agreements related to Phen-Fen' 
A It — it — as we said before it defines them as 
recoverable attorney fees and that s — doesn t necessarily 
limit it to the Phen Fen 
Q Well let s see It says " arising out of the 
Texas firms representation of Barton MEI clients Do you 
see that' 
A I do see that 
Q And Barton MEI clients we re talking about the 
Phen Fen clients aren t we Mr Fidler' Okay 
A Yeah 
Q Okay Now the other point I d like to ask you 
about you said that you re not an English major but you 
believe the subject of which are recoverable attorneys fees " 
that that phrase modifies what precedes it in the sentence 
Do you see that' 
A It defines it as — 
Q Yeah Right And what precedes it m the sentence 
is the Phen-Fen referral agreement between Barton — or the 
Texas firms or any subsequent agreement between Barton and the 
Texas firms the subject of which 
What it defines Mr Fidler isn t it true that what 
it defines is the agreements - doesn t define fees or monies 
it defines the agreements under which we are to look to see 
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what fees and monies are due That s what it defines isn t 
it Mr Fidler? 
A Well you re trying to make me define that as client 
costs And in my mind it is not client costs it is attorney 
fees that — and so " m not — you know that s as much as I 
know on that 
MR JONES Thank you Mr Fidler 
REDIRECT EXAMINATION 
BY MR MAGLEBY 
Q Mr Fidler real briefly Turn to Exhibit 12 
And I 11 just - since this has been stipulated 
admissible I 11 represent to the Court and to the witness 
this is a Phen Fen referral agreement or a referral alliance 
agreement excuse me between GBS and the Texas firms 
And Mr Fidler if you d turn to the second page 
paragraph 8 Are you with me' 
A Yes 
Q And down there m the last sentence it says - or 
last - I 11 just read it 
As to the $2 million loan advanced by Williams & 
Bailey to Gregory Barton & Swapp said amount will be repaid 
to Williams & Bailey out of the first referral fees allocated 



























or hip/knee replacement cases " 
Do you see that' 
A I do 
Q Did you have an understanding that Mr Barton was 
working with the Texas firms on hip/knee replacement cases' 
A I — I know that yes 
Q All right And it s possible - did you think it was 
possible that Keith Barton was working with Texas on other 
cases? 
A Oh yeah 
Q Do you know whether or not -
A They do a lot of their litigation for them 
MR MAGLEBY Okay Thank you No further 
questions 
THE COURT Anything further for this witness' 
MR JONES Just one follow up on that 
RECROSS EXAMINATION 
BY MR JONES 
Q Mr Fidler the - if you take a look at that 
paragraph (j) you 11 - the Phen Fen referral agreement 
defined there isn t it true that that s not Exhibit 12' 
MR MAGLEBY Your Honor I didn t redirect him on 
this 
MR JONES You asked him -
THE COURT I 11 allow the question He could call 
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him on as his own witness, if he wanted, so... 
THE WITNESS: What exhibit is it again? 
Q. (By Mr. Jones) Exhibit 12 that you were just asked 
about was — is dated — 
A. Yes. 
Q. - that document is dated August 17, 2001. Do you 
see that? 
A. I do. 
Q. And would you compare that to the Phen-Fen - the 
Phen-Fen referral agreement referred to in the definition of 
Barton Phen-Fen fees? 
A. Yes. 
Q. It says August 6/8, 2002. 
A. Uh-huh. (Affirmative.) 
Q. Isn't it true, Mr. Fidler, that the Phen-Fen 
referral agreement referred to there is actually Exhibit 13? 
Take a look at Exhibit 13 and tell me if you think that's the 
agreement that's referred to rather than Exhibit 12. 
A. Now, I don't have a legal understanding of which 
exhibit you're - it just — m my mmd, it's - Keith was able 
to satisfy that agreement from his attorney fees. 
Q. Could I just ask you to take a look at the date on -
the date that Exhibit 13 was executed? 
MR. MAGLEBY: Your Honor, we'll stipulate that 




































JONES: Thank you. 
COURT: All right. Anything further? 
MAGLEBY: No, Your Honor. 
COURT: All right. Thank you, sir. You may 
you're resting at this point, then? 
MAGLEBY: We are, Your Honor. 
COURT: Mr. Magleby? 
MAGLEBY: Yes. 
COURT: All right. Just so you know, I do have 
an oral argument coming in at 1:00. Well, it's actually 
another matter. I don't know how extensive it will be. But 





JONES: I don't think I can do that in ten 
Honor. 
COURT: How long do you think you'll take? Do 
you have an estimate? 
MR. JONES: I can probably do it in 30. 
THE COURT: Okay. Well, why don't we get started on 
that and I'll have the bailiff watch for these other folks, 
then we'll see where we go. 
MR. JONES: And I'll - with the Court's schedule and 
mine, I'll try to shorten it as much as possible. 
THE COURT: Okay. Thank you. 
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MR. JONES: And with some indulgence from counsel. 
MR. HOFMANN: And, Your Honor, at this point, we 
haven't participated in the other questioning, but with 
Mr. Hashimoto on the stand, we would like to participate in 
the questioning there. 
THE COURT: All right. Just be - just keep in mind 
I have another matter coming and we're over time on this 
hearing, so, you know — and I don't want to have to make you 
come back next week, if we can avoid it, so... Okay. 
MR. SHORT: And, Your Honor, we can discuss this at 
an appropriate time, but I'm not sure any pleadings have been 
filed by Mr. Barton on this matter. I'm not sure it's 
appropriate for him to raise any questions in this matter. 
THE COURT: You may be right on that. We'll look at 
that when that comes up. 
Okay. All right. So you want to call 
Mr. Hashimoto, then? 
MR. JONES: I do, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: All right. Mr. Hashimoto, do you want 
to come forward, please, and face the clerk and raise your 
right hand. 
MARK HASHIMOTO, 
called as a witness by DAT&K, being 
first duly sworn, was examined and 
testified on his oath as follows: 
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THE COURT: Please have a seat. 
DIRECT EXAMINATION 
BY MR. JONES: 
Q. Mr. Hashimoto, what is your relationship to Gregory, 
Barton & Swapp? 
A. I'm the court-appointed receiver. 
Q. And just for the Court's information, do you recall 
when you were appointed receiver for Gregory, Barton & Swapp? 
A. It was May 2005. 
Q. And, also, could you briefly give to the Court your 
educational and professional background? 
A. Yes. I have a bachelor's degree in both finance and 
accounting from the University of Utah. I also have a - a 
master's in business administration also from the University 
of Utah. I'm a license CPA here in the state of Utah. 
Q. And what is your - could you give me just a little 
bit of your professional employment background? 
A. Yes. I've been employed by several firms in the 
area of forensic accounting. First it was with the national 
and international accounting firm of KMG Maine Hurdman. I was 
there for approximately two and a half years. 
From there, I went to work for a regional firm by 
the name of Nielsen, Elgren, Dirken & Company, was there for 
approximately ten years. From there, I formed my own firm by 
the name of Hunter & Hashimoto, had that firm for 
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approximately five years. And then since that time, I've been 
a sole practitioner with an affiliation with a firm by the 
name of LECG. 
During that time, I've practiced in the area of 
bankruptcy, insolvency, forensic accounting and investigative 
accounting, economic analysis. 
Q. What are your duties - why don't we go back to your 
appointment as a receiver. What were your duties as a 
receiver when you were appointed? 
A. Well, originally, it was basically to operate the 
ongoing firm of Gregory, Barton & Swapp. Effectively, there 
was a definition of receivership assets that I was to take 
control of and operate. And — and at that time, it was an 
ongoing, operation law firm. 
Q. Did you take possession of all the books and records 
of Gregory, Barton & Swapp? 
A. Physically, no. There was some agreements between 
the parties. Since we sold the auto practice, those documents 
and records to those clients were - were shuffled off to the 
Gregory & Swapp firm, who purchased those. With the respect 
to the mass tort clients, those documents were to be retained 
by - by Keith Barton and his associated law firm. 
The accounting records, I have, for the most part, 
in my possession. And that basically, I think, is all of the 
documents and how they were divvied up at the time. 
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Q. So you took possession of the financial and 
accounting records; is that correct? 
A. Well, to the extent that I needed to. I mean, there 
were some old records that I didn't actually take physical 
possession of. 
Q. When you say "old," were those several years or many 
years prior to — 
A. Many - many years prior, yes. And part of the 
agreement was that they would remain in place where they were, 
which Gregory & Swapp effectively took over the old space, but 
we would have complete access to those documents at any time. 
Q. Okay. Was one your duties to review those financial 
statements? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Did you do that? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Was one of your duties to prepare financial 
statements on an ongoing basis for Gregory, Barton & Swapp 
once you were appointied receiver? 
A. Yes. We have a monthly requirement to provide 
monthly financial statements to the court. 
Q. Was one of your responsibilities to review claims 
that were filed in the — in the receivership? 
A. That is one of my duties, yes. 
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Q. In connection with your duties as a receiver, have 
you reviewed - have you reviewed the proof of claim filed by 
MEI? 
A. I have not, in detail, reviewed that. We are 
currently in the process of still trying to pay out DAT&K on 
their claim, and so we have left the other claims, basically, 
to be reviewed at a later point in time, pending whether or 
not there are actually assets and funds available for those 
subordinate claims. 
Q. Do you recall, Mr. Hashimoto, if — the proof of 
claim is Exhibit 6. Do you have it up there in the exhibit — 
A. There's no binder up here. 
MR. FIDLER: Oh, Your Honor, I got it. I got it. 
Sorry. 
MR. MAGLEBY: Got to keep an eye on these witnesses. 
Q. (By Mr. Jones) Mr. Hashimoto, you have seen that -
that note - the note and settlement agreement attached -
A. I have. 
Q. - to that proof of claim before? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Mr. Hashimoto, may I direct your attention to 
Exhibit 14. 
A. Okay. 
Q. And do you recall this document, Mr. Hashimoto, even 
in its redacted version? 
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A. Yes, I do. 
Q. And, Mr. Hashimoto, is this the settlement agreement 
that resolved the disputes among the Texas law firms, the 
receiver, Gregory, Barton & Swapp with respect to the proceeds 
of the Phen-Fen cases? Is that correct? 
A. That's correct. 
Q. And that settlement agreement was approved by this 
court, correct? 
A. Correct. 
Q. Can I call your attention to page 2 of that 
document, the first Whereas. Do you see that? "Since the 
execution of the MEI note"? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Okay. In connection with this settlement process, 
was it necessary for you to determine what payments had been 
made on that MEI note? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And I'd ask you to take a look, then, at Exhibit 18. 
A. Okay. 
Q. Do you recognize this document? 
A. I do. 
Q. Is it a document - is this the document - does this 
document reflect the payments that were made on the MEI note 
that were - we just looked at in the settlement agreement? 
A. Yes. This is an accounting that was actually 
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provided by Williams Bailey which documented the payments that 
they made — 
Q. Okay. 
A. - to MEI. 
Q. And in that accounting, did you determine what 
portion of those payments were withheld from the client 
portion of the recoveries? 
A. Well, I do know the amount that was - that was 
accounted for that was withheld from client recoveries, yes. 
Q. And is that amount that's reflected xn the 
settlement agreement that we just looked at in that - at the 
top of page 2 where it says "...of which only $87,974.16 was 
recovered from client settlements"? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And then that foots, does it not, to Exhibit 18, 
which has the same number recovered from prior settlements? 
Do you see that? 
A. Yes, I do. 
MR. JONES: Your Honor, I'd move for admission of 
Exhibit 18. It is not stipulated to. 
THE COURT: Any objection? 
Hearing none, it's — 
MR. HOFMANN: No objection, Your Honor. 
Q. (By Mr. Jones) Now, Mr. Hashimoto, in - if only 
$87,974,16 came from the client portion of the settlements to 
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make these payments under the MEI note, do you know where the 
other monies came from? 
A. I — it came from Williams Bailey. 
Q. And did you have to - m trying to figure out what 
Williams Bailey owed Gregory, Barton & Swapp under the 
referral agreement, did you have to account for those monies? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And what was the effect of the fact that Williams 
Bailey had made these payments of monies, $284,000 and change 
not from client recovery, what was the effect on the 
receivership estate, the amount Gregory Barton received -
Gregory, Barton & Swapp received from the settlement? 
A. There was a deduction from the amount that we 
ultimately received from the Phen-Fen settlements. 
Q. And if there hadn't been that deduction and that 
money had been paid to Gregory, Barton & Swapp, or paid to you 
as receiver, would you have in turn paid that money to DAT&K? 
A. Yes, I would have. 
Q. And that would have been because that money would 
have been subject to DAT&K's security agreement, correct? 
A. Exactly. 
Q. Mr. Hashimoto, I'm going to ask you to take a look 
at an exhibit that's been marked for identification but not 
stipulated to, and that's Exhibit 19. 
A. Okay. 
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Q. Did you prepare this exhibit? 
A. I did. 
Q. Could you explain to the Court what this exhibit 
tells us? 
A. This is an exhibit that summarizes the amounts 
withheld from client settlements for MEI versus the amounts 
that were paid to MEI. 
Q. So if I take a look at — at the first column, 
Amounts Withheld From Client Settlements -
A. Yes. 
Q. — is that the total amount of dollars that were 
withheld from client settlements for the work done by MEI? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Okay. So that's the total amount. It's a million 
seventy dollars, five seventeen sixteen, correct? 
A. Correct. 
Q. And then I look at the settle - the second column 
and I look at the total dollars that had been paid to MEI. Do 
you see that? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Those match, do they not? 
A. They do. 
Q. And so MEI has received a sum equal to the entire 
amount withheld from the client portion of the recoveries. 
A. Yes. 
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Q. Now, if they received any other money other than the 
payments they've already received, that, m effect, has to 
come from another source, does it not, Mr. Hashimoto? 
A. Yes, it would. 
Q. That other source would be the monies that otherwise 
would have been paid Gregory, Barton & Swapp, correct? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And, m turn, would have been paid to DAT&K pursuant 
to its security agreement; is that correct? 
A. I believe so, yeah. 
MR. JONES: Move for admission of Exhibit 19. 
THE COURT: Any objection? 
MR. HOFMANN: No objection, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: It will be admitted. 
Q. (By Mr. Jones) Try to finish then. 
I have one final question, Mr. Hashimoto. 
In connection with your review of the books and 
records, the financial statements of - of Gregory, Barton & 
Swapp, do you know how Gregory, Barton & Swapp accounted for 
their obligations to MEI? We've heard some earlier testimony 
that - we heard some earlier testimony that invoices were 
delivered by MEI to Gregory, Barton & Swapp on a monthly basis 
but those were not paid. 
How were they accounted for on the books and records 



























A. They were booked as an expense, contract labor and 
included as part of their accounts payable. 
Q. So that was an obligation that they had, they booked 
it in the accounts payable money they owed to MEI; is that 
correct? 
A. That's the way it was accounted on their general 
ledger. 
Q. And if money came in from a client recovery, money 
came in, how was that accounted for? 
A. It was accounted for as part of the gross revenue of 
Gregory, Barton & Swapp. 
Q. So the monies that came in, whether they were 
attorneys fees or whether they're client recovery costs, they 
were all accounted for as income to Gregory, Barton & Swapp; 
is that correct? 
A. That's correct. 
MR. JONES: I have no further questions, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Thank you. 
Mr. Hofmann? 
CROSS-EXAMINATION 
BY Mr. Hofmann: 
Q. Good afternoon, Mark. I'm sorry, we've done this 








Yes, we have. 
If I refer to you as Mark, 
That's fine with me. 
I'll slip if I don't. 
Okay. 


























All right, Mark. 
You're familiar with — you're an accountant? 
Yes. 













And terms used in accounting? 
Yes. 
If I use the term "payment," do you know what that 
an accounting sense? 
Yes. 
What does it mean? 
Generally, a — a payment of funds, an actual payment 
If I use the term "incurred," do you have an 





It's a cost that has been - you've been obligated 
Is the terms "payment" and "incur" sinonomus? 
No. Not exactly. 
182 
Q. In fact, you can incur a debt and never pay it, 
correct? 
A. That's correct. 
Q. Do you have an understanding of the definition of 
the term "disbursement"? 
A. Yes. 
Q. What is that? 
A. In my view, it would be the actual payment of funds. 
Q. Would the terms "disbursement" and "payment" be 
synonymus? 
A. Yes, I think so. 
Q. Would you have a definition of reimbursement? 
A. Yes. I mean, it's not necessarily an accounting 
term, but a general definition, I would say that somebody's 
being repaid for — for a cost. 
Q. Would you agree with me that someone's being repaid 
for something paid or disbursed? 
A. Sure. Could be. 
Q. In fact, you — it's a condition precedent to a 
reimbursement to make a disbursement, correct? 
A. Yes, I - I think so. 
Q. And if I look at the term "advanced," as advanced 
costs under generally accepted accounting principles, how 
would you define that term? 
A. A cost that's been advanced to another party. 
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Q. I just briefly pulled out my dictionary here on my 
little Blackberry, and I get, to quote, "pay an expectation of 
reimbursement as an advance." Would you agree with that 
definition? 
A. Yes. I think so. I think there's some obligation 
to reimburse, yes. 
Q. Now, as a receiver for a law firm, you understand 
there are rules that apply to keep client funds separate from 
law firm funds? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Have you tried to do that in this case? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Are there trust accounts available for GB&S? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And you've never used client funds to pay for 
incurred expenses, have you? 
A. No. 
Q. You've been careful about that? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And that includes client poriton of settlements, 
correct? Client gets this portion in, you don't use that 
portion to pay a law firm bill, do you? 
A. Correct. 
Q. Now, you understand that GB&S has incurred costs on 




Q. In fact, there's a large - a large business for 
automobile accidents, is there not? 
5 | A. There was, yes. 
6 | Q. And there were costs incurred for those clients too. 
A. Yes. 
Q. Accident reconstruction experts. 
A. Absolutely, yes. 
Q. Medical experts. 
A. Yes. 
Q. And isn't it true that, in the history of GB&S, when 
you reviewed it, such fees were deducted from the clients' 
portion for automobile accidents of their settlements? 
A. That's my understanding. 
Q. Now, if the law firm had actually paid those costs 
first, it got reimbursed for those costs out of the client 
portion of settlement. 
A. I think that's generally the case. 
Q. But if the cost had not been paid by the firm, then 
the costs incurred were paid from the clients directly and 
didn't go — were not paid to the firm. 
A. It was paid out of the trust account generally 
towards those costs. 
Q. The client portion. 
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A. Yes. 
Q. All right. In fact, the automobile business was 
sold, was it not? 
A. It was. 
Q. Who was it sold to? 
A. The firm of Gregory & Swapp. 
Q. And does GB&S, as a receiver, receive payments out 
of that sale? 
A. I did. At one time. 
Q. Have you ever required the pujrchaser of that 
automobile business to pay GB&S for costs that it never 
advanced, it never paid itself? 
A. Repeat the question. I'm not sure I understand. 
Q. The purchaser of the automobile business -
A. Okay. 
Q. — needs to make certain — needed to make certain 
payments to GB&S, correct? 
A. Correct. 
Q. And did some of those payments reimburse for costs 
already put out by GB&S for those cases? 
A. That's not how the deal was structured. 
Q. Did GB&S ever get paid back for costs it actually 
expended on behalf of those clients? 
A. Well, I think it was an overall total purchase 
price. We didn't really delineate — 
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Q. It didn't break it out? 
A. - exactly - it didn't break it out, no. 
Q. All right. Let's look at Exhibit 19. 
A. Okay. 
Q. Did you prepare this, I understand? 
A. I did. 
0- Now, the column Amounts Withheld From Clients' 
Settlement, that's simply the amounts that the Texas firm 
has - has said "These are the portion for these clients of 
their echo costs," correct? 
A. That's correct. 
Q. You didn't make that determination, did you? 
A. It was audited by me, but it was accounted for by 
the Texas firms. 
Q. And so that million dollars and seventy thousand 
dollars and change represents the cost for each of these 
individual clients in the aggregate for echo costs? 
A. Yes. 
Q. All right. Let's go to the - the right column, 
Amounts Paid to MEI. There's $601,000. That was the initial 
payment made before the promissory note, correct? 
A. That's my understanding, yes. 
Q. You weren't part of that settlement agreement with 
MEI, were you? 
A. No. 
187 
Q. You have no personal knowledge of what that $601,000 
was for? 
A. No. 
Q. Were you aware that MEI did what are called 
screenings as well as studies for clients? 
A. Yes. 
Q. You satt in today's testimony. Were you sitting 
there the whole time? 
A. I have been, yes. 
Q. Did you hear the testimony that the $601,000 was for 
payment not for full studies but for screenings? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Is it your understanding, though, that the amounts 
withheld from client settlements on your left side of the 
column is for full study work? 
A. I'm not sure exactly what it's for. 
Q. Because Texas made a determination? 
A. That's correct. 
Q. But when you audited it, did you not audit it for 
what the full cost study expense was for each of these 
clients? 
A. I don't recall. I mean, there were basically costs 
related to specific clients, and I couldn't tell you 
specifically if it was for full studies or original 
screenings. 
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Q. Did you audit all the costs that came out of these 
client settlements, whether or not for echoes? For any other 
purpose. 
A. Not every single one. 
Q. Were costs deducted for TV advertisements? 
A. No. 
Q. If, in fact, GB&S had expended monies for - for TV 
advertisement, so that have come - should that have been 
deducted from the client portion of the settlement? 
A. No. It was an unreimbursed cost. 
Q. If GB&S paid for a screening for a client that never 
really - I'm sorry, potential client that never became a 
client because it didn't qualifiy - he or she didn't qualify -
should that be deducted from these particular clients' monies? 
A. No. It was also an unreimbursed cost. 
Q. If some of that $601,000 were for screenings for 
potential clients that never became clients, should that be 
deducted from the hundred - that million dollars that was 
deducted from client settlements? 
A. For purposes of this exhibit, I think, yes. 
Q. The $601,000, if it's paid for a non-client expense, 
your testimony is it should be properly deducted from actual 
clients' settlement monies. 
A. Well, this schedule is merely meant to show what was 
withheld from clients that was reimbursable to MEI versus 
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payments that were made m total to MEI. 
Q. But in your - in doing so, you have made no 
distinction as far as payments made to MEI as to what those 
payments were for. 
A. I think that's, in part, why we're here. 
Q. But m your analysis — 
A. There was a — there was a priority dispute as to the 
remaining dollars that were left over here and that's why we 
chose to interplead it with the court and let the court make 
a fuling on whose funds those were. 
Q. I understand, Mark. But my question was: In your -
your putting this exhibit together, you didn't make a 
distinction as to what these monies paid to MEI were for. 
A. No. 
Q. And if they were paid for screening and not full 
studies, would that change your — your opinion as to whether 
they should be taken out of actual client funds? 
A. And, again, I - that's not the purpose of this 
particular exhibit. 
Q. And the three seventy-two, if those were paid for 
other than for full studies, would your answer be the same? 
A. Yes. It would be. 
Q. Now, the $97,000 figure on the right-hand column, 
that was a calculated amount, was it not? 
A. It was. Absolutely. 
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Q. And that was an amount calculated in order to make 
those two columns match. 
A. Yes. 
Q. Isn't a coincidence they just matched. 
A. Absolutely. We determined what that amount was and 
we paid that. That was undisputedly money that needed to go 
to MEI. Beyond that, there was a priority dispute as to who 
had a claim to it. 
Q. But do you have any personal knowledge as to whether 
the non-plugged numbers, the six oh one or the three seventy-
two, were client costs that should come out of the left-hand 
column or for some other purpose? 
A. No. That's - well, that's - in my opinion, that's 
exactly why we're here before the Court. 
Q. But you personally have no knowledge and have done 
no investigation of what those payments were for, correct? 
A. Well, I know they were for note payments and an 
initial payment related to the MEI obligation. 
Q. Well, there's a number of obligations that GB&S was 
obligated for resulting from Phen-Fen litigation, right? A 
Yes. 
Q. There was the TV advertisement. 
A. There was certainly some that remained outstanding. 
How much of that related to the Phen-Fen litigation and how 
much of it related to the auto practice, I - I don't think I 
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could break that out. 
Q. And did you look at paragraph 25 in doing this audit 
of the breakout between the two firms? This is the Supplement 
to Referral Agreement. It should be in your binder in front 
of you. 
MR. MAGLEBY: Exhibit. You said paragraph. 
MR. JONES: I'm sorry. Exhibit 25. Or tab 25, 
Mark. 
sorry. 
THE WITNESS: Could you ask the question again? I'm 
MR. JONES: Sure. 
Q. You had indicated that you kind of did this audit 
with respect to MEI's costs on the client cost portion that 
Texas was withholding. 
A. I did a general audit, yes. 
Q. Did you consider tab - or Exhibit 25 in doing that 
analysis? 
A. I remember there was a - I remember going through 
all of this stuff on quite extensive detail. Whether or not 
I specifically referred back to this while I was looking at 
costs related to MEI, I don't recall. 
Q. All right. Well, let's go through it real briefly 
then. 
Now, so I have your testimony, you had no indication 































Well, they didn't initially. We did ultimately. 
When that payment was made, that -
By - by a deduction of the amounts that Williams 





















We'll get to that in a minute. 
Okay. 




- $372,000 in payments none of that came from GB&S. 
It - well, again, it ultimately did in the end. It 
came from Williams Bailey, then it came out as a 
from the amounts that we received from Williams 
the end of the day. So -
I'm asking who made the payment, not how you 
it at the end. 
Okay. If you're saying who made the payment? 
Yes. 
The physical payment, Williams Bailey did. 
And Williams Bailey made the $601,000 as well? 
They actually were the ones that cut the check, yes. 



























should be allocated, right? 
A. Yes, we did. 
Q. Did you follow the procedures set forth in Exhibit 
25? 
A. I - I think we did. I think we went through this an 
attempted to negotiate this out with Williams Bailey based on 
the terms of these agreements. 
Q. Let's look at paragraph 4 on page 3. 
A. Okay. I'm there. 
Q. Okay. The first paragraph, 4(a), talks about this 
$730,000. That's not just the $601,000, that's other case-
related expenses, is it not? 
A. I don't know. I don't - it's been a very long time 
since I reviewed this document. 
Q. All right. But that's - from the fee portion, Texas 
has the right to recoup, right? That's the first thing that 
comes out. 
A. For unreimbursed costs. 
Q. Right. And let's start out at the beginning. This 
has nothing to do with client portion of settlement. This is 
only the attorney fee portion, right? 
A. Yes. I believe so. 
Q. Paragraph 4 has nothing to do with what comes out of 
the clients' portion of settlement, correct? 




Q. All right. My question is: Paragraph 4 deals 
nothing with the client portion of this - of - these 
recoveries. 
A. I don't see any specific reference to that, no. 
Q. All right. And we've used the term "client 
recoveries" before. And let me have a definition between you 
and I so at least we are on the same sheet of music. 
A. Okay. 
Q. When a case is settled and the defendant pays an 
amount for a client's (inaudible), that whole thing I'm going 
to refer to as the client's settlement — or the case 
settlement. 
A. Okay. Okay. 
Q. The client portion will be this portion that goes to 
the client, the attorney fee portion will be the portion that 
goes to the attorney. 
A. Okay. 
Q. Would you agree with that? 
A. Yes. That's fine. 
Q. So let's look at the attorney fee provision and how 
that - the portion - how that gets broken out. Paragraph 4. 
So Texas, to the extent it's paid up to seven thirty 






























Yes. Off the gross settlement. 
And out of attorneys fees only. 
No. Well, let me think about that. Yes. Yes, 



















Now, 4(b), to the extent GB&S has advanced any 
gets to be recouped those, right? 
Yes. 
But it's in advancing funds, so that paragraph never 
play. 
It did some. 
How much? 
I don't remember the exact amount, but there were 
we — that GB&S paid for and what we were reimbursed 
Nothing relating to echoes or this type of - nothing 
to our case here today, right? 
Boy, I - I can't say for 100 percent sure. There 
amounts — 
You can't recall any? 
Yeah. I don't recall. 
All right. 
The amount wasn't huge, but I don't recall exactly 
what it was for. It's been several years since I've been into 
that agreement. 



























a point where there's a reconciliation, right? A true-up, if 
you will. 
A. True-up meaning? Meaning what exactly? 
Q. A reconciliation of these attorney fee costs, 
attorney fee division between Texas and GB&S. 
A. Yes. 
Q. Now, you indicated that, eventually, it's worked out 
so GB&S paid a share of this. Is that through the 
reconciliation process you were - that's talked about in this 
agreement? 
A. Yes. 
Q. All right. And that's paragraph 6, is it not? 
A. Could you repeat the question? 
Q. You've indicated that there is this reconciliation 
process and that's kind of what you went through to determine 
that GB&S had a share of this - these funds. 
A. Yes. 
Q. Was that the reconciliation process we see outlined 
in paragraph 6 of this supplemental referral agreement? 
A. Yes. All of the payments that were made to MEI, 
one-half of it was deducted from the portion that was 
ultimately paid to us. 
Q. Did the actuals -
A. As Gregory, Barton & Swapp. 


























third to GBS, two-thirds to the Texas firms, correct? 
A. Correct. 
Q. But this process allowed for 50-50 for certain 
expenses, right? 
A. Yes. 
Q. But isn't it true that that only gets into effect at 
the very end, after the MEI note is paid in full? Correct? 
A. Well, that's how how it worked in the ultimate 
settlement agreement. 
Q. Isn't it true that paragraph 6 says: "Once the MEI 
note is paid off in its entirety, this reconciliation will 
then occur"? 
A. There was a lot of negotiation over this paragraph, 
and what was ultimately deducted out was 50-50 from - from -
50 percent of it was charged to us. 
Q. And -
A. Of those payments to MEI. 
Q. You've never given MEI that portion of the agreement 
so we can see how that was handled, have you? That was 
redacted? 
A. I don't know. 
Q. Will you look at Exhibit 14. Is that the - the 
settlement you're talking about? 
A. Yes, it is. 
Q. Is there any portion of this exhibit that deals with 
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why paragraph 6 was not honored? 
A. I think it was honored. 
Q. My question is: Where do I see in paragraph 14 
that's being dealt with? 
I'm sorry, I keep saying paragraph, Mark. Exhibit 
14. 
A. Let me take a minute and look through it. 
Q. Sure. 
(Pause.) 
THE WITNESS: I don't see the specific division of 
the - the payments - related to MEI divided 50-50 in this 
document. However, there was an attachment to this document 
which had the complete reconciliation of how the cash was 
ultimately divided between Williams Bailey and Gregory, Barton 
& Swapp. 
Q. (By Mr. Jones) That was not provided to MEI, 
though, was it? It was redacted as part of the redactions on 
this document? 
A. Appears to be, yes. 
Q. And in this record, we have nothing to indicate how 
that was done. 
A. It doesn't appear so. 
Q. And that was done - those redactions were done at 
the choice of you and DAT&K, right? 
A. I — I don't recall the exact process of why we 
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redacted what. 
Q. But isn't it true that the way the Exhibit 25 
reimbursement works, GB&S is only entitled to reimbursement if 
it pays over 50 percent of these costs to MEI? Correct? This 
true-up only occurs if it pays more than 50 percent. 
A. Well, the true-up's going to occur regardless. I 
mean, ultimately, there's going to be an accounting for all 
the MEI costs and it's going to — and it got divvied up 50-50 
between us and Williams Bailey, as agreed to in that agreement 
we were just referring to. 
Q. In the true-up, is there a - is there any kind of an 
event that would result in GBS having a right to payment from 
the Texas firms under this true-up? Some contractual right. 
A. Yeah. I mean, ultimately, it was - it was deducted 
from the amounts that were ultimately due us. 
Q. Under the way Exhibit 25 reads, could there 
potentially have come a time that GBS was entitled to a 
contractual right to payment from the Texas firms for the 
reimbursement portion? 
A. Maybe I'm not quite understanding the question. 
Sorry. 
Q. I'm probably trying to speed through this too fast, 




Q. Paragraph 6. 
A. Okay. 
Q. I'm sorry, 7 now. Talking about the payment. 
7? 
Middle of the paragraph. "This reconciliation will 
be made by a payment of a sum from GBS and/or Barton on the 
one hand to the Texas firms on the other, or vice versa, 
depending on the application of the above-referenced factors." 
A. Okay. 
Q. So as a result of this true-up or reconciliation, 
one of the firms may owe the other firm some money. 
A. Yes. 
Q. And isn't it true the only way GB&S was going to be 
owed any money is if it paid over 50 percent of these defined 
costs? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Which it never did. 
A. No. 
Q. And would you agree with me the MEI note was never 
paid, the - well, kick in that reconciliation provision of 25? 
A. Well - repeat the question again. 
Q. The MEI note was never fully paid -
A. It was not fully paid. 
Q. - kicking in the condition of that reconciliation. 
In fact, if you look at paragraph 7, I stopped 
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reading, "this reconciliation will only occur, however, after 
such time that the MEI is paid off." 
Did I read that correctly? 
A. Where are we at again? I'm sorry. 
Q. Paragraph 7 on -
A. Yes. 
Q. - Exhibit -
A. I'm just trying to find the exact location where you 
were reading. 
Q. Okay. It's actually the second to last sentence in 
paragraph 7. 
(Pause.) 
THE WITNESS: Okay. And the question was? 
Q. (By Mr. Jones) Did I read that correctly? "...only 
to occur if the MEI note's paid off"? 
A. It just says "after such time," not "if such time." 
Q. "This reconciliation will only occur, however, after 
such time that the MEI note is paid off." 
A. I think it was anticipated that it would be paid 
off, and it obviously wasn't. 
Q. As we're right here today, it's not been paid off. 
A. That's right. 
Q. Do you see Exhibit 24 in front of you? Do you 
recognize what that is? 
A. I do recognize what it is. I don't think it was 
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produced to me in this exact form. 
Q. Was this information produced to you in a different 
form? 
A. It was more in a - in an overall spreadsheet that 
showed all of the client settlements, all of the costs 
deducted - yeah, it was more in a global sense. I don't 
remember it produced m this specific manner to me. 
Q. Do you understand what this document represents? 
A. I think so, yes. 
Q. Do you see over where it says Echo Cost to MEI? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Is this not the cost that was - this amount of the 
cost, was that factored into — the amount withheld by the 
Texas firms are the funds we're dealing with today? 
A. I think so, yes. 
Q. So if I take any one of these, last to the bottom, 
Anderson, Sandra, $953. 
A. Yes. 
Q. And that differs from the hold-back portions that we 
spent a lot of time talking about now. On the other agreement 
with MEI and the Texas firms and GBS, correct? 
A. I'm not sure I understand the question. 
THE COURT: Let me interrupt. How much longer are 
you going to be with this witness? 
MR. JONES: Five minutes. 
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THE COURT: All right. Let's go ahead and see if 
you can finish up and then I'm going to take that other 
argument. 
MR. JONES: Sorry. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
Q. (By Mr. Jones) Mark, let me have you turn to 
Exhibit 10. We spent some time this morning on paragraph 15. 
Do you see where the sum of echocardiogram expense hold-back, 
the amount of $1,420.65 is discussed? 
A. Okay. 
Q. That's not the amount that was calculated out of the 
client portion of the settlement for the funds we're dealing 
with here today, was it? 
A. No. 
Q. In your work as an accountant, have you ever seen a 
situation where one — or more than one party owes a debt? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Ever see a situation where one party has one or more 
ways of recourse to get the debt paid? 
A. Sure. Yes. 
Q. And if the debt's paid from source A, that reduces 
the liability in source B. 
A. Yes. 
Q. And if these two parties, A and B, owe the debt, is 
it appropriate in the books and records for B to show it as a 
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debt? 
A. it depends on who the primary obligor is on it. 
Q. If it's joint and several. If both owe it. 
A. it depends on the agreement itself. I mean, it may 
be shown as a contingent liability on the books, it may be 
shown as an actual obligation. It depends on the — the 
obligation itself. 
Q. Would you be surprised to see that obligation on the 
books and records of B as an account payable? 
A. Would it surprise me to see that? 
Q. Right. 
A. No. 
Q. And were you surprised to see the client costs on 
the accounting records of GB&S? 
A. No. I assumed it probably would be. 
MR. JONES: Let me just have a moment to see if I 
can just shorten this up, Your Honor. 
Q. Mark, let's do one more exhibit. 18. This is the 
spreadsheet given to you by the Texas firm? 
A. This is one of them, yes. 
Q. So I understand, your contention here today is that 
by this true-up that you've done in the manner we don't see 
because Exhibit 14 was redacted, you believe GB&S has, as an 
end result, paid some portion of these costs. 
A. One-half of this $284,000 figure was deducted out of 
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the GB&S side of the ledger. 
Q. Isn't it true, however, that if we're looking from 
an attorneys fees section, GBS's share would have been one-
third of that amount? 
A. There was quite a discussion about that and an 
argument about that. 
Q. And we don't have anything — 
A. As to — as to where it should be placed, whether it 
should be a one-third cost or a one-half cost. And that was 
part of the negotiation that ultimately took place in reaching 
the settlement agreement. 
Q. MEI wasn't part of that negotiation, was it? 
A. No. 
Q. And you have chosen to keep that information from 
MEI so it can look at it. 
A. Well, again, I don't know exactly how we decided on 
what to redact and what not to redact on the agreement. I 
don't recall the process, to be honest with you. 
Q. But this information you're — you're concluded that, 
for some process you followed, GB&S is incurring this 
obligation. The process you went through, would you agree 
with me, does not comply with Exhibit 25? On the 
reconciliation. 
A. I think it does comply with 25. There was 
ultimately an - an allocation of 50 percent of the cost to GBS 
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and 50 percent to Williams Bailey. That's what 25 agreed to. 
Q. And the process you followed was never disclosed to 
MEI and was redacted from all the agreements given to us, 
correct? 
A. The spreadsheet did not — was not produced, 
apparently. 
MR. JONES: Thank you, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Thank you. 
We're going to take about a five-minute recess while 
I take this other argument. Well, they'll be arguing for 
probably at least 20, 25 minutes. We'll see. It's - then 
we'll start back up on this matter, so let's go ahead and call 
them in, Cat, and we'll give them five minutes to try and get 
set up then. 
(Pause in proceedings.) 
THE COURT: Okay. Mr. Hashimoto, if you'd like to 
retake the witness stand. Let me note that those present when 
the court recessed are again present. And Mr. Hashimoto is 
still under oath on the witness stand. And did you have some 
questions Mr. Hofmann, or were you turning the witness back 
over — 
MR. MILLER: I turned the witness. I think 
Mr. Short does have some. 
MR. MAGLEBY: It's Mr. Miller, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: All right. Did I say Hoffman? I'm 
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sorry. 
MR. MILLER: It's okay. I've been -
THE COURT: Oh, I'm sorry. I had the wrong name 
down. Sorry. 
MR. JONES: Your Honor, we would object to Mr. Short 
cross-examining Mr. Hashimoto. We had this discussion before. 
Mr. Short represents Mr. Barton. 
THE COURT: Is Mr. Barton a party? 
MR. JONES: He's a party in the receivership but 
he's not a party to the dispute over these funds. 
MR. SHORT: Yes, he is. 
MR. JONES: He has no interest in these funds. 
THE COURT: Was he inter - has he interpleaded an 
interest in the funds? 
MR. SHORT: There's no interest to interplead, Your 
Honor. His interest is in the fact that he's the attorney who 
has some responsibility for the very funds that are at issue 
here and he's got some ethical obligations that need to be 
addressed that are different, quite frankly, from MEI's 
interest. And the last time we were here — 
THE COURT: Does that need to be addressed here or 
can it be addressed in other -
MR. SHORT: No. It needs be addressed here because 
what's being proposed is to divert client funds to pay GBS 
debts. 
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THE COURT: But that won't be - and the Court's well 
2 | aware that he has an ethical obligation to protect his 
3 | clients. Is that what you're trying to show here or what? 
MR. SHORT: No. We're trying to show that, 
actually, what is going on and what Mr. Hashimoto is proposing 
is to divert client funds. 
THE COURT: Well, I think that - I think that will 
be self-evident, if that's the case, if these are indeed 
client funds. But, so far, no decision's been made on that. 
MR. SHORT: Well, I understand that there's no 
decision that's been made on it, but that's the decision this 
Court's going to make. And by the time the Court makes the 
decision, we don't get to have a say if the Court doesn't let 
us speak today. 
And when I was here last time, you did indicate, as 
I recall, that we would be allowed to participate today. 
THE COURT: Okay. That may be true. I don't 
recall. 
MR. JONES: Your Honor -
MR. SHORT: I relied on that understanding. 
MR. JONES: Actually, I have a different 
recollection of that, Your Honor. What happened last time 
was, Your Honor, if you'll recall, these motions were both 
filed and noticed to all parties, including Mr. Barton. 
Mr. Magleby noticed his motion, I noticed mine, and there was 
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an objection period for people to file objections to these 
motions in the case. There were no objections filed. All we 
have are the — my motion, DAT&K's motion, MEI's motion, his 
response, my response. Nobody else filed a pleading. 
And I believe what Your Honor said last time to Mr. 
Short is, "I'm not going to let you participate in the 
argument of this because you haven't filed any pleadings and 
you haven't intervened in this matter and you didn't object to 
it." And you suggested to Mr. Short that, if he wished to 
participate, he needed to file something. 
Now, Your Honor, nothing has been filed. We've 
received no pleadings from Mr. Short at all regarding this 
matter. 
THE COURT: Let me hear also from Mr. Hofmann. 
MR. HOFMANN: Thank you, Your Honor. 
This is controversy over disputed funds, obviously. 
There are two parties that have made claims to those funds; 
that's MEI and DAT&K. Mr. Barton has not made a claim to 
those funds, he's not a party to this dispute; he's a witness. 
I'm not aware of any rule that would allow counsel 
to one witness to cross-examine some unrelated witness, and 
that's what Mr. Short is purporting to do here. And I think 
that's improper. 
THE COURT: How do we make sure that the clients of 
Mr. Barton are protected, I guess would be the question, if he 
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doesn't participate? Would you like to address that? 
MR. HOFMANN: Well, I think that that's the - the 
outcome of the Court's decision will determine that very 
issue. Either the funds belong to the clients or they don't. 
If they belong to the clients, then the clients will be 
protected. If the funds do not belong to the clients, then 
that would be the Court's adjudication of that issue. 
MR. JONES: Your Honor, there's really no issue 
regarding the clients. If I may address that there's no 
issue — 
THE COURT: Well, there may be. If the funds belong 
to the clients, if we decide that, I mean, I know they haven't 
interpleaded all the clients in this case, but if - if the 
funds - if the funds are the clients' then that would affect 
how the Court — you know, probably how the Court does this. 
Because if they're the clients' funds, unless Mr. Barton -
unless there's some proof that Mr. Barton was acting as their 
agent in assigning all of their interests over to DAT&K, then 
they probably aren't going to, you know — unless that came up, 
then, sure, they wouldn't be prejudiced. But if there was 
evidence to that effect that came out -
MR. JONES: May I try to address that, Your Honor, 
because — 
THE COURT: Yes. Uh-huh. 
MR. JONES: Because it's not the - it's not DAT&K's 
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position. There's no issue here with respect to the clients. 
Our argument is that the clients owed that money. 
It was originally client funds, they owed it to GB&S who, in 
turn, owed it to MEI. That obligation owing to GBS was part 
of our collateral. That's our argument. 
If the Court concludes that that is indeed correct, 
there's no issue for the clients, because the Court is 
concluding that the money was owed to Gregory, Barton & Swapp 
and properly would be paid to Gregory, Barton & Swapp and, in 
turn, to DAT&K. 
If the Court concludes that that money was client 
money and never - that GBS never had an interest in it, then 
that money would properly be payable, under their theory, to 
MEI because that was for the services incurred or provided by 
MEI to the client. 
There's no issue here regarding the client or client 
funds or ethical obligations. This is not an issue with 
respect to the clients, it's only an issue among the parties 
here. There will be prejudice however the Court rules to the 
interest of any client or any issue regarding ethical 
obligations. 
THE COURT: Well, now, but Mr. - the owner of MEI 
that testified. I'm sorry. Name slipped my mind for a moment 
here. 
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MR. JONES: Fidler. 
MR. MAGLEBY: Mr. Fidler. 
THE COURT: Mr. Fidler said that be believes that 
these clients owe him money for some type of an agreement 
there. Although maybe the statute of limitation on that has 
run; I don't know. But if he intended to go after them 
personally and the money went to DAT&K, that could affect 
them, couldn't it? They could have a - somebody could be 
going after them personally. 
MR. HOFMANN: And their right to even go after that 
money hasn't happened yet because the money's still sitting 
right here in the court. 
MR. JONES: Your Honor, actually, there's been no 
evidence offered of any agreement between MEI and any of the 
clients regarding payment. And if we look at the testimony, 
including the testimony I read from Mr. Fidler's deposition, 
he had — he testified he had no right of recovery against the 
client. 
THE COURT: Well, he's saying here today he does, he 
thinks he does. At least he's - I don't know if he's saying 
he has a right of recovery; he's saying, "I don't know if I 
can go out and sue them" or whatever m a court. But he 
thinks that they owe him this money personally, not just 
through GB&S, I think is what he's saying. 
MR. BARTON: Your Honor, could I just chime in for 
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a minute here to just being the attorney -
THE COURT: Well, let's let the attorneys talk, if 
we could, please. 
MR. JONES: And the other thing is, Your Honor -
THE COURT: I know you're an attorney, but you're 
represented, so... Okay. 
MR. JONES: I understand Mr. Fidler's testimony not 
to provide a basis for them to go after the client, but also, 
to the extent that Mr. Barton thought that there was an issue 
regarding the distribution of these funds either to MEI or to 
DAT&K, he had every opportunity, he had notice, opportunity to 
object and to participate in this proceeding, and he has not 
done so. 
THE COURT: Okay. Mr. Hofmaim - and I don't have 
the transcript of that prior -
MR. BARTON: Your Honor, may -
THE COURT: Don't interrupt me, please. 
I don't have the transcript of that prior 
proceeding. But is it also your understanding that the Court 
indicated that, if they wanted to participate, they were 
supposed to file something and -
MR. HOFMANN: That was my memory, Your Honor, as 
well. 
THE COURT: Okay. Mr. Hofmann or Mr. Magleby, do 
you - that probably wasn't a big - as big of a deal to you, 
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but do you have any memory on that? 
MR. MAGLEBY: I don't, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. HOFMANN: I don't. But it's my understanding 
that Mr. Barton, whose counsel participated in discovery was 
in the deposition. 
THE COURT: Well, that's fine. But, evidently, the 
Court said something about they wanted them to file some kind 
of a claim or notice or something. 
MR. BARTON: I wasn't here at that hearing, Your 
Honor. 
THE COURT: All right. Thank you. 
MR. HOFMANN: And, Your Honor, if I may, there needs 
to be some legal basis — 
THE COURT: Do you remember me saying that, that you 
were supposed to file something? 
MR. SHORT: That is my recollection and I 
(inaudible) did not. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. SHORT: I've been operating on the understanding 
that we would be allowed to participate -
THE COURT: If you filed something. 
MR. SHORT: No, not if. And that we would also be 
allowed to file something if we want. But the problem is 
we're putting a great burden on Mr. Barton to rebrief what's 
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already been briefed. That doesn't make sense. 
There's no legal precedent at all, and they haven't 
cited any, to say that when there is a hearing in a case where 
Mr. Barton is already a party that he can't participate in it. 
Just like any other case. If you have multiple parties, you 
don't need to file something to participate in the hearing. 
THE COURT: Well, I realize that, but this is not -
this is an interpleader action that's just been put down in 
this case. So -
MR. SHORT: Actually, Your Honor, there's never been 
an interpleader in this case on these — on these funds. 
THE COURT: Well, it's what the receiver's doing. 
It's the receiver's -it's the receiver's interpleader action. 
All right. How long you going to take with this 
witness? 
MR. MILLER: It's going to be very quick. 
THE COURT: All right. 
MR. MILLER: We could have been done by now. 
THE COURT: All right. That's - I'm going to allow 
you to ask your questions. 
MR. MILLER: Your Honor, I do have the -
THE COURT: - just because he is a party. 
All right. 
MR. MILLER: We have the transcript here, Your 
THE COURT: All right. What did we say? 
MR. MILLER: I'm going to as quickly as I can, Your 
Honor. 
THE COURT: Because I want to do what I promised I'd 
do. But let's -
MR. SHORT: And whatever may be there, we do assert 
that we've got a right to be here, regardless of -
THE COURT: But the Court also has the right to 
control the proceeding, so — 
MR. SHORT: And I understand. 
THE COURT: — so go ahead and read that. If we — 
did I tell him he could just file something if he wanted to 
or - realize we're all working on about a half-year-old memory 
here, so... 
MR. MAGLEBY: I think the short answer is we can 
spend time reading the transcript and agonizing over it. By 
the time we do that -
THE COURT: Well, but evidently, it's a significant 
point for the other side, so let's -
MR. SHORT: But there's no prejudice to the other 
side. 
THE COURT: Well, they think there might be. So 
let's take a look here. 
MR. SHORT: I would just assert that they need -
THE COURT: Let - let's - let's let them look. 
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MR. SHORT: Okay. I was just going to say, while 
they're looking -
THE COURT: Let's let them look and then we'll see. 
MR. MILLER: Your Honor, I believe I found the 
section, if that helps. 
THE COURT: Great. That would be great. 
MR. MILLER: Starting at page 52 - I'll just read 
it, if that's okay. 
THE COURT: Sure. 
MR. MILLER: "Mr. Short: Your Honor, may I be heard 
on this as well? I realize I'm not -
"THE COURT: You're not a party here and I'm not going to 
let you be heard until I've heard from the parties, okay? 
"Okay. 
"THE COURT: You are well - well, you - you are a party. 
"That's what I was saying, Your Honor, that I'm not a 
party. 
"THE COURT: But you are. You haven't filed any - you 
haven't filed any appearance or motions or anything like that 
or papers, so I'll hear from you later. Let me hear from 
these gents first, okay?" 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. MILLER: So it would appear to me as you're 
saying "Let me hear from these guys first, then you." 
THE COURT: But did we say anything after that about 
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today's hearing? 
MR. MILLER: I don't see it. 
It appeared to be a — just a timing issue. You 
wanted to hear from these gentlemen first, then Mr. Short. 
THE COURT: All right. Okay. 
MR. MILLER: But, again, I -
THE COURT: All right. Well, I'm going to go ahead 
and let Mr. Short proceed. If you come across something 
there, let me know. But let's try and keep it brief. 
MR. SHORT: Okay. 
CROSS-EXAMINATION 
BY MR. SHORT: 
Q. Mr. Hashimoto, prior to being appointed as the 
receiver in this case, have you ever been a receiver for a law 
firm? 
A. No, I have not. 
Q. Did you have any prior experience with the duties of 
a law firm to their clients as to safeguarding their client 
funds? 
A. Only to the extent that I have been - that I've had 
counsel help me through that. 
Q. So but you personally have no prior experience? 
A. No. 




Q. Okay. Now, do you have a duty under your 
receivership order to the clients of Gregory, Barton & Swapp? 
A. Yeah. There is mention to that, yes. 
Q. What is your understanding of that duty? 
A. That there is a duty to protect the clients. 
Q. So the decision as to whether or not to take money 
out of their settlements was made by you? 
A. There was a disputed action here. I've interpled 
the money to the Court for the Court to decide, ultimately, 
where that money needs to go. 
Q. And that's -
A. I - I wasn't going to make that legal determination. 
Q. And that's not the question I'm asking you. I'm 
asking about the decision when Williams Bailey and the other 
Texas law firms did their settlements with the clients, there 
was approximately $1 million withheld from those clients, 
correct? 
A. Approximately, yes. 
Q. And did you give the authorization to withhold that 
money on behalf of GBS? 
A. No. That was operative through agreements that were 
previously made. 
Q. So you did not independently review whether or not | 
it was appropriate to take that money out of the GBS clients' 
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accounts? 
A. I just said I didn't authorize that specifically. 
There's — the operative language is in the agreements that 
were previously entered into between Gregory, Barton & Swapp 
and the Texas firms. 
Q. And what I'm asking is, before that money was 
withdrawn from - or withheld from those clients in the 
distribution to the clients, did you review whether those 
monies could be withheld? 
A. I only got review of that after the fact. Williams 
Bailey made that determination. They sent me an accounting of 
how that was to be - how that was accounted for and how it was 
handled. 
Q. And did you object to taking that money away from 
the clients? 
A. No. 
Q. Why not? 
A. Because I thought it was appropriately taken out. 
Q. It was appropriately taken out to pay MEI? 
A. It was appropriately deducted from the clients' 
settlement. 
Q. What - for what purpose was it deducted from the 
clients' settlement? 
A. Well, originally, it was for MEI, but then there 
became a dispute over whose funds ultimately the $442, 000 went 
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to. And so that's why we're here. 
Q. I understand that. But my question is just to the 
question of why was it withheld from the clients? Was it 
withheld from the clients to pay MEI? 
A. It was related to the MEI costs. 
Q. Okay. I'll ask my question again. You can answer 
it yes or no. 
THE COURT: Okay. I think we're - another law firm 
did this. He didn't do it, okay? So -
MR. SHORT: Well, actually -
THE COURT: - let's - let's move on, okay? We're 
not getting anywhere with this. Let's move on. 
MR. SHORT: Okay. 
Q. As far as those funds, then, where were they at the 
time that you learned about them? Where were they located? 
A. They were located in the bank accounts of Williams 
Bailey. 
Q. Was it located in their operating accounts or in 
their trust accounts, their client trust account? 
A. I'm not 100 percent sure. 
Q. You didn't verify where these monies were? 
A. I had no reason to. 
Q. Are you not the trustee that was supposed to be 
watching over these - the receiver watching over these 
clients' interests? 
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A. It's Williams Bailey's responsibility to deal with 
that. Ultimately, we got an accounting of how the monies were 
accounted for, what was owed us, and we got the proper amount 
paid to us. 
Q. Okay. So — well, you say the proper amount "paid to 
us." Has any money out of that $1 million actually been paid 
to GBS? 
A. Of the million dollars withheld? 
Q. Yes. 
A. No. 
Q. Okay. So that money -
A. No. What I was talking about "paid to us," I meant 
the overall settlement proceeds. 
Q. Okay. The attorney fee portion. 
A. Well, the attorney fee portion and whatever 
reimbursement of costs that we were to receive. 
Q. Okay. But — and so that's separate from this $1 
million, correct? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Okay. So from this $1 million, what then happened 
with that money while it's in the trust account of Williams 
Bailey and the others? 
A. $97,000 of it was paid to MEI, $442,000 of it was 
paid from Williams Bailey to MEI, and $442,000 of it was sent 
here to the court. 
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Q. So that $97,000 was actually from a previous round 
or a previous batch, correct? 
A. No. It was the overall difference between what had 
been withheld from client funds for MEI-related costs and what 
had already been paid to MEI through previous payments made by 
Williams Bailey. 
Q. And that's how you did this reconciling from before. 
A. And that's why we put the additional $97,000 to get 
them to exactly the amount - MEI was then exactly at the 
amount that was withheld from client settlements on Phen-Fen 
cases that was earmarked for MEI-related costs. 
Q. But you're saying there's still $400,000-plus 
sitting in the trust account at that time of that $1 million. 
A. Well, it's now sitting here with the court. 
Q. Okay. So that very same money that was withheld 
from the clients has been sent and is being held by the court 
right now? 
A. Yes. 
Q. So it was client trust money at Williams Bailey; 
it's still client trust money today, correct? 
A. I think we're sitting here trying to figure that 
out. I mean, that's what this dispute is all about. 
Q. Well -
A. I wasn't about to try and make a legal conclusion on 
that, and that's why I interpled it to the Court so this could 
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be decided m — decided in a judicial manner. 
Q. You understand -
A. I wasn't going to make that legal conclusion. 
Q. You understand the concept of tracing money, 
correct? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Those were trust account monies. Tell me how they 
changed from being trust account monies at Williams Bailey to 
the point when it comes into this court into its trust 
account. 
A. Well, I think it's an accounting issue, because 
what's being argued here is that some of these MEI costs were 
previously paid. And so it's merely being a reimbursement of 
costs to potentially DAT&K, which would have passed through 
Gregory, Barton & Swapp and then gone on to DAT&K. 
So it's — it's an accounting issue and that's what 
we're debating over today. 
Q. When that dispute arose, you then went back and did 
the accounting for each of the accounts to find out exactly 
what happened on each account and whether or not that money 
had been properly withheld from the clients? 
A. Well, there was an accounting that was performed by 
Williams Bailey that was sent to me, in terms of what was 
withheld from client settlements related to MEI costs. 
Q. Was the $1 million - one million seventy, et cetera, 
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on your Exhibit No. 19, is that the total amount that's owed 
to MEI? 
A. No. That's the total amount that was withheld from 
client settlements related to MEI costs. 
Q. Okay. Well, let's clarify. In the first column, 
that's the total amount that was withheld from clients, 
correct? 
A. Yes. Related to MEI. 
Q. But is the amount, then, in the second column the 
amount that was paid from client accounts? 
A. That is - not - not necessarily. It's the amount in 
total that was paid to MEI -
Q. And, in fact -
A. — from Williams Bailey related to MEI costs. 
Q. In fact, is not MEI owed more than $1 million? 
A. Yes, I believe they are. 
Q. So you have taken or are proposing that it's 
appropriate to take these trust accounts and use it to pay 
another obligation of GBS rather than pay MEI for which 
purpose those amounts were withheld. 
A. What I'm saying is there's a priority dispute as to 
those funds. And that's what we're now adjudicating. 
Q. Let's talk about the priority dispute. What 




THE COURT: All right, Counsel, I think you're 
getting into things that the Court's supposed to be deciding 
here. 
MR. SHORT: That's the purpose of the exam. 
THE COURT: Well, he's decided -he's decided that 
he doesn't know. He can't make that determination. So he's 
paid the money into court and we're trying to trace the funds 
to see whom they belong to. That's what we're trying to do 
here. 
So I don't - Mr. Hashimoto, it's probably not really 
productive to have him - to argue with him over why he has the 
funds here, because he said it's because "I don't know what to 
do with them," basically. Okay? 
Okay. Well -
All right. So let's - let's move on. 
Okay. Let me see if there's anything — 
And we're - no. We need to get this 
MR. SHORT: Okay. Just one last point. 
Q. Did you give any notice to any of the clients that 
you were interpleading their trust account funds into this 
court? 
A. I don't believe so. 











All right. Let's see -
MR. JONES: Just - I will be brief, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Certainly. 
REDIRECT EXAMINATION 
BY MR. JONES: 
Q. Mr. Hashimoto, could I draw your attention to 
Exhibit 19? We looked at it earlier. And while you're 
looking for that, do you recall hearing the testimony from 
other parties this morning that, at the time the security 
agreement and settlement agreement among MEI and GBS, do you 
recall hearing the testimony that Advocate's security interest 
was already in place, was senior and was in default? Do you 
recall that? 
A. Yes, I do. 
Q. Okay. So that was what the landscape looked like 
prior to that settlement agreement, correct? 
A. Correct. 
Q. Okay. Then let's take a look at - at 19. 
A. Okay. 
Q. If - I think you testified earlier that Williams 
Bailey made the payments of the $601,000 and $372,000, those 
payments, correct? 
A. Correct. 
Q. And those payments - all those payments were made 
pursuant to that settlement agreement, correct? 
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A. That's my understanding, yes. 
Q. Okay. What would have been the position of GBS had 
those payments, the payments that were made pursuant to the 
settlement agreement after DAT&K's security interest was a 
default, what would the result have been for GB&S and for 
DAT&K in terms of monies that it would have recovered? 
MR. MILLER: Objection. Calls for legal 
conclusions, part of what we're here for. 
THE COURT: I agree. I'm going to sustain that 
objection. 
Q. (By Mr. Jones) Let me try to rephrase it. In your 
calculations of how much was due GB&S and, in turn, DAT&K, 
what was the impact on that calculation of the fact that these 
payments were made? 
A. Well, ultimately, that amount was - at the end - the 
end result was the amount would have been higher. 
Q. And how much higher would that amount have been? 
A. It would have been — well, had we not paid the 
$97,000, it would be -
Q. Let's just assume that we paid that, because -
A. Okay. 
Q. Let's assume we paid that. I'm only talking about 
the $601,000 and the $372,000. 
A. It would be the $442,000 that we're currently with -
with the court now. 
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Q. And what would have MEI received, total, in terms of 
payment, including all the monies withheld from client costs 
and any other — what would MEI have received? 
A. Well, they would have received the million seventy 
thousand dollars. 
Q. Okay. And so — and they've been paid the exact 
amount they would have received had those documents not been 
entered into subsequent to DAT&K's security interest, correct? 
A. Yes. 
MR. MILLER: Objection. Calls for a legal 
conclusion. 
THE COURT: Sustained. 
Q. (By Mr. Jones) Let me - you were asked some 
accounting questions earlier, at the beginning of your 
testimony. I just want to focus on one of them. 
A. Okay. 
Q. You were asked about definitions for GAAP purposes 
of items like "advanced" and "reimbursement" and those - those 
kinds of things. Correct? Do you recall that? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And do you recall also testifying that, whenever 
GB&S received an invoice from MEI, they booked it as an 
account payable. Do you recall that? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Okay. And those hadn't been paid, they were just on 
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the books as an account payable, right? 
A. That's correct. 
Q. From an accounting standpoint, could a party have a 
right to reimbursement when they've incurred the obligation, 
put it on their books as a payable but have not yet paid it, 
if there's another party obligated to reimburse them for that? 
A. Yes. Yes. 
Q. Doesn't have to be paid in order for a right of 
reimbursement to arise, at least under accounting principles, 
correct? 
A. As long as there's the obligation, I think that 
would be the same. 
MR. JONES: I have no further questions, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Thank you. 
Recross? 
MR. HOFMANN: Try to be brief, Your Honor. 
CROSS-EXAMINATION 
BY MR. MILLER: 
Q. Mark, let me have you take a look at Exhibit 19. 
That's where we left off. 
A. Okay. 
Q. I just want to make this clear. The first column, 
then, represent monies deducted from the clients' portion of 
these recoveries, correct? 
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A. That's correct. 
Q. These are monies that would never have gone to - for 
attorneys fees in any event. 
A. Correct. 
Q. The amounts set forth in that column are a summary 
of a whole bunch of individual costs for individual clients, 
correct? 
A. Yes. 
Q. We saw in Exhibit 24, a Sandra Anderson, for $953. 
A. Correct. 
Q. Can you show me where the offsetting account for Ms. 
Anderson appears in either the $601,000 or the $372,000? 
A. It's looked at on a more global basis. This is the 
amount that was due MEI from withholding from client 
settlements and this is the amount that was ultimately paid to 
them. 
Q. It's not viewed out of the client-by-client basis, 
is it? 
A. No. It's on an overall basis. 
Q. It's withheld on a client-by-client basis, but 
you're offsetting general business expenses that are not 
client based, correct? 
A. It's not on an individual-by-individual basis. 
Q. And if I'm Ms. Anderson, you've taken $953 from me 
in the one column but I'm not getting credit for it in the 
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Well, that's, again, I think partly what we're here 
for. 
Q. But that's the effect of what this schedule does, 
does it not? 
A. It shows that MEI basically got paid an amount equal 
to the amount that was withheld from clients. 
Q. But the monies that - well, no. These are never 
monies that went to fees. The monies that came from these 
clients, though, are not being reimbursed on the other side of 
this column to any individual client. They're not getting 
credit for it all. 
A. Well, it's looked at - in this schedule, it's looked 
at as a whole. And that's the way we looked at it as well. 
Q. You're looking at it only in MEI but not in the 
client's perspective, correct? 
A. I'm not sure there's a difference. The money was 
paid, ultimately. Whether it's looked at on a client-by-
client basis, the money was paid. 
THE COURT: Counsel, this raises a question. I 
don't know whether you want to go into this. But you raised 
a question and, certainly, you could go into this as well, 
where we say "amount withheld from current client 
settlements," and then you ask "That wouldn't include any 



























We've got 40 - 60 percent going to clients, 40 percent going 
to attorneys fees. I'm just wondering if that - if he's 
taking that into account when he says that these are client 
settlements. 
See -
MR. MILLER: Let me ask. I -
THE COURT: - see what I'm asking you? 
MR. MILLER: Sure. 
THE COURT: You don't have to ask it if you don't 
want to, but I'm just -
MR. MILLER: No. That's fine. 
THE COURT: I'm just wondering. 
MR. JONES: Your Honor, all that money is taken out 
of the client portion of the recovery. So 40 percent — 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. JONES: - legal fees, you put it over here; all 
that money's taken out of the 60 percent remaining. 
THE COURT: All right. Okay. Thank you. I 
appreciate that. Sounds like there's agreement there. 
MR. MILLER: So as I understand - right. These are 
all funds that otherwise would be paid to clients if not for 
this. 
THE COURT: All right. Thank you. 
Q. (By Mr. Miller) Talked briefly about 
reimbursements. I thought your definition of reimbursement is 
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to be paid back for something already paid, correct? 
A. Well, I - I think it can be an obligation that's 
ultimately owed that hasn't necessarily been paid yet. 
Q. Did you not agree that incurrence is different than 
payment? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Now, if you've incurred a debt on my behalf, Mark, 
I can prepay that reimbursement by paying you now, right? 
Even though you haven't paid it. 
A. I guess you could. 
Q. And I've satisfied your incurrence of debt. 
A. Yes. 
Q. But I haven't reimbursed you anything because you 
never paid it. 
A. But if I still have the legal obligation, I can 
still be reimbursed for it. 
Q. And then, once I pay you for it, should you then not 
pay the obligation for which you're being reimbursed? 
A. Could. That's one way of dealing with it. 
Q. Is there any other way it could work? 
A. It could go in my general account and I could pay it 
with some other funds from some other source. 
Q. Can you imagine any way from an accounting 
perspective that you should be reimbursed for something you 
never paid, ever? 
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A. If I still have the obligation for it. 
Q. But you'll never pay it. 
A. Well, if I still had the obligation for it. 
Q. And you consider that -
A. Potentially. 
Q. - a reimbursement of the definition you gave to me. 
A. Yeah. I believe it would be. 
Q. A payment back for something you've already paid but 
not incurred. 
A. I thought we were talking about just the opposite, 
something that had been incurred but not necessarily paid. I 
thought that's what we were talking about. 
Q. All right. Well, maybe - let's make sure that we 
have the same definition. 
A. Okay. 
Q. A disbursement's the same as a payment. 
A. Yes. I believe so. 
Q. And a payment's something you actually make. 
A. Yes. 
Q. An incurrence is something - an obligation that you 
have obligated yourself to make but haven't yet paid. 
A. Yes. 
Q. And a reimbursement is payment to you for something 
you already paid in the past. 



























Q. Are you familiar with GAAP standards for advance 

















I - I honestly couldn't recite that off the top of 
no. 
GAAP is not tax accounting, is it not? 
No. Not necessarily. 
Different? 
It can be different. 
And in tax accounting, you're able to accrue 
and take them the year you accrued the expense? 
Depends on the type of tax accounting. There's 
ways of accounting for things. 
Assuming you're an accrual basis taxpayer; is that 
Yes. 
But if you re a cash basis, you can't do that. 
That's correct. 
Under GAAP, isn't it true that if I am going to take 







I actually pay — make payment for the goods and 
I can't take it in advance? Under GAAP. 
Repeat that again? 
If I'm going to take a GAAP charge in my financial 
, because I'm a reporting entity — 
Okay. 
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Q. - I can only take that charge when paid. Not 
incurred, when paid, under GAAP. 
A. I don't believe that's right. I mean, if you're an 
accrual basis taxpayer, you can - you can expense the item -
Q. For taxes. 
A. — when it's — when it's incurred. 
Q. No, I'm not talking about expenses. You can expense 
it off your financial - your balance sheet or your income 
statement, right? 
A. Okay. 
Q. But can you take the reimbursement until paid? 
Until you've actually paid the expense? 
A. I believe so. I think as long as it's been 
incurred, I think that's - I think - I don't know why. If 
you've booked the obligation, I don't know why you couldn't 
take the - the repayment. 
Q. And the basis upon which you take the payment is the 
fact you would make the payment to the third party. 
A. Ultimately, yes. But you'd have that obligation to 
do that. 
Q. And if you never made the payment to a third party -
what's the nature of the payment you received? Is it a 
reimbursement or something else? 
A. What are - I'm not sure what we're referring to 
right now. 
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Q. You owe Mr. Magleby $1,000. 
A. Okay. 
Q. I owe him $1,000 too. 
A. Okay. 
Q. I pay you the money because you — because you've 
incurred the debt. 
A. Okay. 
Q. You never pay Mr. Magleby, you pay Mr. Jones. You 
never pay Mr. Magleby at all. Have I reimbursed you or done 
something else? 
A. Are we talking about you and I owe the same debt to 
Mr. Magleby? Is that what we're talking about? 
Q. Yes. You've incurred a debt to Mr. Magleby but 
never paid it. 
A. Uh-huh. Okay. 
Q. I'm going to pay you that $1,000. 
A. Okay. 
Q. But you never ever pay it to Mr. Magleby. Are you 
saying that, under your definition of reimbursement you went 
through with me and under your understanding of accounting 
principles, not an expense, that that's a reimbursement? 
A. Well, what we're talking about here, Blake, is - is 
not the same scenario we were talking about before. 
Q. Stay with my scenario, please. 
A. Okay. 
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Q. Is my payment to you a reimbursement if you never 
paid Mr. Magleby? 
A. Well, maybe not in that specific situation. 
Q. And if these funds that we're dealing with now are 
paid to DAT&K, they won't be paid to MEI, will they? 
A. That's correct. It's a priority issue. 
Q. It's a reimbursement issue, is it not? 
A. I -
MR. MILLER: Thank you, Mark. 
THE WITNESS: Okay. 
THE COURT: All right. Mr. Short? 
MR. SHORT: I won't even bother to bring the book 
this time, Your Honor. 
RECROSS-EXAMINATION 
BY MR. SHORT: 
Q. As far as the priority goes, what priority does 
DAT&K have in the trust account funds? What claim? 
A. I don't believe they do. 
MR. SHORT: Thank you. 
THE COURT: Anything further, Mr. Jones, for this 
witness? 
All right. Thank you, sir. You may step down. 
THE WITNESS: Are we done? 
THE COURT: Did you have any other evidence you were 
going to present today? 
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MR JONES I do not Your Honor 
2 | THE COURT Okay 
3 | MR MAGLEBY Your Honor? 
4 | THE COURT Yes sir 
MR MAGLEBY We have two additional things Let me 
just tell you what they are and you can tell me if you want to 
hear them or not 
I would like to recall Mr Barton put him up there 
and ask him if paragraph 15 m the security agreement ever 
happened I believe he s previously testified that it did 
not But if we can get a stipulation for that then I don t 
have to call him 
THE COURT You re asking Mr Jones to stipulate? 
MR MAGLEBY Or if the Court can take judicial 
notice 
THE COURT Do you understand what this - do you 
understand what he s asking? 
MR JONES I do And 1 do not believe that s 
Mr Barton s testimony and I would not stipulate to it 
MR MAGLEBY Well I 11 put him up then 
THE COURT So you re going to call him to say 
22 | something different than what he said on -
23 | MR MAGLEBY I think he s - I think he s already 
said it but I m not clear if I asked him the question as 
plainly as that so I d like to put him up there and make my 
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record 
THE COURT Okay Now is this proper rebuttal? 
MR MAGLEBY Yes 
THE COURT How is it proper rebuttal if he said -
MR MAGLEBY In response to Mr Hashimoto s veiled 
although not direct testimony that attempts to support that 
somehow the money in the one column is money for another 
column relating to paragraph 15 of the security agreement As 
he says it s a priority issue I want to ask Mr Barton 
questions about the security agreement the priority issue 
and whether or not those events ever happened It would — the 
events that — 
MR JONES Your Honor all of those questions have 
been asked and answered 
THE COURT I believe that s - I don t believe 
that s proper rebuttal at this point 
What else did you want to present? 
MR MAGLEBY Your Honor couple more questions for 
Mr Fidler about the lien agreement I 11 make a proffer and 
you can tell me if it will make a difference 
Mr Fidler is prepared to testify that the 
contingency fee agreement and the lien agreement he knows 
that those were documents that were executed in conjunction 
with MEI echocardiograms because they were given to him by one 
of his clients one of the people who received the 
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echocardiogram That s why they have the MEI control number 
on it And the names were redacted because of HIPA and other 
privacy concerns But that he is a hundred percent sure that 
those were the actual documents that were signed in 
Mr Barton s office for his echocardiogram because he knows 
this client and he did her echocardiogram 
THE COURT Well he s already - he s already 
testified that people would have signed those when they came 
in for their echocardiograms right? 
MR MAGLEBY That s true but I think it gives 
enough foundation for that document to then come into 
evidence 
THE COURT And how is those — what is this 
rebutting m their case? 
MR MAGLEBY This is rebutting the argument that 
MEI did not have its own independent right to be paid which 
Mr Jones asked Mr Hashimoto about 
THE COURT Mr Jones? 




question Your Honor 
THE COURT 
with Mr Hashimoto 
I don t recall that -
I have - I did ask Mr Fidler that 
Yeah I don t recall that coming up 
MR MAGLEBY I believe the whole line of 
questioning is whether or not in this column versus that 
column 
THE COURT Well yeah I don t believe that s 
proper rebuttal either That s just bolstering what the — 
bolstering what you were trying to do on your original case 
All right Anything else you want to discuss 
before - before we decide how you re going to argue this? 
MR MAGLEBY Nothing from me Your Honor 
MR JONES Nothing from me Your Honor 
THE COURT It s quarter to 3 00 The Court was 
planning on having this concluded at noon The Court has 
another matter to take care of What I would propose is that 
counsel provide a written closing argument to the Court by 
next week something like that if you can while these things 
are still fresh m everybody s m m d And then I can - I can 
issue findings and conclusions on this case Any 
problem with doing that that you can see? That could - you 
could even email your arguments into Catherine s email if you 
want You know whatever you want to do In case there s a 
logistics problem with you being out of - both of you being 
from kind of out of town So - and Mr Short if you want to 
chime m on something too then you can 
But -
MR JONES That s perfectly fine Your Honor 
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THE COURT: Okay When do you think you could do 
that by, keeping in mind that the - I'd like to rule on this 
next week, if possible. 
MR MAGLEBY: Your Honor, I would like to - like to 
get it to you by Wednesday, but I'm afraid I'm going to ask 
until Friday, because I have other hearings Monday and 
Tuesday. 
THE COURT- Okay. Mr Jones, is there any problem 
with Friday as far as you' re concerned"3 
MR. JONES: There's no problem. There's no problem 
with Friday, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Why don't we do that? And like I say, 
if you want to facilitate expeditious delivery, you could 
email those m to Catherine and she can print them off 
MR. MAGLEBY: We will do that, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Okay. Very good. 
All right. 
MR JONES: Thank you, Your Honor 
THE COURT: Thank you, counsel. Thank you all for 
being well prepared today, and -
MR MAGLEBY: Your Honor, I'm sure I speak for all 
of us Thank you for working through lunch 
THE COURT: Well, I take it you have an accounting 
background? 
MR MILLER: No. Actually, I don't. 
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THE COURT. Oh, you don't? Okay I was going to 
say it's pretty agonizing to listen to two accountants talk to 
each other. But, anyway. Okay. 
MR. MAGLEBY. He's just -
MR. HASHIMOTO- I'll take that (inaudible) 
THE COURT But it was very clear. The testimony 
was very clear and I thank you for that. Okay. Thank you. 
(Whereupon, the hearing was 
concluded at 2:40 p.m ) 
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Pause204 5 207 1121216 
,.. 62412 
payment 30 5 9 13 13 31 25 38 4 
413 49232550964911664 
74 18 76 13 17 16 20 80 19 8122 
12 3 83 4100 18 107 1 108 18 
110 3 126 5 132 24133 7 134 4 
I36 1 137 2 22 138 10 16 19 139 
,17 25140 2143 9 187 1 5611 20 
22 192 11193 1196 9 197 16 19 , 
24 198 10 12 14 205 8 15 25 206 3 
218 19235 18240 24 2423 11 18 ' 
23 243 16 244 14 15 18 19 245 23 
payments 242 13 
'—"T»ents 31 4 34 24 38 14 17 
,.. 1216 16 20 2161 22 23 62 1 
5689116381011 1264614 
18 23 65 2167 3 22 68 6 73 13 
749217646898 20 999101 6 
102 4 109 19111 1013217 138 5 
1504 1725 151 5 180 22 1816 
10 15 182 10 19 1B4 13 190 22 
191 7 9 194 17 19 20196 7 8 198 
202 15203 13 204 7 229 18 
234 12 13 1515 1919 235 5 
pays 133 16 200 4 204 25 205 1 
pending 179 11 
people 17 15 24 93 9 123 16125 , 
3126 14 14221 163611 152152 
248 22 249 5 
per 9 13 
percent 2013 53224 65 1415 
146 18 201 11203 11204 25 205 
,1 206 12 211 25 212 1 226 7 239 
20 21240 8 11248 25 
percentage 65 17 
perfected 143 20 1 J
 - 250 22 
M 9 8 19 17 21 104 15 
,107 18 117 15 
performed 7 21 46 18 23 79 25 
10123 131 9140 10 231 12 
performing 19 13 112 14 140 6 
163 10 
period 152 20 215 2 
.permit 26 14 
permitted 70 11 19 143 1216 
144 11 
person 122 16 
I ,117 25 
r al 131 21616168 25192 
,16 195 25 
personally45 81164 15 128 16 
'129 18 22 22 138 24 196 6 218 11 
13 219 2 225 6 
persons 131 8 
'perspective 239 10 241 18 
—isimist 102 25 
,. ..sn 18 25 52 6 97 5 149 18 
PhenFen7 9 8 2 6 H 2 1 13 25 
14 2216 112023 23 12 14 27 8 
35 7 36 10 37 11 17 38 18 421 
52 14 15 1618 72 131519 73 1 
J77 3 5 12 17 88 12 116 6 13 121 2 
6122 18123 24 147 3 714 25 
149 10 14 150 3 153 19 157 20 24 
25 158 3 5 7 24 159 8 10 17 23 
1165 2166 7 168 13169 1414 20 
170 2 5 1120 171 15 72 120 
173 9 1011 151801218224196 
11 15 229 23 
phrase 142 24 148 14 149 10 
154 1 8 165 23 170 16 
physical 178 9 198 14 
physically 129 9 177 20 
- • - - • - — 1 0 5 2 physic 
ilainK/247 22 
plaintiff 159 3 
Plane 112 24 113 10 12 
[planned 160 6 
' - ' - — ' " 250 9 
115511 
,. 2156 
pleadings 47 17 175 12 215 914 
Please* 356 8 1525 103 5 11 
15157 8175 21 176 219919 
219 7 21245 21 
pledging 94 21 
plenty 35 1 10 5311 
plus 43 16 90 22 
pocket 81 25 89 13 95 4 109 21 
'110 16 1121 16 
pomt62789 15 25 22 26 23 27 |2 29 10 54 4 57 24 65 18 85 22 
88 22 99 20 105 14 107 5 109 16 
115 16 117 25126 4 133 24 140 1 
155 13 18 169 25 170 13 174 6 
175 2 179 11 201 20 222 25 230 
23 233 11248 13 
points 5 21 23 10 
policy 17 3 
ponton 189 8 
portion 12 7 20 5 64 25 66 12 75 
18 20 25 77 6 9 94 25 115 4 125 4 
15133 816134 19181 1516182 
9 184 10 189 9 10 190 3 815 191 , 
24 193 24 197 4 199 8 13 14 1722 
200 9 9101016 20216203 14 21 
20a 16 209 12 210 24 229-1 2 
237 17 240 8 
portions 208 19 
posed 44 14 
risrtion 71 5161431 14512 7 5 234 18 [positive 11 19 123 22 
possession 28 9 84 16 177 18 
'178 3 59 
possessory 53 
possibilities 58 12 
possibility 58 14 116 21 
'possible 34 20 51 19 80 12 120 7 
1727 8174 24 250 25 
post processing 118 2 
postpone 124 13224 
potential 11 1125146171637 
1218 194 2 8 
potentially 42 12 81 3205 14 
231 3 241 24 
ids 104 20 [practice 13 2 17 3 22 11 17 2710 
5067 1958 159761 1 4832 
87 13 109 4 177 21 196 16 
practiced 177 7 
practitioner 177 5 
pre 100 5 
pre-screening 9812100235 
preamble 44 23 45 25 
preceded 165 24 
precedent 188 72216 
precedes 170 16 19 
preceding 166 1 
precise 16 25 
predecessor 69 2 
prejudice 217 24 223 1 
prejudiced 216 24 
preliminarily 10 2 [preparation 140 25 25 
Prepare 26 16 178 22 183 12 191 
prepared 6 17 23 24 25 26 18 
1248 18251 17 
prepay 241 2 
present 78 6 7 128 7 15 22 25 
129 102022130 4 52121819 
246 22 248 14 
'presented 226 
presenting 160 8 
presume 28 4 
I pretend 145 25 
pretrial 5 12 
pretty 15 2 85 1225124 
previous229 131417 
previously 19 24 120 1 122 24 
127 1422691523122477 
VST print 2S1 11 
prior 17 7 22 1515 50 3 823 67 
1482 1210611 10841194132 
11 150 5153 8 178 11 1218125 
219 19 22224 22 225 16234 7 
priority 194 23 195 23 232.11 13 
14 246 31313 248 6 8 
privacy 248 25 
pnvlde70 18 
privilege 25 7 13 15 18 18 28 9 
16 22 23 6515 86 9 
privileged 27 23 24 28 18 86 10 
142 15 
Pro-rated 110 13 
probably 72 2 118 10 126 15 21 
129 21 138 24 143 22168 3174 
19 20519 210 15 212 12 21618 
22 220-4 2331 
problem 101 15127 3144 20 
2213 2501518 251 57B 
problems 46 24 
procedure 14 222 17 27 10 87 14 
123 16 
procedures 17 8 19a 21 
proceed 4 17 19 78 9 138 9 15 20 
160 13224 16 
proceeded 83 9 
proceeding 69 16 126 24 127 2 
219 1623 222 15 
proceedings 212 16 
proceeds 180 12 228 25 
process 9 20 46 25179 9180 21 
198 18 202 3 9 1223 204-21 211 
182021212.3 
produce 23 19 21 28 8 
produced 23 19 24 9 11 25 2 6 
2614 28262061272126 (productive 233 2 {professional 176 13 20 |proffer248l7 
prohibited 79 1 
prohibition 79 5 
prohibits 144 17 
promised 37 4 222 10 
promissory 29 16 192 11 
proof 61 1295 5 101 17179 614 
'1801216 20 
proper 24 24 88 23 228 15 17 
247 24 248 113 250 2 
properly 194 13 217 14 18 231 11 
I pursuant 32 13 64 20 70 4 97 23 
98 4 141 22145 21 146 9 15217 
18155 22 184 21234 1619 
pursue 24 11 
pursuing 36 18 
put 13417851 1153496 14 
'1139117 21 118 1212335191 
10221 13229 2123622 240 10 
247 51722 
putting 195 3 221 4 
250 10 
213 25 
,. , J2147232.7 
proprietary 79 10 




2310 415 23 
qualifier 53 22 
quality 194 3 
qualify 108 2 194 4 
quality 46 18 81 19 
' 78 2 250 8 
Iy41 21 64 18 74 9 18 20 
_. . .1015102 4 150 24 1514 
152 19 
question 34 4 44 13 16 47 12 48 
1049 155 924 25 58 8 68 4618 
69 1671 10 80 1717 85 19 93 21 
9415 98 17 23100 15104 9106 
15107 17 108 15110 4 130 1134 
,24 135 23 136 4 10 20 21 22 138 7 
139 1 144 8148 11 150 81513 
152 12 14 153 17 155 20 158 1 10 
,16 23159 14 160 25164 22167 1 
215 169 12172 25185 31913 
195 2 196 25 199 21 202 7 203 24 
205 17 206 20207 12 206 22 216 
3 225 25 227 13 14 17 239 14 16 |247 21 249 17 20 
questioning 175 3 5 249 24 
questions 26 25 44 9 14 55 12 13 
73977 2178 1981 1082683 17 
84 12883892818 91693 17 
'94 12,18971610218114 18 
,122 4 126 9153 15 25 154 5 159 
25160 17161201629163 22 
165 1 16614 22167 21 17214 
17514186 4 212 212221236 6 
i237 6248 71015 
quick 11 14 31 18 111 19 22122 
quicker 10 8 
lquickly15 22149 5 222 8 
quite 22380 12 110 12133 23 
197 10 205 17 2115 213 20 
quote917188 15 
14 1641 1317 44 161719 
511718 69 25 73 14 8120 
82 8 83 19 89 19 91 8 97 24 102 2 
113 21 116 71293513223134 
7 23 135 1619 21 138 6 142 3 6 
'1023 152 24 153 4 7 9 22154 3 
23 24 157 21 159 4 160 19 161 21 
162 11 165 2166 24 176 9 179 14 
,180 6193 12 19712 201 1314 18 
204 21211 18 214 17 19 24 233 
24 23424236 11 13 15 2475 
249 18,21 
"lna 26 23 
I recap 124 16 
receipt 50 1 g 83 5 
receive 34 23 67 5 9 68 16 126 4 
135 25 138 1016 19140 2152 16 
1619 155 2168 12190 22 229 3 
received 12 12 32 14 51 1 5 8 10 [68 13 71 24 101 20 13217 136 7 
,145 21 149 20154 2 167 4 182 
'2152 24 184 9 1213 198 8 215 14 
1235 17 19 20 23 236 14 244 19 
sr 4 12331355 284 23 
86 1 5160 11 17679177 11 12 
178 24 1795 180 11 1832188 20 
190 22 224 23 23 228 11 
• 221171818 
re 24 3 
Iprovide 42 2 48 11 50 21 59 10 
731920 74 9 84 2310515178 
25 219 12250 11 
provided 32 23 42 14 45 2 19 20 
2123 461049 20 23 50 8 56 7 
60 2425 7615 84 21 141 34149 
17 153 8165 12 181 10 204 12 
217 19 
'provider 27 14 16 90 7 7 8 14 95 
2125 1216512 
providers 26 8 92 2 
provides 65 20 70 12 71 4 11 14 
73 21 74 3 140 21 145 10 
providing 67 3 
provision 56 23 66 22 73 4 75 6 8 




led 100 6 188 14 
purchase 191 14 
purchased 177 23 
purchaser 1914 
purporting 215 25 
purpose 70 17 193 18 195 9 196 
32278232 1020 
purposes 194 11 236 9 
radio 10212 
raise 6 9 27 25 28 21 78 14 103 5 
175 14 21 
raised 25 7 20 28 22 239 15 
raises 23914 
rate 35 8 42 9 119 24 
rather 26 18 841 129 15131 16 
142 2017318 232 9 
RawlingB! 251101925111 69 
led 43 8 
Mng211 11 
, 5 17 11 2216 13 17 19 17 22 
20 136 1138 6 13 39 16 4018 
43 1950363 25 698755811 
'104 221119 122813211135 25 
136 10145 9147101581314 21 
,17121207 213218 20 22217 
223 14 
reading 42 18 72 22 74 23 111 6 
19 24 157 12206 25 207 8 222 22 
readings 60 20104 2111019 
111 1622114 12 
reads 205 13 
ready 417 
real 13 13 116 21 171 12197 13 
realae85 3 221 12 222 19 223 1B 
reallyS 1028 1746 12 7358022 
85 23 87 10 133 25 157 14 191 15 
,194 2216 112332 
resizing 85 21 
'reason 28 5 53 21 63 14 1341 
156 1228 9 
reasons 25 5 87 19 
" ef2214 
rebuttal 247 24 248 1 13 250 2 
rebutting 249 11 12 
receiving 146 9 163 15 
recent 16911 
recees77 2478 24 5 21210 
recessed 7a 6 212 19 
i recital 63 15 
recitals 35 23 
recite 242 24 (recites 45 23 63 15 72 8 9 12 
ireoive 68 14 
recede 84 23 
recognize 9 811 6 21 1730 21 
35 20 108 23 122 13 141 19 159 
811 1813 207 24,25 
recollection 8 21 87 16 98 11 
129 8214J3220 21 [reconciliation 41 10 201 2023 
1202 3 812203 7204 9 206 2818 
235520717 21123 
reconciling 229 19 
reconstruction 189 22 
'record 6 25 58 24 103 15 204 16 
I247 23 
recorded 14 15 
recording 118 2 
records 22 14 177 19 22 178 2 6 
8185 5 12 209 25210 914 
recoup 20 24 39 5 199 9 
recouped 39 13 22 40 2 76 23 
1200 25 
{recoupment 21 12 
recourse 209 19 
recoverable 66 8 91 7 92 12 15 
24 93 5 13102H 1218122 10 |147 20 165 16 23 170 415 
recovered 39 19 63 22 64 5 65 21 
90 2099 5 17 155 12 181 2225 
234 22 
recoveries 56 24 65 14 80-2 148 , 
24 151 11 1522154 310155 6 22 
15614157 21158 5159 9167 5 
181 1618 184 10199 23 2001 
23718 
recovery 53 9 25 55 19 56 4 64 
125 7518133 21134 3 1513515 
151 21 182 20185 20 25 218 21 
25240 8 
recross1Q219237 9 
Recross-e*amination 97 19 20 
169 9172 17 246 11 
recurring 108 2 
redact 211 17 17 
redacted ?3 15 62 21 180 7 203 
16 204 13 S2 210 23 212 4 248 24 
redaction* 204 13 19 
Redirect 81 13 15 101 1 3 160 5 
15 171 10172 22 233 20 
redoing 4^4 
reduce 67 24 
reduced 31 13 67 48 23 68 1213 
reduces 209 21 
reduction 68 7 19 
refelct 80 e 
ireler 31 8 79 16 105 9143 21 
144 12186 14 200 6 
16 1923 1213 30 9 36 
337 11 1720388396405416 
50 5 6518 83 5 100 19 108 18 
,._. ..14 135 19 156 13199 24 
referenced 38 9 206 5 
references 8 1 31 4 
referencing 41 9 42 17 99 14 16 
referral 35 21 38 19 39 14 67 5 
212468 1194 11216137 24 
147 814 25170 220 1711515 24 
172 20 173 101618215196 20 
202 13 
referred 8 9 13 15 74 20 132 5 
' - • 173 10161819711 
ng 37 9 45 10 58 20 59 20 
'9 2289 298 22145 8 205 
6 244 21 
refers 38 12 72 19 140 10 144 1 
147 6 2152167 4 
refleclted 84 5 
" B0 10 112 19 181 6 
, J 82283 12 84126113 
4 115 2014311 181 19 
reflects78 24112 11 12 
Irefresn 87 15 
refused 86 1 2 
, . - .__ 14 17 20 16 263527 B 
32 6 33 15 20 43 99125 95 6 25 
1015 106 24 114 16123 15 166 5 
.. 5 2 4 3 -
.. . 1 4 1 6 
42 6215 14 216 12 217 2155 
21819 21914 
regardless 161 8 205 2 222 13 
regional 176 25 
registered 107 22 
registry 21 7 107 23 24 
regular 111 21120 12 161 12 
Vefiabllftate8716 1
 • ""36 1537 7 38 2023 
1194 18 
reimburse 188 19 191 9 236 23 
reimbursed 19 25 36 19 58 18 
12 10138 22 190 7 2018 239 3 
2417101218 245 6 
eimbursement 58 13 140 22 
87 25188 8 16204 2454 205 16 
1229 3 231 3 236 10 21 237 2 240 
19 241 255 242 18 243 15 244 8 
20 2451618 23 246 4 
• ursements 240 19 
«29 17 
98 7 100 9 13 136 5 
d11 21 161131 22349 
35 13 4612 98 25 99 6 100 16 
36 25170 2193 13196 91516 
197 12199 5204 7 22716 231 
1419 23 232 4 
dates 16 10 
slating 36 10 10519106 8201 
10 248 5 
Nation 31 9 11 2298 24 
31 12 176.5 
, 1 6 1 6 
4314 48 16 
relied 214 21 
relying 225 8 
1
 102 23 24 178 13 
646 
196 14 
19 8 40-16 43 15194 
124 240 11" 
s 78 7 
, 26 19 42 9 51167123 
962597 131979920162087 
220 19 
rendered 44 15 17 69 18 19 ] 
rent 92 21 23 
repaid 84 10 171 24188 3 5 I 
repayment 94 3 244 13 
epayments 74 20 
••peat 34 4 121 161913202 7 
206 20 243 18 
repeatedly 43 2 B4 2254 
rephrase 148 10 235 2 
report 33 6 123 6 
reporting 243 20 
represent 13 25 16 14 25 21 31 
15 122 19135 13 171 14 237 17 
reprei 




33 17 18 52 21 
, 10919262088 
213 8 
request 112 20 117 16 
require 24 B 
1 •---•17 16 24 13 19025 
, jent 178 25 
reschedule 14 8 13021 
rescheduled 10 5 
m 12617 
•d1713 
re 5 9 
red 80 13 180 10 
espect 52 6 71 6 16 97 25 128 6 
36 17145 12 177 24 180 11 197 
1217523 
respond 24 17 85 1987 18 
response 44 16 47 19 56 13 69 7 
81 9 215 5 5 248 2 
responsibilities 179 2 
responsibility 54 13 213 18 228 
I responsible 20 4 53 8 
'—'15123 
rte 48 10 55 25 144 8 
ngl74 6 
It 31 17 68 6 19 97 9101 20 
116 1320582068210 24 234 21 
235 7 
• - • - '4721532 
Ing196 11 
• 143123356 
retain 119 18 
retained 177 25 
' 21218 
• 120 17 
39412401 121543 1349 25 
53 15 57 24 60 14 63 1 1222644 
71 4 74 17 75 25 80 5 82 21 83 4 
95 21992410011 12109710 
110 18 112 24 117 12 1512124 
122 29140 8144 419 146 16 
147 11 156 24 158 254 159 2 20 
165 4 1522170 6 17120173 13 
,181 21 2036207 15208 10239 
22 248 6 
scaling 5: 
scenario I 
ve 12 15 
return 33 B 11 
returned 32 25 
iue185 22 
M 46 4 153 7 178 17 179 2 
185 4199 18 226 101951 
reviewed 153 1017966811 
19021997 
right hand 195 14 
-'-Ms 34 6 10 125 12 15 22 126 4 
,.__ 131688 
Roger 4 9 6 20 57 19 64 19 77 16 
78 15135 19 157 7 
roiund 83 18 
104 21 123 21 130710 14 
evelt 105 6 
I roughly 201 
round 8 3 10 13 15 9 4 35 7 10 
105 16 19106 91216 1118229-
IS82620229 18212 
rule 24 8 24 25 25 3 26 14 28 5 
54 17 85 2186 412916135 4 
215 23 250 24 
ruled 124 9 
Rules 54 18 85 9 188 21 217 25 
218 1(3 
safeguarding 225 2 i l
laries 60 21 
, 10 10 15 10 20 9 2120 20 
22617 35 814 36 94822 9122 
93 13 101 8 102 10 118 10 146 11 
14911 151 16 159 8 167 15 181 
25 195 12 200 2 230 4 237 5 242 
911245 8 20 
Sandra 208 17 238 2 
satisfied 241 5 
' ' / 74 196 24 97 25 98 2 173 
21 
salt 57 20 192 22 
M571813 
14 3 91 1 2 238 2 
Isaying 49 8 96 5 9 146 19 164 1 
12198 12 204 1218 23 25 25 
219 3 220 19 223 24 224 7 229 25 
' 1 245 16 
Isays11 1815 141616 121319 
'17 31 136 7 37 10 25 38 3,14 17 
245 20 21 
! 9 9 49246089810 
,174 23 19415 238 22 239 6 
Scope 16 12521982 17 141 5 
screened 122 25 
screening 9 16 17 20 20 10 3 7 
11 1191214 191218131 324 
' 14 3 5 14 15 28 24 82 22 25 98 12 
1599 2010061102112 19 122 
1617 123 2 3 18 1313 5 137 23 
140 17194 1 195 6 
.screenings 9 13 14 10 3 31 16 23 
37 3 3 50 2 7 59 13 60 19 81 24 
836121598131062410718 
9101091013 19 20112 20114 
IB 10127 23 25 1281 11 13 131 1fi 
160 18161 9 192-201931 15 
194 7 






, . . .66 2 82 2198 2410612122 
8 145 10 1501 156 5171 17 184 
3 207 9 231 24 
retaries 123 1 
retary 131 3 
,__ ton 143 23144 1 13145 4 
2113 223 12 
57 2 94 2137 2 
secured 72 23 95 21 
security 29 16 33 18 34 6 23 59 
18 61 16 679112068969170 
I 1217 18734823 79 179946 
13 95 7 18 96 1552 97 10120 22 
12125 125 22 136 5 137 126 
,14121 142 7143 6144 523145 
21 22 146 B 10 149 9 151 1 6 153 
21 154 9155 19 159 7 163 22 
,164 1168 4 183 6 184 2123325 
234 2 20 235 24 247 6 248 5 7 
see 4 24 5 210 10 3 11 1716 8 
28 17 30 9 31 1 32 5 37 12 18 38 
15 39 7 40 2 44 24 45 4 48 25 50 
.5361056 2325 57 135586 
1011 151662 23 6334 1718 66 
22 69 6 70 813 14 71 7 72 610 
I I 13 15 17 20 2455 74 11 1223 
!76 1278 21 79 1389990 20 91 
16 93 15 25 95 23 108 19 25 109 
, : : ':"".: 1916121 211140 
511 143 13 144 1 3 145 8 14 147 
238150 7156 121518157 389 
164 23 165 6 18 169 24 170 6 8 9 
1717111722173 7174 22180 
1181821184 5199 24 20212 
203 15 24 204 6 207 23 208 10 
209 1 8 18 210 8 10 13 1623212 
,12 223 10 224 10 232 24 233 7 17 
239 24 240 1250 15 
seek 28 10 
seem 28 15 116 21 
emed8 8 
ems 85 12 86 7 136 19 
en 26 24 27 5 30 19 61 9 108 
179 22 209 15 
If evident 214 9 
mi monthly 111 10 
send 131 20 
70 20144 512155 19 234 
[sense 85 25187 2 208 6 221 5 
104 23 1091 13123 226 22 
J22912 230 5 231 13 [sentence 43 13 44 24 45 4 50 3 5 
79 13 80 5 8 122 9 145 10 156 20 
21 165 24 170 17 20 17120 207 9 
sentences 112 10 
separate 159 13 188 21 229 4 {separately 36 23 
Iseries41 12 85 6 154 5 
•ervlee 27 14 16 90 14 95 2 125 
12 140 10 165 13 
services 7 19 21 8 19 16 1317 19 
,19 19 2683223441517452 
119 2146 949 20 23 5219 53 21 
J56 7 57 4 59 10 12 69 18 90 7 8 
92 3 106 8 131 9137 25 138 2 
140 6191413 21719 242 23 
243 15 17 
set 6 20492277 24 97 4 122 24 
14918158 25198 21212 15 237 
123 
49 24 
setting 166 2 
settle 80 16 101 16 133 24 134 18 
,15124161 21 184 3 
settled 8 13 126 14 7 35 8 9 46 
'97 8 107 4116 241312124 
132 918133 6138 2151 19162 
12004 
settlement 11 21 12 514 6 719 
252056182610291623303 
62131 1425 33 1534281335 
13 38 10 40 2141 1125 4518 24 
,46 148 1 15 53 20 55 19 59 2122 
651920 70 473 17 77 7 9 84 15 
: : 1091297924 10041018 
10817 109 1 110 2113 8 13 19 
114416221151461161122 
1171 12551621 13316 1650 
134 20 135 19 136 5137 1 18 
140 4 14123 153 19 20 154 9 
155 9 156 4 159 716415 165 9 
166 9 16B 7 19 179 23 180 9 14 21 
11817 20182 22190 819123 |192 13 193 24 194 14 199 13 17 
200 6 750 203 519 209 12 211 11 
227 7 9 228 25 234 171650 
settlements 14 24 32 15 43 10 
163 162264 590 2099 518137 
" 154 2 167 4 181 22 25 182 9 24 j 
183 1720 23 189-8 190 4 193 4 17i 
194 10 208 5 225 18 226 2 229 23 
231 1419 238 8239 18 23 
|Since7 763 185 9 88 7 9018 99 I 
2171 13 177 4 21 18018 1997 
201 17 
slngle55 6 6 193 19 
slnonomus 187 11 
Sir 6 8 28 20 48 B 102 21 103 1 4 
'105 25 126 20 162 18 174 4 246 
,19 2471 
sit 123 21 
Sitting 52 10 64 3 192 22 216 16 
230 1310 
» 23 200 18 
| seventy 184 1 1925 231 15 235 
seventy two 195 11 196 2 
several 8 15 80 12 81 23 103 18 
109 18 129 2 168 25 176 21 178 
10201 172103 
lhall 39 13 72 23 24 95 21 22 
1215147 653 165 5 
2022102113 
shareholders 73 25 
sheet 51 20 131 3 137 24 200-2 
244 5 
1
 s13 1 
. en 174 24 210 17 
shortfall 76 21 96 19 
shouldn't 93 5 
, . . . 129-14130 3 194 15 209 25 
214452384 
showed 122 25 208 5 
showen 18 18 
• ..: .24 25 
shown 12 9 210 5 6 
'-"• vs238 24 
fled 177 22 
.20 172171326 1034 1111 
37 1022 3919 20 418 4310 83 
2125 89 22 94 22121 15165 9 
6851934211 1222 25 2232 
239 3 
sign 17 6 17 18 27 11 95 10 105 
'15 124 3125 3 130 818 
ilgned 1347911 17422 24 22 
,12 2124 22 27 14 1935 14 46 4 
5085565661163525 8215 
90689110 10 122 17 20123 17 
'124 24 13011 139 7 10 14018 
"" '313 148 14 162 15163 611 
249 1 5 
«15 6 
11823 222 25 
signing 161 14 
Similar 12 19 35 8 
'" iilarly43 13 
iple 55 24 94 14 
iply80 8 19123 
Ip 158 15 
Ipped 158 19 
p186 16 
poed 218-3 
,„W 177 21 190 18 20 
sole 177 5 
somebody 11 10 17 10 31 17 
'123 9 124 17 163 18 21812 1 Jrs1882 
13492484 
122 23 156 22 
S188 4 
7 16 
7 9104 5163 1315 
Somewhat 157 22 
• 1271 
. _r..jrs 107 23 
10 14 22 133237134-
'56 21 59 17 18 60-4 71 8 10 110 4 
17 812118122 1312416 143 
14 151 3 157 13 159 22 164 1854 
16711179-19186 10194 2196 
,23 197 1204 1205 18 25 207 3 
20942132452183 
•ought 88 18 
sound 105 16 
sounds 5 21 25 22 240 13 
source 64 6 184 14 16 209 2152 
241 16 
space 92 22 23 178 15 i .__
 1 3 2 1 5 
59 1379 3125 7148 7 8 [specific 82 7 157 8 193 13 199 24 
204 6 208 7 245 25 
specifically 80 21 1127 14711 
148 20154 4 193 14 19711226 
128 17154 6 
speculating B5 18 
speed 205 19 
spend 222 22 
spent 208 20 209 7 
split 55 2 65 10 
spoke 1378 
sponsor 283 
sponsoring 85 10 
spreadsheet 208 4 210 19 2126 [ 
stamp 15 8 
stand 78 7 85 22 102 21 1325 
174 5175 42121820 
"27 7 5213 24 
8 242 22 
lpoint 236 20 
_ 104 1019912 21213 
started 174 20 




, jtated 67 1 16216 
statement 4 21 6 4 50 1 83 5 110" 
25 13329 135225424320244 6 
merits 51 1235 83 12178 
18 23179 1 185 5 
,states45 19 57 2168 25 
stating 90 9 [station 1021212 
statute 218 9 
Stay 245 21 
-Itepl21 19 246 19 
itick 149 25 
itiR94 9109 21 128 2316311 
,79 9 212 20 218 15 229 25 230 9 
2419 10 20 22250 13 
stipulate 18 2213214 173 2' 
247 1018 
stipulated 10 17 19 25 18 1 2 10 
'19158212235 19434171 13 
DISSOLUTION OF GB4.S DISSOLUTION OF QB&S 
165 155217015 22 183 6 
subordinate 70 13 145 22146 10 
13179 13 
subparagraph 21 11 140 4 
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